Perspectives on Firm Decision Making During Risky Technology Acquisitions by Powell, Adam C.
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations
Spring 5-16-2011
Perspectives on Firm Decision Making During
Risky Technology Acquisitions
Adam C. Powell
University of Pennsylvania, adampowell@adampowell.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the Behavioral Economics Commons, Business Administration, Management, and
Operations Commons, Economic Theory Commons, Equipment and Supplies Commons, and the
Health and Medical Administration Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/313
For more information, please contact libraryrepository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Powell, Adam C., "Perspectives on Firm Decision Making During Risky Technology Acquisitions" (2011). Publicly Accessible Penn
Dissertations. 313.
http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/313
Perspectives on Firm Decision Making During Risky Technology
Acquisitions
Abstract
A novel survey dataset on computed tomography (CT) machine acquisition is used to explore which theories
best answer two questions from the decision making literature. First, what determines how much uncertainty
a firm has when investing in updated technology? Second, what determines the value of the acquisition? In
answering these questions, two theoretical comparisons are conducted. In the first, economic theory,
behavioral theory (the Behavioral Theory of the Firm and Prospect Theory), and Bounded Rationality are
tested as potential determinants of acquisition uncertainties. In the second, economic theory and Prospect
Theory are tested as potential determinants of the value of the machine acquired.
To answer these questions, hospitals were surveyed about the acquisition of their most valuable computed
tomography machine. From the survey data, support was found for the Bounded Rationality hypothesis; firms
have less uncertainty about an acquisition’s performance on attributes that correspond to more strongly held
objectives. Support was also found for the behavioral theory hypothesis; firms whose prior machines perform
below aspiration levels seek more uncertainty in their subsequent acquisitions, while firms whose machines
perform above aspiration levels seek less uncertainty. No support was found for the normative hypothesis;
acquisition uncertainty is determined by economic attributes.
In the second comparison, partial support was found for the normative theory hypothesis and no support was
found for Prospect Theory hypothesis. The value of the acquisition increased as the minimum lifespan of the
acquisition increased. Perceived revenue, operating cost, and financial factor uncertainty did not significantly
influence acquisition value, providing no support for Prospect Theory. However, greater uncertainty over the
acquisition’s ability to fulfill customer desires was associated with the acquisition of a less expensive machine.
Studies of the influence of uncertainty on capital investment decision making have traditionally focused on
financial forms of uncertainty. The results of this study suggest that the influence of uncertainty related to an
acquisition’s ability to fulfill customer desires may have an even stronger influence on the value of an
acquisition than variables related to the non-perceptual characteristics of the acquirer.
Degree Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Graduate Group
Managerial Science and Applied Economics
First Advisor
Lawton R. Burns, Ph.D., M.B.A.
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/313
Keywords
risk, uncertainty, capital investment, hospital, computed tomography, Behavioral Theory of the Firm
Subject Categories
Behavioral Economics | Business Administration, Management, and Operations | Economic Theory |
Equipment and Supplies | Health and Medical Administration
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/313
PERSPECTIVES ON FIRM DECISION MAKING 
DURING RISKY TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITIONS 
Adam C. Powell 
A DISSERTATION 
in 
Health Care Management & Economics 
 
 
For the Graduate Group in Managerial Science and Applied Economics 
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania 
in 
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
2011 
 
Supervisor of Dissertation 
 
Signature: _______________________________ 
Lawton R. Burns, Professor, Health Care Management 
 
Graduate Group Chairperson 
 
Signature: _______________________________ 
Eric T. Bradlow, Professor, Marketing, Statistics, and Education 
 
Dissertation Committee 
 
John R. Kimberly, Professor, Management, Health Care Management, and Sociology 
Howard C. Kunreuther, Professor, Decision Sciences, and Business and Public Policy 
Mark V. Pauly, Professor, Health Care Management, Business and Public Policy, 
Insurance and Risk Management, and Economics 
Harbir Singh, Professor, Management; Vice Dean, Global Initiatives 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PERSPECTIVES ON FIRM DECISION MAKING 
DURING RISKY TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITIONS 
COPYRIGHT 
2011 
Adam Cooper Powell
 Powell iii 
DEDICATION 
 
I dedicate this dissertation to Barbara J. Cooper, Ph.D. and Robert C. Powell, 
M.D., Ph.D. — my parents. Hearing them say their names on their answering machine 
messages many times inspired me to seek to become “Dr. Powell” as well. Furthermore, 
without the help of Joel B. Karlinsky, M.D., M.B.A., none of this may have been 
possible. Finally, I dedicate this dissertation to the faculties of the MIT Program in 
Writing and Humanistic Studies and the MIT Sloan School of Management, where I 
completed my undergraduate training, and the Wharton School of the University of 
Pennsylvania, where I completed my graduate training. Without the assistance and 
mentorship of a large collection of individuals, this would not have been possible. 
  
 Powell iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to thank my dissertation committee for providing me with substantial 
theoretical guidance. I give special thanks to my advisor, Lawton R. Burns, Ph.D., 
M.B.A., for his assistance in both this process and other endeavors. Additionally, I would 
like to thank John R. Kimberly, Ph.D., Howard C. Kunreuther, Ph.D., Mark V. Pauly, 
Ph.D., and the chairman of my committee, Harbir Singh, Ph.D. Furthermore, Joanne H. 
Levy, M.B.A., M.C.P. deserves thanks for guidance throughout this process. 
Two individuals not on my dissertation committee played a substantial role in 
shaping the course of this dissertation: James G. Barlow, Ph.D. and Philip Bromiley, 
Ph.D. They deserve acknowledgement plus additional thanks as well. 
No novel dataset appears out of thin air – the data collection process requires 
substantial funding and time. I thank the Mack Center for Technological Innovation for 
funding data collection through an Emerging Technologies Management Research Grant, 
the American College of Healthcare Executives, the Society of Cardiovascular Computed 
Tomography, and the Texas Medical Board for assistance in obtaining data, plus the 
Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center for funding the presentation 
of this research through a Russell Ackoff Doctoral Student Fellowship. Furthermore, the 
data collection process required the help of a number of individuals. I would like to thank 
Joe W. Kim for his assistance in contacting Texas hospitals. I would like to thank Goh 
Lay Mei, Chen Kim Foo, and Eunice Chen for their assistance in conducting the Texas 
and American College of Healthcare Executives mail-based studies. Their generosity 
never ceases to amaze me. Lastly, I would like to thank everyone else who helped me 
during the process – Jeff A. Barnes, Lisa Y. Chen, and Chen Han, and Jennifer Luo. 
 Powell v 
Additionally, thanks are due to all of the radiologists, radiology administrators, 
and radiological technicians who took time out of their busy schedules to answer my 
questions and to complete my surveys. In particular, the radiology department chairs of 
Philadelphia-area hospitals were generous with their time in providing qualitative 
interviews. Likewise, I would like to thank the principle manufacturers of computed 
tomography machines – GE, Philips, Siemens, and Toshiba. While none were able to 
provide me with access to customer data, all did their best to help. All of these contacts 
were facilitated by the support provided by Mitchell D. Schnall, M.D., Ph.D. 
For believing in me and offering me chances to grow as a leader during my 
graduate school years, I would like to thank David D. Lin and Shreedhar Natarajan, Ph.D. 
Also, I would like to thank my friends and fellow economists, Kei Muraki, Ph.D., 
JungJae Park, Tom F. Tan, and Naoki Wakamori, Ph.D., for discussing this research with 
me on countless occasions. 
Finally, America’s taxpayers deserve thanks, for funding the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality’s National Research Service Award (NRSA), which 
supported my studies. Similarly, The Wharton School’s departments of Health Care 
Management & Economics, Management, and Operations & Information Management 
deserve thanks for providing both funding and training along the way. 
  
 Powell vi 
ABSTRACT 
PERSPECTIVES ON FIRM DECISION MAKING 
DURING RISKY TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITIONS 
Adam C. Powell 
Lawton R. Burns, Ph.D., M.B.A. 
 
A novel survey dataset on computed tomography (CT) machine acquisition is 
used to explore which theories best answer two questions from the decision making 
literature. First, what determines how much uncertainty a firm has when investing in 
updated technology? Second, what determines the value of the acquisition? In answering 
these questions, two theoretical comparisons are conducted. In the first, economic theory, 
behavioral theory (the Behavioral Theory of the Firm and Prospect Theory), and 
Bounded Rationality are tested as potential determinants of acquisition uncertainties. In 
the second, economic theory and Prospect Theory are tested as potential determinants of 
the value of the machine acquired. 
To answer these questions, hospitals were surveyed about the acquisition of their 
most valuable computed tomography machine. From the survey data, support was found 
for the Bounded Rationality hypothesis; firms have less uncertainty about an 
acquisition’s performance on attributes that correspond to more strongly held objectives. 
Support was also found for the behavioral theory hypothesis; firms whose prior machines 
perform below aspiration levels seek more uncertainty in their subsequent acquisitions, 
while firms whose machines perform above aspiration levels seek less uncertainty. No 
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support was found for the normative hypothesis; acquisition uncertainty is determined by 
economic attributes. 
In the second comparison, partial support was found for the normative theory 
hypothesis and no support was found for Prospect Theory hypothesis. The value of the 
acquisition increased as the minimum lifespan of the acquisition increased. Perceived 
revenue, operating cost, and financial factor uncertainty did not significantly influence 
acquisition value, providing no support for Prospect Theory. However, greater 
uncertainty over the acquisition’s ability to fulfill customer desires was associated with 
the acquisition of a less expensive machine. 
Studies of the influence of uncertainty on capital investment decision making 
have traditionally focused on financial forms of uncertainty. The results of this study 
suggest that the influence of uncertainty related to an acquisition’s ability to fulfill 
customer desires may have an even stronger influence on the value of an acquisition than 
variables related to the non-perceptual characteristics of the acquirer. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1: Problem Statement 
 In every technology-driven industry, firms must repeatedly make investments in 
equipment. As technology advances, firms research new technologies in an attempt to 
understand the implications for their businesses. Firms must decide both how much 
uncertainty they are willing to have about various performance attributes of the 
equipment and how valuable equipment they are willing to acquire. While there a number 
of competing views on how this occurs, they have all largely been tested separately. 
Thus, there is no clear consensus on which of the theories model reality the best. 
This dissertation aims to answer two questions, which have been arranged as a 
two-stage model. First, what determines the amount of uncertainty a firm has about the 
technology that it acquires when it makes an acquisition? Second, what determines the 
value of the technology acquired? A number of different theories have been applied to 
both of these questions. This dissertation compares a selection of extant theories on the 
answers to these questions in order to determine which best hold within the context of a 
hospital’s acquisition of a computed tomography (CT) machine. Unlike much prior 
research, it considers the impact of customer desires as well as financial factors on the 
acquisition process. Given that national hospital spending on equipment and 
infrastructure increased 1,800% over the past 40 years, understanding hospital capital 
investments is rapidly becoming more important (Hartman, Martin, Nuccio, & Catlin, 
2010). 
 Powell 2 
 At least three competing perspectives exist on the determinants of the degree of 
uncertainty that firms experience when making investments under product uncertainty.  
The normative, economic perspective is to assume that the uncertainty in the decision is 
determined by externally-visible internal and environmental factors that exist at the time 
of acquisition (Achrol & Stern, 1988). In contrast, the behavioral perspective (Behavioral 
Theory of the Firm and Prospect Theory) argues that the degree of uncertainty a firm is 
willing to take on is codetermined by past performance, aspirations, and social 
comparisons (Cyert & March, 1963; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Finally, the Bounded 
Rationality perspective argues that the degree of uncertainty perceived is directly tied to 
the objectives held by the firm (Simon, 1947). Given these three competing perspectives, 
this paper aims to determine which one is most applicable to this context. 
 Likewise, there are at least two competing perspectives on the determinants of the 
value of technology acquisitions. Prospect Theory argues that uncertainty should play a 
role in determining the value of the technology selected, while the normative economic 
theory argues that the level of uncertainty should be irrelevant in determining the value of 
the acquisition. Instead, the normative theory suggests that the size of investments should 
be determined by measurable, non-psychological firm characteristics that influence 
revenues and costs. As no study of Prospect Theory using measures reported from within 
the firm has been conducted, it is unclear which perspective better predicts the value of 
an individual capital investment made by a firm. Using survey data collected from 
decision makers, this dissertation aims to determine which perspectives best predict both 
the uncertainty experienced during the acquisition process and the ultimate present value 
of the acquisition.   
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1.2: Choice of Context 
Not all industries provide an equally good opportunity for studying capital 
investments by firms. In industries where there is an oligopoly or monopoly, it is not 
possible to study a large number of firms making similar capital investments. Fortunately, 
the hospital industry provides an interesting and suitable context for the study of firm 
investment decision-making. In the hospital industry, many firms produce similar 
services using similar sets of equipment. Matters are slightly complicated by the fact that 
some hospitals have for-profit missions, which others have non-profit missions, and that 
the customers of hospitals pay varying amounts due to insurance variation. Nonetheless, 
as hospitals compete for patients in part on a geographic basis, it is possible for a large 
number of hospitals to undergo similar investments. While the hospital industry contains 
adequate uniformity for comparisons to be made, the hospital industry also contains 
variation that causes different firms to make different investment decisions. Some 
hospitals have obligations to shareholders, while others have non-profit missions. 
Likewise, some hospitals exist in highly competitive urban environments, while others 
are rural monopolists. As a result of all this variation, it is possible to examine how firm 
characteristics influence the decision making process. Through surveying hospital 
employees, it is possible to examine how hospital objectives and perceptions influence 
the decision making process as well. 
This study focuses on how hospitals acquire computed tomography (CT) 
machines because the acquisition of a CT machine is one of the single largest acquisitions 
a hospital makes. As many hospitals own multiple CT machines, they must go through 
this particular process over time. They likely go through a similar process when making 
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other capital investments in costly technologies. While other imaging modalities like 
MRI and PET/CT are rather close comparators, the issues considered by this study are 
likely prevalent in the acquisition of other technologies, such as electronic medical 
records systems, as well. Although this study is healthcare-specific, purchasing is a topic 
of general interest that has been explored in number of industries, including aviation, 
food, plastics, and manufacturing (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Puto, Patton, & King, 
1985; McCabe, 1987). 
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Chapter 2: Theory & Hypothesis Development 
 As this dissertation aims to look at the determinants of capital investment 
uncertainty and at the magnitude of a capital investment in the context of hospitals 
investing in CT machines, it makes sense to explore the literature by moving from 
specific to general. I will start by discussing what is known about hospital investments in 
imaging technology before exploring what is known about how hospitals make 
investments in general. Afterwards, I review the literature on the determinants of 
investment uncertainty and uncertainty-seeking and on the determinants of investment 
value. By Section 2.4, it will be clear that the vast majority of the existing literature on 
hospital investment is based upon the examination of externally-measurable economic 
constructs, rather than upon behavioral and psychological constructs such as perceived 
uncertainty and objectives, which are most readily visible to those participating in the 
decision making process. Section 2.4 explores gaps in the hospital investment literature 
for which only research on other contexts has been conducted. 
2.1: Previous Research on Investment in Imaging Equipment 
A large portion of the literature on the adoption of imaging equipment focuses on 
the decision to adopt, rather than the size or nature of the investment itself. Magnetic 
resonance imaging (MRI) has more commonly been studied than CT, perhaps because 
adoption rates have been and still are lower for MRI than CT. (As this dissertation studies 
the acquisition, given that it has occurred, CT was selected due to its much greater 
prevalence.) Hillman and Schwartz (1985, 1986) counted existing CT and MRI 
installations within the United States and attempted to discern patterns in investment 
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decisions and found that MRI was diffusing more slowly than CT. They speculated that 
uncertainties surrounding MRI technology, its medical utility, and its potential for 
reimbursement were hampering its diffusion relative to that of CT. Their speculation 
suggests that increased uncertainty on outcomes of an investment in a medical technology 
causes reduced investment. They authors further found that the Prospective Payment 
System and Certificate-of-Need regulation have both had a dampening effect on the 
adoption of MRI in hospitals, and have instead stimulated adoption by other types of 
organizations.  
Others have studied MRI adoption as well. Teplensky, Pauly, Kimberly, and 
Hillman (1995) examined the adoption of MRI using a series of Cox regressions. Each 
regression attempted to determine whether a different motive explained hospitals’ 
adoption of MRI. The motives considered were technological preeminence, clinical 
excellence, and profit maximization. These motives were picked, as they parallel the 
three decision systems which Greer (1985) claimed that hospitals use when adopting 
technologies: fiscal-managerial, strategic-institutional, and medical-individualistic. Self-
reported measures of motive strength, as well as measures of concern about obsolesce, 
uncertainty about the type of MRI to acquire, and perceived importance of being a 
technological leader were included in the survey. They found that the likelihood of 
adoption was most strongly explained by the extent to which a hospital had positioned 
itself as being a technological leader. All three motives examined appeared to be relevant 
in determining the likelihood and timing of MRI adoption. 
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Likewise, Friedman and Goes (2000) examined the drivers of MRI adoption using 
the responses to a questionnaire and found that adoption appeared to be driven by market-
related factors in California, but by physician championing in the Oregon/Washington 
region. The Oregon/Washington region was deemed to be a less turbulent environment 
than California, and it was found that organizational factors like size and decision maker 
influence played a stronger role in the adoption decision as a result. In a separate study 
that attempted to explain MRI adoption, Baker and Wheeler (1998) found that high HMO 
market share is associated with low MRI availability and usage—a finding they felt 
suggested that payers are able to influence the diffusion and utilization of technology. 
The hospital technology adoption literature also includes papers not related to 
medical imaging. Kimberly and Evanisko (1981) examined the role that contextual, 
individual, and organizational factors played in the adoption of both administrative and 
technological innovations and found that the likelihood of adopting technological 
innovations was greater in younger and larger hospitals. In a similar vein, Romeo, 
Wagner, and Lee (1984) examined the diffusion of a variety of new (non-imaging) 
technologies, and found that interstate variation in prospective reimbursement programs 
influenced diffusion rates. This supports the notion that a relationship exists between the 
probability of adoption and the reimbursement system in place. 
While the literature on hospital adoption of medical imaging equipment, and 
technologies in general, has closely examined the decision to adopt, thus far, it has only 
partially examined the determinants of both the value of the technology ultimately 
adopted and the role that uncertainty plays in the adoption process. As technologies such 
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as CT mature, hospitals will increasingly go from making initial adoption decisions to 
making replacement decisions. This dissertation adds to the literature by examining 
hospitals who are primarily deciding what to adopt rather than whether to adopt. 
2.2: Previous Research on Hospital Investment  
 Prior research on hospital investment has tended to examine how accounting 
variables such as operating costs and profit influence capital expenditures. The American 
Hospital Association’s Annual Survey has provided control variables to much of the 
empirical literature, enabling the easy study of the influence of hospital control type, bed 
size, urbanicity, and expenditures on capital investment. Additional efforts to gain data 
on hospitals to better understand their investment have centered on determining hospital 
revenue and profitability, two variables not reported by the American Hospital 
Association. 
There is an ongoing debate on the determinants of the size and nature of hospital 
capital investments. According to Anderson, Erickson, and Feigenbaum (1987), there is a 
conflict in the literature over whether a linkage exists between hospital capital 
expenditures and operating costs. Dunn and Lefkowitz (1978), Bentkover, Sloan, Feeley, 
Campbell, and Firth (1984), and Somers (1989) found evidence of a relationship between 
hospital capital expenditures and operating costs, while Dunkelberg, Furst, and Roenfeldt 
(1984) found little evidence of such a relationship. 
Adding to this stream of research, Ginsburg (1970) found that hospital investment 
is explained by religious affiliation, hospital age, hospital size, and the amount of cash 
and assets restricted for improvement available. Anderson, Erickson, and Feigenbaum 
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(1987) concurred by stating that hospital bed size, ownership, wage levels, case mix, 
teaching status, and government regulations can influence both a hospital’s capital 
investments and operating expenses. Meanwhile, Pauly (1974) found that hospital capital 
investment is a function of output changes and changes in physician net income. Bed size 
was more strongly linked to profitability than was hospital capital investment. 
The literature also explores how profitability influences the decision to enter or 
exit an investment. Wedig, Hassan, and Sloan (1989) found that the entry and exit of for-
profit hospitals is determined by reimbursement levels to a greater extent than in the case 
for non-profit hospitals. For-profit hospitals maximize their market value, which is 
defined as the sum of debt plus equity, while non-profit hospitals maximize the 
discounted present value of the utilities realized by hospital administrators, board 
members, and staff. For-profits obtain capital from retained earnings, stock issue, or debt 
issue, while non-profits obtain capital through retained earnings or debt issue. Cutler, 
Feldman, and Horwitz (2005) found that hospital profitability was not associated with 
computerized physician order entry (CPOE) investment. Government hospitals were the 
most likely to adopt CPOE, and for-profit hospitals were the least likely to adopt it. For-
profit hospitals were also less likely to respond to the Leapfrog survey on adoption. 
 Another issue that the hospital investment literature examines with some detail is 
the factors that determine the extent to which a hospital uses debt. Sloan, Valvona, and 
Mahmud (1988) found that the cost hospitals paid for equity capital was much higher 
than inflation. The cost of debt capital was far lower. Wedig, Sloan, Hassan, and 
Morrisey (1988) found that a higher share of cost-based payments was associated with 
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more leverage. Furthermore, they found that factors associated with a high risk of 
bankruptcy, such as earnings volatility, cause hospitals to take on lower levels of debt. 
Hospitals with greater percentages of their assets in tangible form take on more debt. 
There is also evidence that metropolitan hospitals take on more debt than rural or 
suburban hospitals (Anderson, Erickson, & Feigenbaum, 1987; Wedig, Sloan, Hassan, & 
Morrisey, 1988). 
As debt financing is more affordable and universally available (unlike equity 
financing, which is not available to government and non-profit hospitals), it plays a larger 
role in the acquisition literature. Government hospitals, however, may behave different 
than for-profit and non-profit hospitals, as government hospitals have a soft budget 
constraint, while for-profit and non-profit hospitals do not. As a result of this budget 
constraint, Duggan (2000) found that for-profit and non-profit hospitals are equally 
responsive to financial incentives and no more or less altruistic than one another.  
2.3: Previous Research on Firm Investment Uncertainty 
 While a rich literature on hospital investment exists, the extant literature largely 
focuses on readily-observable factors that are not psychological or behavioral in nature. 
Hospitals are but one type of firm. Fortunately, an even more varied literature exists on 
how firms make investments under uncertainty and on the magnitudes of the investments 
that firms make. 
 Although there may be other strands, I have identified three primary strands in the 
literature addressing the level of risk or uncertainty that firms take on with their 
investments (Figure 1). The first strand, the normative theory, has been developed by a 
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series of economists. Similar to the literature mentioned in Section 2.2, the normative 
theory examines how concrete firm characteristics influence a firm’s uncertainty during 
the investment process. The second strand, behavioral theory, examines how the gap 
between prior performance and prior aspiration levels influences a firm’s willingness to 
take on risk or uncertainty in an investment. This literature was initially developed by 
Cyert and March (1963) as the Behavioral Theory of the Firm, then was substantially 
extended by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) as Prospect Theory, and then was further 
extended by Bowman (1980, 1982) as Bowman’s Paradox. The third strand of literature 
is based upon the implications of Simon’s (1947, 1951, 1952/1953, 1955) work on 
Bounded Rationality. This strand of literature posits that firms have limited time to assess 
their options. As a result, they must conduct a less vigorous search on some dimensions 
and focus on whether the various options meet their most strongly held objectives rather 
than simply on how well they meet all objectives in general. 
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Figure 1: Three Potential Determinants of Perceived Uncertainty 
2.3.1: Normative Economic Theory 
Prior Normative Work on the Determinants of Uncertainty 
 A number of papers in the economics literature have examined the impact of 
uncertainty on firm capital investment through using metrics that are externally-visible 
and are economic rather than psychological in nature. While the papers largely do not 
focus on the determinants of uncertainty (treating uncertainty as a dependent variable), 
they define measures of uncertainty which are used as independent variables that are 
paired with measures of capital investment. 
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Leahy and Whited (1996) wrote an excellent review of the economic literature on 
the impact of uncertainty on investment. From their review, it is clear that study of the 
role of risk and uncertainty in capital investment decisions received substantial attention 
during the 1980s and early 1990s. Bernanke (1983) simply defined uncertainty as the 
spread in future outcomes. Hartman (1972) crafted a theoretical model for studying the 
influence of uncertainty on investment in which uncertainty was considered in future 
output prices, wage rates, and investment costs. Caballero and Pindyck (1993) and 
Pindyck and Solimano (1993) both examined the impact of uncertainty on irreversible 
investment through looking at the variance in the firms’ marginal revenue product of 
capital as a proxy for uncertainty. Ferderer (1993) used the risk premium of corporate 
bonds as a proxy for the financial uncertainty that the firms faced. Hurn and Wright 
(1994) used variance in observed output prices (in their case, the price of oil) as a 
measure of price uncertainty. Normative models of the determinants of uncertainty tend 
to look at factors influencing uncertainty in profit through examining uncertainty in 
pricing (Hartman, 1972; Hurn & Wright, 1994), demand, costs (Hartman, 1972; Ferderer, 
1993), or a combination these (Bernanke, 1983; Caballero & Pindyck, 1993; Pindyck & 
Solimano, 1993). 
In the context of a hospital acquiring a CT machine, there are economic measures 
that reflect these variables. Pricing uncertainty comes from the payers. Different payers 
have different payment policies, and coverage and rates may vary over time. Demand 
uncertainty comes from the patients and referring physicians. For a CT machine to 
experience demand, people must desire, be able to afford and be able to access the 
machine’s services. Costs are multi-faceted; CT machines have a fixed cost of 
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installation, operating costs associated with servicing, and labor costs associated with 
providing the various services associated with their operation (operation by a technician, 
preparation of the patient by a nurse, interpretation by a radiologist, etc.). The relative 
impact of a change in most of these factors may be influenced by the overall size of the 
factor. Hospitals with more payer contracts may have less uncertainty about pricing, as 
no individual payer has as much pricing power when there are more payers. Likewise, 
hospitals with greater overall expenditures may have less uncertainty about operating 
costs, as they are better able to manage demand uncertainty without resorting to 
additional operating costs. (When firms have more employees, they tend to have more 
slack resources that can be shuffled to account for shifts in demand without paying 
overtime.) Additionally, hospitals with greater expenditures may have economies of 
scale. For instance, they may be able to spread the cost of a service technician over a 
larger number of pieces of equipment. Thus, any change in the cost of the technician will 
be reflected in a smaller change in the operating cost of the individual pieces of 
equipment. This leads to my first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Uncertainty during the acquisition is influenced by measurable, 
non-psychological internal and external hospital characteristics. 
 While testing my first hypothesis, I expect to find that hospitals with more 
numerous payer contracts will experience less uncertainty related to the revenues 
generated by their CT machines than hospitals with fewer payer contracts. Likewise, I 
expect to find that hospitals which have greater expenditures on facilities and labor will 
have less uncertainty in the operating costs of their most valuable CT machines. 
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Finding any relationship at all, regardless of sign, would support the notion that 
concrete firm characteristics are related to uncertainty. If this is the case, then the 
uncertainty I observed through my survey is a form of Knightian risk, in that it is easily 
quantified and determined by quantifiable measures (Knight, 1921). If a relationship is 
not found, it would suggest that the uncertainty that I measured may not be externally 
observable (or may not be observable using the measures I chose). If Hypothesis 1 is not 
supported, it would suggest that traditional economic measures would make the 
uncertainty reported on the survey appear to be a form of Knightian uncertainty – an 
unknowable unknown. 
Nonetheless, it is quite possible that while the perceptions of uncertainty that I 
observed are quantifiable using non-economic, behavioral and psychological measures. 
To determine whether this is the case, Section 2.3.2 explores whether the uncertainty can 
be quantified using a behavioral measure and Section 2.3.3 explores whether the 
uncertainty can be quantified using a psychological measure. If the reported uncertainty 
can be quantified using any of these three types of measures, it would suggest that the 
respondents did not experience uncertainty while acquiring CT machines, but instead a 
form of Knightian risk (Knight, 1921). 
2.3.2: Behavioral Theory of the Firm & Prospect Theory 
Both Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Cyert & March, 1963) and Prospect Theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) can be used to explain firm uncertainty-seeking. 
According to these perspectives, firms observe where they stand relative to where they 
wish to stand, and then choose a level of uncertainty accordingly. While both theories 
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predict uncertainty-aversion when performance exceeds aspirations and uncertainty-
seeking when performance fails to meet aspirations, the theories reach these common 
conclusions through different means. Nonetheless, they have been used in combination in 
a number of studies (Lant & Montgomery, 1987; Bromiley, 1991; Greve, 2003; Audia & 
Greve, 2006). 
While these theories have traditionally been discussed within the context of risk, 
it is valid to discuss them within the context of uncertainty as well. Although the 
Behavioral Theory of the Firm is traditionally stated in terms of risk (measurable 
uncertainty), it has been examined within the context of uncertainty many times 
(Levinthal & March, 1981; Miller & Bromiley, 1990; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996; 
Greve, 1998, 2003; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Kahneman and Tversky (1992) 
stated that Prospect Theory is equally applicable to situations involving both risk and 
uncertainty. Thus, discussing these theories in the context of uncertainty is legitimate. 
The Behavioral Theory of the Firm argues that past aspirations, past performance, 
and social comparisons drive a firm’s present aspirations.  Initial aspirations are created 
at the founding of the firm, and all present aspirations are henceforth iteratively 
determined as a function of prior aspirations, performance, and social comparisons. The 
firm then compares its current level of performance with its current aspirations and 
decides the extent to which it wishes to engage in a search for potential investments. The 
findings of Cyert and March (1963), are rather similar to those of Downey and Slocum 
(1975), who stated that variations in uncertainty arise from differences in cognitive 
processes, prior experiences, and social expectations. 
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According to the Behavioral Theory of the Firm, when searching for a solution for 
bringing performance to the level of aspiration, firms consider decisions associated with 
differing amounts of uncertainty. When firms have exceeded their aspiration level, they 
must still plot a course for the years ahead. As the desire to overcome failure is greater 
than the desire to increase success, firms take on more uncertainty when performing 
below their aspiration level. 
In contrast, in Prospect Theory, the aspiration level is the firm’s present situation 
and the firm judges whether the outcomes it experiences are successes or failures by 
measuring whether they are above or below this level (Audia & Greve, 2006). Prospect 
Theory suggests framing drives decision making behavior (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986, 
1991; Thaler & Johnson, 1990).  Prospect Theory predicts that firms will be uncertainty-
averse when making decisions related to gains and uncertainty-seeking when making 
decisions related to losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). When firms perform at below 
their aspiration levels, under Prospect Theory, this is perceived as a loss, which results in 
the firms increasing their uncertainty-seeking (Greve, 2003). 
The Behavioral Theory of the Firm 
 
Figure 2: The Behavioral Theory of the Firm; Cyert & March (1963) 
  
Aspirations Satisfaction Search(Certainty)
Past Aspirations
Past Performance
Firm Characteristics
Social Comparisons
 Powell 18 
The Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Figure 2) suggests that firm aspirations are 
determined by past aspirations, past performance, social comparisons, and firm 
characteristics (Cyert & March, 1963). Aspirations drive a firm’s satisfaction with its 
present state, which in turn drives the extent to which it searches for new, uncertain 
solutions, or attempts to preserve the status quo. While there are several components to 
the Behavioral Theory of the Firm, much of the resulting research has focused on how the 
discrepancy between firm aspirations and performance influence firm behavior (Cyert & 
March, 1963; March & Shapira, 1987, 1992; Bromiley, 1991; Harris & Bromiley, 2007). 
There is consensus that for firms performing above aspiration levels become more 
uncertainty-averse, but there is disagreement on whether firms performing below 
aspiration levels become more uncertainty-seeking (Cyert & March, 1963; Wright & 
Kunreuther, 1975; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Bowman, 1980, 1982; Bromiley, 1991) 
or more uncertainty-averse the further performance deviates from aspiration levels (Janis 
& Mann, 1977; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981; Sitkin and Pablo, 1992). 
Nonetheless, some authors have proposed that more complicated relationships 
exist. Greve (1998) argued that whether firms make greater or fewer changes as their 
performance falls further from the aspiration level is dependent on the nature of the 
change. Firms have a higher probability of making some types of changes, but a lower 
probability of making others as their performance falls further behind. However, he found 
that firms far more dramatically decrease their likelihood of enacting change if their 
performance exceeds aspiration levels. Subsequently, Audia and Greve (2006) argued 
that the relationship between below-aspiration performance and uncertainty-seeking is 
moderated by the size of a firm’s stock of resources. They found that shipbuilding firms 
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with smaller stocks of resources took on less uncertainty when underperforming in order 
to avoid failure, while shipbuilding firms with larger stocks of resources took on more 
uncertainty when underperforming in order to attempt to restore performance to the 
aspiration level. 
The distance between a firm’s prior performance and aspiration levels is in part 
determined by how aspiration levels are set. There has been slight variation in how 
March has defined the determinants of aspiration levels across his canon of papers. 
March and Simon (1958) suggested that aspirations are determined by both past 
performance and social comparisons. Cyert and March (1963) subsequently suggested 
that aspiration levels are a function of past performance, social comparisons, and 
previous aspiration levels. Levinthal and March (1981) simply defined present aspirations 
as a weighted sum of past aspirations and past performance. 
To further complicate matters, the relative performance of firms has been 
measured in several ways as well. Relative performance historically has been measured 
by either combining a firm’s own performance and the performance of its peers into one 
measure (Bromiley, 1991; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996; Wiseman & Catanach, 1997; 
Greve, 2003), or through handling both types of performance separately (Greve, 1998; 
Harris & Bromiley, 2007). In some papers (Bromiley, 1991; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996; 
Wiseman & Catanach, 1997), social comparisons have been used as the firm’s reference 
point for performance below aspirations, while self-comparisons have been used as the 
firm’s reference point for performance above aspirations. The logic behind doing so is 
that firms no longer refer to their competitors when setting goals if their performance 
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exceeds that of their competitors. If this were not the case, high-performing firms might 
set future aspiration levels below their current level of performance.  
Bowman’s Paradox 
In a series of two papers published in Sloan Management Review, Bowman 
(1980, 1982) presented a paradox that was the basis of much further research on the 
Behavioral Theory of the Firm and Prospect Theory at the firm level. Bowman found that 
there is a negative correlation between risk and return. While intuitively, one would 
expect that greater risk taking by firms would have to be rewarded with greater returns in 
order for firms to be willing to take the greater risks in the first place, Bowman found the 
opposite to be the case. He suggested that the return on risk might be in part determined 
by the fact that better performing companies may be less desperate for investment 
opportunities, and thus less willing to take less favorable risks. In his 1982 paper, 
Bowman used a variety of data sources to show that troubled companies are more risk-
seeking than healthy companies, which may be the cause of the association between 
higher risk and lower return. In the paper, Bowman commented that this behavior is 
similar to the behavior demonstrated by individuals under Prospect Theory. Bowman 
noted a laboratory study conducted by Laughhun, Payne, and Crum (1980), in which it 
was found that managers were risk-seeking for below target returns, except when at risk 
for a ruinous loss. This finding was stable for managers from a variety of backgrounds, 
and held regardless of whether the decision was over a personal or managerial 
investment. 
 In a later set of papers, Fiegenbaum (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1986; Fiegenbaum, 
1990) used industry-level data to test Bowman’s Paradox. Fiegenbaum and Thomas 
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(1986) found that when using accounting measures of risk and return, Bowman’s Paradox 
held during the 1970’s, but not the 1960’s. When they instead used market-based 
measures of risk and return, the Paradox disappeared completely, as the market 
compensated for the Paradox. Firms with relatively low levels of risk compared to their 
return were priced higher by the market. In a follow-up study, Fiegenbaum (1990) found 
that Prospect Theory could be used to explain how firms made trade-offs between risk 
and return. Namely, organizations performing below their industry average return on 
assets tended to be risk takers, while those performing above their industry average 
tended to be risk averse. Furthermore, the slope of the risk-return trade-off was about 
three times as large for firms below their industry average as it was for firms above their 
industry average. Additional support was found for these conclusions by Bromiley 
(1991), who found that poor firm performance resulted in increased risk taking, and that 
these risks appeared to result in even further poor performance. The poor performance of 
the risky investments made by the poorly performing firms held even after controlling for 
industry performance, past firm performance, and organizational slack. In a subsequent 
study, Wiseman and Bromiley (1996) found that among organizations in decline, risk 
taking was associated both negatively with performance and positively with decline. 
Testing the Theories 
As this review has shown, many studies have modeled aspirations as being 
determined by both prior aspiration levels and prior performance (Cyert & March, 1963; 
Lant & Montgomery, 1987; Levinthal & March, 1981; Lant, 1992). In these studies, 
aspirations automatically adjust upwards as performance improves and downwards as 
performance declines. Unlike these prior studies, this study relies upon a self-reported 
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combined measure of past performance and past aspiration. The Behavioral Theory of the 
Firm literature tends to rely upon externally-visible indicators of both aspirations and 
performance which may or may not be held or directly compared by individuals within 
the firms in question. By directly asking decision makers how much their firm’s 
performance deviated from their aspirations, it is possible to ensure that they have 
considered both past aspirations and past performance in combination. 
Given the relative lack of clarity that surrounds the determination of aspiration 
levels and relative performance, this dissertation attempts to skirt the issue entirely. 
Instead of attempting to measure absolute performance, social performance, and prior 
aspiration levels, I have simply asked firms about the extent to which their prior CT 
under-performed or out-performed in comparison to their aspirations for the machine. 
The prior most valuable CT machine acquired by the hospital is used an anchor, as the 
literature shows that firms anchor on their prior aspirations and performance when setting 
new aspirations. Incremental change is a decision rule that reduces the amount of 
information that needs to be processed for a decision to be made (Levinthal & March, 
1981; Lant, 1992). Thus, aspirations change with performance. To test whether the prior 
literature on the performance-aspiration disparity holds in this context, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2: Uncertainty during the acquisition is negatively influenced by the 
disparity between the firm’s aspirations for the prior acquisition and the 
performance of that acquisition. 
If prior performance exceeds aspirations for each of the CT attributes, I expect to 
see hospitals invest in machines associated with less uncertainty on the corresponding 
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attributes, while if prior performance falls short of aspirations, I expect to see hospitals 
invest in machines associated with more uncertainty on the attributes in question. 
2.3.3: Bounded Rationality Theory 
 It is possible that there is a third explanation for firm uncertainty during the 
acquisition process. In addition to stemming from firm characteristics or the firm’s choice 
to seek uncertainty, it may also stem from limits on the firm’s ability to reduce 
uncertainty. Bounded Rationality (Simon, 1955) suggests that firms have simple, 
somewhat binary, pay-off functions and are constrained in their ability to search for 
solutions. As pay-offs may be determined by multiple, difficult to compare attributes (i.e. 
revenues, physician satisfaction, and research output in the case of CT machines), firms 
may elect to search for viable solutions that satisfice on all the necessary attributes, and 
then attempt to find the best possible satisficing solution (Simon, 1951, 1952/1953). 
 While traditionally, the study of Bounded Rationality has looked at the behavior 
of firms, rather than that of divisions (in this case, the Department of Radiology), there is 
an empirical reason to believe that Bounded Rationality is applicable here. Respondents 
to the survey on which this study was based were asked whether their radiology 
department maintained a profit and loss statement. As 72% of respondents claimed that 
their radiology department maintained its own record of its profitability, there is reason to 
believe that the radiology departments are essentially miniature firms operating within a 
larger ecosystem. Thus, this observed behavior suggests that Bounded Rationality may be 
applicable in this context as well. 
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There is some debate over whether the views Simon expressed are correct. March 
(1978) stated that when tastes appear in prescriptive theories of choice, they are absolute, 
relevant, stable, consistent, precise, and exogenous, and noted that each of these 
properties of tastes appears to be inconsistent with observations of individuals and 
institutions. March continued by stating that we avoid our preferences, and that we are 
prepared to act in ways inconsistent with our preferences. Furthermore, he stated that “we 
specify goals that are different from the outcomes we wish to achieve”. 
If March (1978) is correct, there should be no relation between a firm’s 
uncertainties and a firm’s objectives. Firms with inconsistent preferences varying wildly 
over time would perform pre-acquisition research to decrease uncertainty about 
objectives different than the ones held at or after the time of acquisition. Meanwhile, if 
Simon (1951, 1952/1953, 1955) is correct, if firms have consistent preferences and are 
constrained in their abilities to search, they should search more extensively along 
objectives of greater importance to them and less along objectives of lesser importance to 
them. If this is the case, the result should be that higher objective strength leads to lower 
objective uncertainty for each of the objectives. Hypothesis 3 tests whether March’s 
(1978) statements about the inconsistence of preferences are correct, or whether instead 
preferences are consistent and uncertainty reduction activities are most strongly 
concentrated on the strongest objectives, as is suggested by Bounded Rationality. 
Hypothesis 3: Uncertainty during the acquisition is negatively influenced by the 
objectives the firm held for the acquisition. 
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Prior Research on Objectives and Their Relationship to Uncertainty 
Before testing Hypothesis 3, it is important to precisely define what objectives are 
and to explore what is known about their relationship with uncertainty. Both a goal and 
an objective may be defined as “a desired direction or state that guides behavior” 
(Carlson et al., 2007). The objectives examined in this study are all consumption 
objectives; namely, how a CT machine will influence a hospital’s revenues, costs, 
physician and consumer preference fulfillment, quality of care, and research. Van 
Osselaer et al. (2005) wrote that “consumers choose products for the benefits they afford, 
not the attributes they contain.” Thus, it seems very appropriate to cast the objectives in 
terms of CT benefits, and not in terms of CT properties, such as number of slices or 
physical size.  
Objectives and objective setting has long been a topic examined by the fields of 
behavioral economics (Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988; Slovic, 1995; Krantz & 
Kunreuther, 2007) and micro-organizational behavior (Vroom, 1964; Locke & Lantham, 
1990; Wright et al. 1993). There is also an extensive theoretical literature (Debreau, 
1960; Krantz, Luce, Suppes, & Tversky, 1971; Keeney & Raiffa, 1976) and empirical 
literature (Kunreuther, 2008; Barseghyan, Prince, & Teitelbaum, 2009; Hardisty & 
Weber, 2009; Laury, McInnes, & Swarthout, 2009; Burmeister-Lamp, Lévesque, & 
Schade, 2010; Schwarcz, 2010) on decision making when there are multiple objectives. 
Several good reviews of the multiple objective decision making literature have also been 
written (Leeds, 2006; Weber & Johnson, 2009; Warren, McGraw, & Van Boven, 2010).  
As a result, there is some evidence from the literature suggesting that a connection exists 
between uncertainty and objectives. Nonetheless, many papers suggest the opposite 
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causal direction from the one suggested by Bounded Rationality. That is, they suggest 
that uncertainty drives objectives, rather than that objectives drive uncertainty. For 
instance, Bourgeois (1985) found that while the number of objectives held by a firm has 
nearly no relationship to a firm’s actual environmental volatility, firms that perceive more 
environmental uncertainty have significantly more objectives. Thus, the number of 
objectives held is more determined by the perceived uncertainty, rather than by the actual 
uncertainty in the environment. Nonetheless, the number of strategic objectives held by a 
firm was found to have no relationship with its performance. 
Another study that connected uncertainty to objectives was Cox and Rich (1964). 
They found that the amount of risk a woman perceived in buying items over the 
telephone was related to her objectives when buying. Items used in the home, such as bed 
linens, were perceived as less risky to buy over the telephone than items like shirts, as 
bed linens are often purchased to meet utilitarian objectives while shirts are purchased to 
meet fashion-related objectives. In general, perceived risk was found to be determined by 
the buyer’s subjective certainty that she would win or lose some of what was at stake. 
Likewise, Mitchell (1998) examined the relationship between perceived risk and buying 
objectives in the context of grocery shopping, using the model of perceived risk proposed 
by Cunningham (1967), in which total perceived risk was in part related to the number of 
sources of adverse consequences considered. These studies imply that if there is more 
uncertainty surrounding an item’s ability to meet the most important objectives behind its 
purchase, the purchase will be perceived by the consumer as overall more uncertain and 
will be less likely to occur. 
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The testing of Hypothesis 3 will help affirm whether a relationship exists between 
firm objectives and uncertainty. While it will not be possible to determine the causal 
direction, it will be possible to determine whether a relationship exists. If a relationship is 
found, one possible explanation might be the one suggested by Bounded Rationality – 
greater objective importance is associated with less uncertainty surrounding the objective 
due to the greater investment of effort in conducting a search and reducing uncertainty 
related to the objective in question. The empirical literature also suggests that the 
opposite causal direction might be possible as well (Cox & Rich, 1964; Bourgeois, 1985; 
Mitchell, 1998). 
 When the results of the tests of Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 are compared, it will be 
possible to get a better understanding of the factors that determine firm uncertainty 
during the acquisition process. It is possible that multiple models will to some extent 
explain firm uncertainty during the acquisition process. If this is the case, the most 
relevant model can be determined by looking at the fit of the models. Even if this occurs, 
there is value in knowing whether there are multiple explanations for firm uncertainty 
during the technology acquisition process. 
2.4: Previous Research on the Determinants of Investment Value 
 Section 2.3 examined the determinants of the amount of uncertainty that firms 
face when making investment decisions. This section builds upon that by examining 
whether concrete financial factors and firm characteristics or uncertainty measures do a 
better job of explaining the present value of a hospital’s most valuable CT machine. As is 
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depicted in Figure 3, this section will compare two potential explanations for the present 
value of the acquired machine. 
 The two competing determinants of CT present value tested in this model are 
meant to parallel the constructs from the comparison in the prior section as much as 
possible. The concrete factors used to test the normative model are the same ones used in 
the prior section. Likewise, the measures of perceived uncertainty used as independent 
variables in this section are the same measures that were used as dependent variables in 
the prior section. 
 
Figure 3: Two Potential Determinants of Acquisition Value 
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2.4.1: Normative Economic Theory 
Profit Maximization 
 The normative economic theory of how for-profit hospitals make investment 
decisions is that of profit maximization (Wedig, Hassan, & Sloan, 1989). Namely, firms 
pursue the portfolio of investments that has the greatest possible Net Present Value 
(NPV). To do this, for each investment, they must estimate the expected revenue in each 
time period, the expected costs in each time period, the discount rate, and the time 
horizon of the investment. Differences in the distributions of revenue and cost outcomes 
are ignored; only expected values are considered. As revenues, costs, and time horizons 
differ from machine to machine, different CT machine investments have different Net 
Present Values. Under economic theory, profit maximizing firms should invest in the CT 
model with the greatest Net Present Value. It should be noted that strictly profit 
maximizing firms do not consider their uncertainty when making acquisition decisions. 
As the expectations of the variables in the model are used to derive the Net Present Value 
of the acquisition, the distributions of the variables themselves are not relevant to the 
decision making process. 
 Purchasing versus leasing CT machines results in a slightly different Net Present 
Value formula. When machines are purchased, hospitals undergo either a large fixed cost 
in the year of purchased, or a stream of recurring costs for a fixed period, if debt 
financing is used. When machines are leased, hospitals must pay recurring lease 
payments. In some leases, these payments are made on a periodic basis (i.e. monthly 
billing), while in other leases, these payments are made based upon utilization (i.e. pay-
per-scan). 
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 The two formulas below illustrate the formulas for determining the Net Present 
Value (NPV) of a purchased and leased CT machine, with an operational life of t years. 
Note that when the machine is purchased, the cost of the machine is experienced at the 
time of purchase, and thus is not discounted. Under the lease, if payments are uniform, 
the lease payment will be discounted more and more over time. 
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The decision between buying and leasing can be made by comparing the present 
value of the two. When buying or leasing, a firm should keep in mind its alternative 
potential uses of the capital. The upfront cash saved from leasing instead of purchasing 
can be invested or can be used to pay off other debt. Tax implications may also influence 
the decision. While lease payments are a deductible expense when determining income 
subject to taxation, only the interest expense of a loan is a deductible expense. Thus, the 
size of the lease payments, the useful life of the asset, the tax rate, the interest rate for 
borrowing capital, the salvage value of the asset if purchased, and any differences in 
operating costs between a leased or purchased asset will all figure into the decision as to 
whether equipment should be leased or purchased (Johnson & Lewellen, 1972; Gorton, 
1974). When the duration for which a piece of equipment will be used is unknown, a 
lease with an uncertain life may be preferable (Bierman & Smidt, 1984). 
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While profit maximization is the normative model of how firms make 
investments, it is not testable due to the limitations of the data available. The pilot study 
that was conducted revealed that respondents had great difficulty estimating their 
hospital’s CT usage. As pricing, profit, and revenue information is confidential due to its 
use in negotiations with insurers, no such information was available in the American 
Hospital Association database. Likewise, questions on pricing were not included on the 
survey in order to not adversely influence the response rate. Thus, it is not possible to 
determine what the profit of the acquired machine ultimately was. Furthermore, since 
information was not obtained about other CT options which were not selected, it is not 
possible to tell whether hospitals acted in an NPV-maximizing fashion. The only 
elements of the NPV formula that are known are those that relate to machine cost and 
operational time horizon. 
Incorporating Risk into an Economic Model of Investment 
The economic literature proposes a number of techniques that can be used to deal 
with risk in cash flows (Bierman & Smidt, 1984; Bierman, 1986). Ultimately, only 
expectations enter into the measure of profitability used (i.e. Net Present Value or 
Internal Rate of Return). For each period of the investment, the decision maker can 
enumerate all the possible events, their probability of occurrence, and their magnitude, 
and then can determine the expected value in that period. Uncertainty – immeasurable 
risk – cannot be incorporated into economic models of cash flows, as by definition, 
taking the expectation of uncertain variables is impossible. 
When estimating profit, if certain events can only occur in certain sequences, a 
series of rules can be devised and then the outcomes can be simulated. Observation of the 
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simulations or prior real-life events can be used to build a probability distribution (Hillier, 
1963). Sensitivity analyses can also be performed. The values in a model can be adjusted 
for risk by adjusting the discount rate or substituting certainty equivalents for the values 
of risky outcomes. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) can be used to estimate the 
required return for any investment (Sharpe, 1964). 
When modeling the cash flow of an investment under uncertainty, it is essential to 
incorporate the salvage value of the investment. That is, the revenue and cost 
implications of abandoning the investment in the event that it does not work out must be 
incorporated into either the calculation of Net Present Value or Internal Rate of Return 
(Johnson, 1994). CT equipment has a non-zero salvage value, as it is traditionally resold 
outside of the U.S. once it surpasses its useful life to its original owner. 
Prior Research on the Normative Determinants of Investment Value 
 The normative literature suggests that when making investments, hospitals should 
consider factors influencing the revenues, costs, time horizon, and interest rate associated 
with their investments (Johnson & Lewellen, 1972; Gorton, 1974). After examining the 
investment processes of a number of firms, Bromiley (1986) stated that the cash flow 
equation plays a large role in corporate investment decisions. All of the firms he studied 
used hurdle rates to evaluate and compare the profitability of investments, and rarely 
changed these hurdle rates more than once every five years. While the firms that 
Bromiley observed attempted to make investments that were as profitable as possible, 
they were constrained by the availability of acceptable investments, the availability of 
funds, and the capability of the firm to execute on the investments. 
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Although it is not possible to directly measure the revenues or operating costs that 
the hospitals experienced in connection with their CT machines, the healthcare literature 
contains many findings on factors influencing revenues and costs. Zwanziger and 
Mooney (2005) found that hospitals in markets with more concentrated managed care 
payers got paid less as a result of the increased negotiating power possessed by the 
payers. Supporting this finding, Sorensen (2003) found that payer size influences market 
power. However, Dranove, Shanley, and White (1993) had the contradictory finding that 
HMOs and PPOs were not able to substantially influence prices within concentrated 
hospital markets. Thus, while there is some evidence that payer contracts may play a role 
in the ultimate value of the investment, the evidence is not conclusive. 
There is also evidence from the literature on the influence of costs on investment. 
Ladapo, Horwitz, Weinstein, Gazelle, and Cutler (2009) found that hospitals with higher 
operating margins were more likely to adopt advanced CT machines. Hospitals with 
higher operating margins have more financial wiggle-room with which to handle lags that 
it may take for reimbursement levels to cover the higher costs of more advanced imaging 
technology. Thus, operating margins may be relevant to the adoption decision. 
However, the cost of capital, as reflected by the interest rate, may not influence 
investment as might be suspected. Graves (1988) did not find a significant relationship 
between the interest rate and R&D expenditures, and several others have found that 
leverage encourages risk-seeking behavior when debt is not appropriately priced to 
reflect the risks of the investments for which it will be used (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Barnea, Haugen, & Senbert, 1985). Leverage may even encourage risk-seeking behavior 
(Wiseman & Catanach, 1997). This is a disconcerting finding, as investments made at 
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rates of return below the discount rate are harmful to stockholders (Elton, 1970). These 
findings would all suggest that lower interest rates may be associated with larger 
investments. 
As a result of these findings, the economic literature seems to suggest that the size 
of a hospital’s investments will be in part determined by a combination of the diversity of 
its revenue sources, the magnitude of its other costs, and the interest rate that it faces at 
the time of investment. Thus, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4: The present value of the acquisition is influenced by measurable, 
non-psychological internal and external hospital characteristics. 
In testing this hypothesis, I will look at the diversity of payers, the magnitude of costs, 
and the interest rate faced by the hospital at the time of acquisition. I expect that more 
payer contracts, greater overall expenditures, and lower interest rates at the time of 
acquisition will all be associated with acquisitions having higher present values. 
2.4.2: Prospect Theory 
 Just as Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) was used to explain the 
magnitude of uncertainty firms have during investments (Section 2.3.2), it may again be 
used to explain the magnitudes of the investments themselves. Prior studies related to 
Prospect Theory have shown that people tend to be uncertainty-seeking when facing 
uncertainty in the loss domain and uncertainty-averse when facing uncertainty in the gain 
domain. While Prospect Theory has not been studied in the context of corporate 
investment decisions, MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986) found that executives presented 
hypothetical investment gambles were more risk-seeking for threats than they were for 
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opportunities, regardless of whether making decisions for themselves or their businesses. 
Furthermore, Schoemaker (1991) found evidence that the effect of uncertainty on utility 
is not symmetrical around zero; people’s distaste for uncertainty in the probability of 
winning a gamble is greater in the gains domain than in the losses domain. Studying 
whether Prospect Theory influences the size of acquisitions in this particular context is 
important, as it has been shown subjects evaluate risk differently depending on context 
(Hershey & Schoemaker, 1980). Thus, it is possible that findings on investment behavior 
under risk in other contexts may not be generalizable to this one. 
Uncertainty-aversion Due to Managerial Discretion 
In addition to Prospect Theory, there is another possible explanation for general 
uncertainty-aversion in the investment decisions made by hospitals. Managerial desire for 
self-preservation induces uncertainty-aversion, regardless of the domain. Although the 
investors in for-profit hospitals or charitable or government sponsors of non-profit 
hospitals may wish for their hospitals to be uncertainty-seeking, decision makers within 
the hospitals are likely to be uncertainty-averse, as they are unable to protect themselves 
against firm-specific adverse outcomes through creating a portfolio of investments 
(Coffee, 1986; Greenwald & Stiglitz, 1990). Decision makers may act in a way that 
minimizes personal potential for loss of employment (Gupta, 1987, Chatterjee & 
Lubatkin, 1990; Wiseman & Gomes-Mejia, 1998). While an investor may invest in 
multiple for-profit hospitals and a charity or government entity may contribute to 
multiple non-profit hospitals, decision makers employed by the hospitals themselves have 
a lot to lose if their particular hospital becomes financially-distressed. In other contexts, it 
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has been shown that corporations purchase insurance against losses in order to protect 
their management teams from the downside outcomes, to enable less uncertainty-averse 
decision making (Mayers & Smith, 1982). 
 There is evidence that decision makers’ actions are influenced by these biases. 
Alchian and Kessel (1962) found that in less competitive markets, decision makers are 
able to maximize a preference function other than a profit function. Williamson (1963) 
found that decision makers have a preference towards costs that are likely to directly 
benefit them over costs that are not. Given that many hospitals operate in remote 
geographic markets and openly have preference functions other than that of profit 
maximization (i.e. government and non-profit hospitals), it is likely that Alchian and 
Kessel’s finding holds in the context of hospital equipment acquisition as well, and that 
decision makers are able to behave in a manner that suits their interests rather than one 
that maximizes the profit of the hospital. Nonetheless, managerial concerns do not 
explain why in some contexts, uncertainty-aversion is associated with gains and 
uncertainty-seeking is associated with losses. While managerial self-preservation would 
explain an association between uncertainty and investment, the association they suggest 
is uniformly uncertainty-averse. 
Prior Research the Impact of Uncertainty on Capital Investments 
 The Prospect Theory literature on investments tends to look at investments made 
by individuals. While the Bowman’s Paradox (Bowman, 1980, 1982) literature looks at 
Prospect Theory from the context of a firm, it examines risk taking rather than capital 
investment. Most of the extant literature on the role of uncertainty in capital investments 
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comes from the field of economics. Economic research on this topic largely began with 
Hartman (1972), who found that in a theoretical context, current investment does not 
decrease with increased uncertainty in future output prices and wages, and is invariant 
with uncertainty in future investment costs. Pindyck (1982) demonstrated using a 
theoretical model that uncertainty increases a risk-averse firm’s desired level of capital 
stock if the marginal cost of adjustment is rising at an increasing rate. Abel (1983) 
demonstrated that although Hartman (1972) and Pindyck (1982) had somewhat different 
results, Hartman’s results continue to hold using Pindyck’s stochastic specification. 
Overall, Abel found support for the assertion that increased uncertainty causes increased 
investment. 
Over time, two competing views on the relationship between uncertainty and 
capital investment have emerged within the economics literature (Caballero, 1991). On 
one hand, there is evidence that the two have a negative relationship (Bertola, 1988; 
Pindyck, 1988; Craine, 1989; Zeira, 1989; Caballero, 1991), and on the other hand there 
is evidence that the two have a positive relationship (Hartman, 1972; Pindyck, 1982; 
Abel, 1983, 1984, 1985). Ultimately, the relationship found appears to be highly sensitive 
to the specification of the model in the paper. 
A number of papers from behavioral theorists have examined how uncertainty and 
framing influence individual investment decisions in the context of Prospect Theory. 
Kahneman and Tversky (2000) compiled an anthology of papers providing support for 
support for Prospect Theory. Their anthology contained many papers which were 
empirical in nature and dealt with individual decision making. One included paper, 
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Johnson, Hershey, Meszaros, and Kunreuther (1993), found framing substantially 
influenced how people evaluated purchasing decisions. A disability policy featuring a 
rebate was preferred over a policy without a rebate, even though the rebateless policy had 
a lower expected cost. It was suggested that this occurred because the decision makers 
evaluated the losses and gains associated with the policy separately using non-linear 
value functions, rather than simply taking the expected value of both policies. Further 
evidence for the separate evaluation of gains and losses due to mental accounting was 
provided by Thaler (1999). As a result of these findings, it makes sense to separately 
consider how uncertainties related to revenues and costs influence investment. 
The empirical support for Prospect Theory predicting investment decision making 
in situations in which Expected Utility Theory fails is rather strong. Camerer (2000) 
summarized the literature on the topic and noted supportive prior findings related to the 
relative returns of stocks and bonds (Benartzi & Thaler, 1995), stock holding and selling 
behavior (Odean, 1998; Genesove & Mayer, 2001), and single product consumer 
purchases (Hardie, Johnson, & Fader, 1993). Thus, empirical support for Prospect Theory 
stems from multiple domains. 
Nonetheless, there is empirical evidence that people do not always make their 
investment decisions in accordance with Prospect Theory. Kalayci and Basdas (2010) 
found that professional power traders did not treat gains and losses differently when 
making investment decisions, nor did the history of their outcomes influence their 
decision making, in direct opposition to the findings of Thaler and Johnson (1990).  
Gneezy, List, and Wu (2006) found an even more puzzling violation of Prospect Theory 
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in which people’s willingness to pay for a lottery consisting of two prizes was less than 
their willingness to pay for either prize on its own. For instance, people were willing to 
pay more for a $50 gift certificate than for a lottery with a 50% chance of winning a $50 
gift certificate and a 50% chance of winning a $100 gift certificate. This finding, which 
they dubbed the uncertainty effect, fits with neither Expected Utility Theory nor Prospect 
Theory. If the uncertainty effect applies to equipment acquisition, it is possible that 
greater decision maker uncertainty will be associated with lower acquisition values, even 
if the worst possible outcomes estimated by the uncertain decision makers are better than 
those estimated by more certain decision makers. 
Extending Prospect Theory to Equipment Acquisition 
 Prospect Theory, as introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), proposes a 
utility function for the interpretation of outcomes which is concave for gains and convex 
for losses, causing uncertainty-aversion in gains and uncertainty-seeking in losses, with a 
loss of one unit causing more disutility than the utility provided by a gain of one unit. 
Prospect Theory suggests that for each facet of a multifaceted investment, firms will 
prefer low uncertainty related to the facet if they view it as a gain, and high uncertainty if 
they view it as a loss. While Kahneman and Tversky suggested that decision makers 
combine valuations of different aspects of an investment through “mental editing”, it is 
unclear how decision makers edit together gains and losses that pertain to substantially 
different units. Revenues and costs are measured in dollars, care is measured in quality-
adjusted life years (QALYs), and preference fulfillment is often measured through self-
reported measures of satisfaction. Thus, rather than examining how an aggregate measure 
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of uncertainty impacts acquisition value, it makes sense to examine how different types 
of uncertainty each impact the present value of the acquisition. Examining one type of 
uncertainty at a time eliminates the problems posed by aggregation. 
 Perhaps one reason that firm uncertainty in the context of a self-reported measure 
has not been previously examined is because it is hard for firms to report. During my 
pilot study, I attempted to determine both the skewness and means of the uncertainties 
perceived by the respondents. The respondents had difficulty providing responses to the 
questions. As a result, I only asked about the perceived degree of uncertainty on the 
ultimate instrument. Although this is a crude measure, it does facilitate examining how 
variation in perceived uncertainty impacts the present value of the machine ultimately 
acquired. As a result of these measurement issues, my test of the influence of uncertainty 
on acquisition value is simply the following: 
Hypothesis 5: The present value of the acquisition is influenced by the acquirer’s 
perceived uncertainty about the acquisition before it takes place. 
In testing this hypothesis, multiple types of perceived uncertainty will be 
examined. I hypothesize that increased revenue uncertainty will be associated with lower 
acquisition present value, as revenue is in the gains domain. Likewise, increased 
operating cost uncertainty will be associated with higher acquisition present value, as 
costs are in the loss domain. Finally, I predict that uncertainty related to factors that are 
non-financial in nature will not have a significant association with the present value of 
the acquisition. As it is unclear whether physician preference, consumer preference, care, 
and research uncertainty are considered uncertain gains or uncertain losses, I predict that 
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no significant association will exist. While these assertions are supported by the Prospect 
Theory literature, as was summarized by Camerer (2000), there is evidence that Prospect 
Theory does not hold in certain contexts (Gneezy, List, & Wu, 2006; Kalayci & Basdas, 
2010). The managerial self-preservation literature would suggest that greater uncertainty 
should be associated with lower investment, no matter the domain of the uncertainty 
(Mayers & Smith, 1982; Coffee, 1986; Gupta, 1987; Chatterjee & Lubatkin, 1990; 
Greenwald & Stiglitz 1990; Wiseman & Gomes-Mejia, 1998). 
2.5: Issues Unaddressed by the Literature 
 As Chapter 2 demonstrated, the economics and management literature contains 
several perspectives on decision making during the capital investment process. 
Unfortunately, the literature provides little guidance in weighing the hypothesized 
outcomes suggested by these theories against one another within the context of hospital 
equipment acquisition. This is likely the case because the theories come from different 
sources. Economists developed the normative literature on capital investment. 
Management scientists developed the behavioral theory of the firm and Bounded 
Rationality. Behavioral economists developed Prospect Theory. Most of the findings on 
capital investment in hospitals came from health services research, which is likewise a 
somewhat distinct academic community. This dissertation provides an empirical 
comparison of the hypothesized findings of these models within the context of hospitals 
acquiring a costly and uncertain product (Figure 4). While it is not possible for me to 
generally suggest that one of the theories that has been tested outperforms the others in 
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predicting acquisition uncertainty or value, it is possible for me to provide one example 
of the relative performance of the various theories in predicting these outcomes. 
 
Figure 4: Potential Explanations of the Capital Investment Process 
 Prior to this study, there have been very few studies that have looked within firms 
in order to explain investment decision making. While Teplensky, Pauly, Kimberly, and 
Hillman (1995) examined MRI adoption using survey responses that contained some 
strategic measures, the firm capital investment literature has primarily relied upon 
accounting measures or other externally-visible proxies of performance. This study 
utilizes externally-visible accounting and demographic measures, as well as externally-
invisible behavioral and psychological measures. As a result, it considers a far more 
diverse set of explanations for variation in capital investment than most of the prior 
literature. 
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Beyond its theoretical implications, this study fills a gap in the health services 
research literature as well. Equipment manufacturers and payers (both private and public) 
are interested in having a better understanding of what determines hospital capital 
investments in equipment. As much of the literature suggest that uncertainty plays a role 
in determining firm capital investments, it is likewise important to gain an understanding 
of what drives uncertainty. 
 Both CT manufacturers and payers have a vested interest in understanding the 
drivers behind hospital investments in CT. Manufacturers desire to increase investments, 
while payers likely desire to decrease investments, as CT utilization appears to grow with 
capacity (Baker, Atlas, & Afendulis, 2008). Due to gaps in the literature, it is unclear 
what approach manufacturers and payers should take when attempting to educate CT 
acquisition decision makers. Should they focus on changing hospitals’ aspirations or 
objectives for their CT equipment, should they provide data that can be used to reduce 
uncertainty about CT performance, or should they simply do nothing? If CT investment is 
not dependent upon factors that may be modified through education, campaigns to 
influence hospitals may be wasteful altogether. This dissertation provides insights into 
the factors that drive the CT acquisition process. Manufacturers and payers can use the 
findings to better target their campaigns. 
 While there is great concern over the increased cancer risk to patients from more 
advanced CT machines, the literature does not provide clear solutions for encouraging 
hospitals to acquire simpler (and less expensive) CT machines that expose patients to 
lower doses of radiation. The problem of CT-related radiation exposure is increasing, as 
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according to Nickoloff and Alderson (2001), “Inherent in the design of advanced CT 
scanners providing many new applications are elements that have the potential to increase 
radiation exposures to patients.” This increased radiation exposure poses a serious threat. 
It is estimated that 500 of the 600,000 children whom receive abdominal or head CT 
examinations each year will eventually die of from cancer attributable to CT radiation 
exposure (Brenner, Elliston, Hall, & Berdon, 2001). Furthermore, it has been estimated 
that 150 CT-related cancers are induced for every 100,000 individuals screened with CT 
colonography (Berrington de González et al., 2011). By helping policymakers understand 
what drives hospitals to acquire more complex CT machines associated with higher 
acquisition costs and radiation output levels, this study contributes to the improvement of 
human health. 
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Chapter 3: Empirical Context, Data, and Methods 
3.1: Empirical Context 
The importance of understanding equipment purchasing is only increasing. While 
equipment purchasing occurs in many industries, the rapid escalation in equipment costs 
within the hospital industry makes studying equipment purchasing within that context 
particularly important. National hospital spending on equipment and infrastructure has 
grown from $6 billion in 1970 to $114 billion in 2008, an increase of 1,800% in less than 
40 years (Hartman, Martin, Nuccio, & Catlin, 2010). 
A large component of hospital equipment spending comes from the acquisition of 
imaging equipment. In 2005, roughly $8.1 billion was spent on purchasing imaging 
devices from manufacturers (Iglehart, 2007; Burns, Cisneros, Ferniany, & Singh, 2010). 
Computed tomography (CT) machines, the focus of this study, are very costly and have 
large variation in pricing. According to the ECRI Institute (2009), the cost of a new CT 
machine can range from $500,000 for a low-end 16-slice machine to $2,500,000 for the 
latest high-end machine. 
The true cost of acquiring these machines is even higher when the required 
service contracts and building renovations are considered.  As hospitals must cover their 
costs through their billing, these high costs have resulted in high bills. Imaging spending 
accounted for $3.52 billion in Medicare Part B disbursements in 2006 (GAO, 2008). 
Baker, Atlas, and Afendulis (2008) estimated that the addition of one CT machine to a 
physician’s practice would have increased Medicare spending by $685,000 in 2005, and 
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that the average amount that Medicare paid for a CT scan billed under the fee schedule 
was $308. On average, each additional CT machine acquired resulted in an additional 
2,224 CT procedures. 
Given the high expense and importance of a CT acquisition, hospitals must 
contemplate the decision carefully even if they have adopted similar technology in the 
past. While several prior studies (Teplensky, Kimberly, Hillman, & Schwartz, 1993; 
Teplensky, Pauly, Kimberly, & Hillman, 1995; Hillman & Schwartz, 1985; 1986) have 
examined the decision to adopt medical imaging devices, these technologies now have 
existed for around three decades, and, as a result, some of the uncertainties surrounding 
their operating costs, potential revenues, and clinical utility have dissipated. For the 
majority of hospitals, the key decision has shifted from whether to adopt CT to which 
specific machines to adopt. Most hospitals purchasing CTs are seeking to replace or 
expand their existing capacity, rather than seeking to make an initial acquisition. Thus, 
this study instead focuses on replacement. 
3.1.1: Computed Tomography (CT) Machines 
 Before delving into the details of the acquisition process, it is important first both 
to explain CT technology, the market in which the machines are sold, and the 
reimbursement process. Computed tomography machines produce medical images useful 
during diagnosis and certain procedures. A CT image shows a slice of the human body. 
Multiple images can be assembled by computer software to construct three-dimensional 
models of structures within the body. Unlike x-rays, CT images focus on showing tissues. 
The technology uses radiation in the process of capturing images. While Magnetic 
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Resonance Imaging (MRI) also can be used to see inside the body, it is not a complete 
substitute for CT, as there are some situations in which CT is superior and others in 
which MRI is superior. 
CTs are large and often need to be situated in a room of around 300 square feet. 
They also are energy intensive and often require new electrical lines to be run into a 
hospital. As a result, there are costs associated both with acquiring the machine and with 
situating it. While they can be leased as well as purchased, leasing does not eliminate the 
problem of the facility cost. The CT machines themselves often cost between $500,000 
and $2,500,000, and are typically replaced within five to ten years. After replacement, 
they are typically resold outside of the U.S. by either the manufacturer or a refurbishing 
company. 
3.1.2: CT Reimbursement 
 The complexity of the reimbursement process for CT is reflective of the overall 
complexity of the U.S. insurance system. When treating patients on an inpatient basis, 
hospitals do not receive payment for the use of CT if they are reimbursed through a 
Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) payment. This method of reimbursement is used by 
Medicare and by most major insurers. Thus, inpatient CT is a cost for the hospital, but 
may increase profits to the extent that its presence can attract patients with diagnoses 
requiring CT imaging or if the usage of CT can reduce the overall costs associated with 
CT. Nonetheless, a physician may still collect revenue for his or her professional services 
when providing treatment to inpatients that involves CT. So, inpatient CT usage 
generates revenues for physicians but not hospitals. In contrast, outpatient CT usage 
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generates revenues for hospitals. The Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) code 
corresponding to the procedure performed is assigned to an Ambulatory Payment 
Classification (APC), which is then used to determine the payments to both the physician 
and the hospital. Hospitals may submit global charges pertaining to both physician and 
hospital services if they employ physicians as salaried employees (GE Healthcare, 2010). 
Outpatient CT usage is source of revenue for both the hospital and the physician. 
Revenue growth from CT has outpaced other forms of medical spending. While 
the sum of all Medicare physician service payments grew by 31% from 2000 to 2005, 
imaging services grew by 61%, at an average rate of 10% per year. The growth rate of 
CTs for areas of the body other than the head exceeded the growth rate for imaging 
services overall. As a result of all this growth, in 2006, CT accounted for 17% of 
Medicare spending on imaging services (Winter & Ray, 2008). 
3.1.3: CT Acquisition 
CT acquisition is a complicated process wrought with uncertainty because new 
models arrive on the market each year. The capabilities of new models functionally differ 
from those of old models, as they can be used to perform new types of tests and can 
produce new types of software-based analysis. While acquirers may gain experience 
using older models of a given manufacturer or similar models of other manufacturers, this 
experience may be partially obsolete, as CT machines rapidly advance, but are replaced 
only every five to ten years. 
Different manufacturers offer somewhat different software packages for their 
machines and their machines substantially differ in their capabilities. That is, more than 
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an “apples-to-apples” comparison is involved. At the high-end of the market, in 2010, 
two different strategies were deployed. Toshiba offered a machine with one set of 320 
detectors (slices), which was more detectors than was offered by any other manufacturer, 
while Siemens offered a dual-source machine, which was able to capture images with two 
sets of detectors at once. The significant difference between these two technologies added 
to the complexity of the decision making process. In addition to differing in their number 
of slices and sources, CTs differ in their bore size (influencing their ability to handle 
obese and claustrophobic patients), software platforms, and cost. Due to the cost and 
complexity of the acquisition process, acquisition of a CT machine is a substantial 
decision for a hospital which almost always requires managerial approval. 
While different hospitals delegate ultimate purchasing authority to different 
individuals (typically the chair of the department of radiology or an equipment 
purchasing manager), in most cases the financial impact of the acquisition is considered 
substantial enough that it must be evaluated by a group of individuals including the CFO. 
Although the clinical staff may be less directly involved in the process, they often spend 
substantial time describing their desires to key decision makers (such as the chair of the 
department or the purchasing administrator), as they are the end users. The purchasing 
process takes a substantial amount of time on the part of the decision makers and staff. It 
often involves consensus building, negotiation, and research.1 While the purchasing 
process described in this dissertation is specific to one industry, the phases described are 
remarkably similar to the buying decision phases that Lilien and Wong (1984) described 
for the metalworking industry: initiating the purchase, determining the type of product to 
                                                 
1
 This description of the acquisition process was constructed using information obtained during nine 
qualitative interviews with decision makers from eight healthcare systems. 
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be purchased, drawing specifications for the product, evaluating suppliers, selecting 
suppliers, determining the cost, and giving final authorization for the purchase. 
Illuminating somewhat similar processes, Bower (1970) and Bromiley (1986) examined 
the resource allocation and purchasing process at a multiple firms using qualitative 
means. 
The purchasing decision process is at first driven by the existence of a desire to 
fulfill one or more objectives. Hospitals have a variety of objectives which can be 
broadly categorized as revenue maximization, cost reduction, care improvement, 
satisfaction of physician and consumer preferences, and research maximization (Long, 
1964; Reder, 1965; Ginsberg, 1970; Feldstein, 1971; Newhouse, 1970; Lee, 1971; Pauly 
and Redisch, 1973; Burns, Shah, Sloan, & Powell, 2009). Different hospitals have 
different priorities and hold these objectives to differing degrees. Either the clinical staff 
or the marketing department presents a desire to the acquirer. The desire for new 
equipment may result from a technological advance, an acquisition by a competitor, an 
increase in demand resulting from new clinical applications, or the obsolescence of an 
existing piece of equipment.  
 After a general desire for new equipment is identified, the desire must be further 
fleshed out through the creation of a list of equipment requirements. In some hospitals, 
the purchasing manager formally organizes a group of users and guides them in creating a 
requirements document.2 In other hospitals, the chair of the department of radiology 
                                                 
2
 CT and MRI machines are very large and expensive. Thus, when multiple departments within a hospital 
wish to utilize their output, they may jointly discuss the purchasing decision. Even if a scan is not 
ultimately read by the Department of Radiology, it usually makes little sense for other departments to 
operate machines entirely separately from the Department of Radiology. Nonetheless, on occasion, 
departments do operate machines separately. As this is a substantial decision, the Department of Radiology 
is usually aware when this occurs. 
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mentally creates a requirements document using a less formal process based on his or her 
observations and interactions with the clinical staff. While understanding the desires of 
the hospital, the acquirer must keep in mind that a business case must be developed to 
justify the acquisition. This business case will include both the cost of the acquisition, as 
well as all the potential benefits it may bring. However, not every acquisition increases 
profit in and of itself; during interviews, purchasers have recalled unprofitable 
acquisitions done for other motives, such as maintaining or increasing the quality or 
quantity of care, or retaining key personnel. If the acquisition of a CT machine can attract 
physicians or patients likely to generate large revenues, it may be very well worthwhile, 
even if the machine in isolation is not profitable. This may be the case if the machine is 
primarily used for inpatients covered by the Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) system, as 
the DRG system does not provide hospitals with reimbursement for CT utilization. 
 Once equipment requirements have been identified, the acquirer then typically 
gathers more information about the various available CT machines, such as their 
operating and maintenance costs, utility in performing different types of imaging studies, 
and image quality. This may be done through communicating with peer institutions, 
reading vendor literature, and examining information provided by trade associations and 
buying groups. Field research indicated that vendors sometimes bar institutions receiving 
substantial discounts from disclosing their prices to peers or to companies determining 
industry averages (Aunt Minnie, ECRI, etc.). As a result, the comparator prices seen 
during the research phase are likely on average slightly higher than the true average price. 
 After determining the machines that are likely to discuss the hospital’s desires and 
creating an estimate of the price range of the machines that they would like to consider, 
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the acquirer typically must present a business case for the acquisition to the CFO. The 
CFO will then assess the hospital’s budget and determine the best investments for the 
hospital to finance that year. Money can come from profit accumulated in the current or 
prior years, through the issue of a bond, through donations, or in the case of for-profit 
hospitals, through the sale of equity. Provided that the acquirer has received funding from 
the CFO, he will then work to get the best price for the machine. Sometimes, acquirers 
will strategically request quotations for products that do not strictly meet their desires to 
gain additional leverage when negotiating. Some vendors may be viewed more favorably 
than others, either as a result of prior experiences or as a result of prior acquisitions. As 
each vendor has its own flavor of the DICOM imaging standard, only partial inter-
compatibility between the equipment of different vendors exists.3 Therefore, when 
negotiating with vendors, the acquirer must weigh price against issues such as equipment 
quality and equipment compatibility with pre-existing equipment. 
 Although finalizing requirements and negotiating both the hardware and service 
elements of the acquisition contract takes time, the acquirer must consummate the deal 
within the timeframe for which the money has been allocated by the CFO, which 
normally is one fiscal year. While technology is always advancing and there are always 
benefits to waiting for the next model, the acquisition must be made within the specified 
timeframe, or else the acquirer faces the possibility that the CFO may reallocate the 
allotment of capital to another investment. In addition to preventing the acquirer from 
waiting for technological improvements, this constraint limits the ability of the acquirer 
                                                 
3
 Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine (DICOM) is a standard for storing and viewing 
medical images, such as CT scans. CT machines produce DICOM images and often come with software to 
read them. However, slight differences in the DICOM output of different manufacturers makes 
interoperability difficult. 
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to search for options after receiving a commitment of capital. Thus, the behavior of the 
acquirer may be boundedly rational due to the limited availability of search time. It is 
impossible for the acquirer to wait indefinitely for there to be less uncertainty or better 
technology (Simon, 1947). 
As a result of the variation in the hardware, software, operating costs, and fixed 
costs of CT machines, the benefits and drawbacks of each piece of equipment are slightly 
different. Thus, the acquirer must make trade-offs when making a purchasing decision as 
different machines offer different combinations of attributes. He furthermore may 
experience some imprecisely quantifiable uncertainty over the outcomes that he is likely 
to experience as a result of purchasing the equipment. 
CT Machines as a Rich Case for Study 
 While there are many non-commodity technologies whose acquisition is fraught 
with uncertainty, this study focuses on one type of medical imaging equipment—CT. CT 
machines are durable, with many hospitals retaining them for between five and fifteen 
years. They are also rather expensive and in many hospitals are among the largest 
equipment acquisitions in the budget. As a result, a substantial degree of thought must go 
into determining which machines should be acquired and into justifying purchasing 
decisions. The machines are highly complex and vary along multiple attributes, such as 
financial, medical, and research potential. Hospitals often hold multiple objectives for the 
machines which correspond to each of these attributes. Furthermore, they are somewhat 
of an experience good, in that hospitals may have reduced uncertainty about the 
capabilities and performance of a machine if they have previously owned a similar 
machine from the same manufacturer. It is often impossible for a hospital and its staff to 
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fully understand the benefits and drawbacks of a particular machine until it has been 
owned for some time.   (To partially mitigate this, some acquirers request onsite 
demonstrations at other hospitals.) While it is possible to lease machines, the difficulty of 
situating a CT machine makes it difficult for hospitals to rent and test machines. Only 39 
of the 221 respondents reported that their hospitals had used a mobile CT. As mobile CT 
has both higher fixed and operating costs than fixed CT, it was not widely used within the 
sample (Reeve & Baladi, 1995). As the machines advance, subsequent acquisitions are 
likely to be made from a different choice set than prior acquisitions. Thus, prior 
acquisitions provide only partial information that can be used to reduce the uncertainty of 
future acquisitions. 
 There are often substantial trade-offs between different models of CT machines. 
Between machines, there is variation in the image resolution, speed of image acquisition, 
cost of machine acquisition, and operating costs. Furthermore, different machines have 
different form factors. Within the Siemens CT product line, the machine with the highest 
resale value is worth over four times as much as the machine with the lowest resale value. 
The machines each have slightly different features and there is no machine that is 
dominant and most suitable for all hospitals. The market is divided between four major 
manufacturers whom each produce a handful of models. Thus, when determining which 
machine to acquire, a hospital must decide the nature of the capabilities it desires (i.e. low 
maintenance costs, novel features to be used in research, etc.) which will then drive its 
preference for manufacturer and model.4 
                                                 
4
 While all of the current machines are more or less adequate for meeting clinical needs, more advanced 
machines may be needed to meet marketing or research needs. 
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 Although this study exclusively focuses on one medical imaging technology, 
there are many technologies in other industries that share the attributes of being multi-
faceted, durable, differentiated goods that undergo technological progress. Airlines face 
similar issues when considering which aircraft to acquire or lease for their fleets 
(McCabe, 1987). Purchasing decisions must be made under uncertainty in the plastics, 
container, and food industries (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). Similar scenarios also likely 
occur in companies purchasing technology-intensive manufacturing equipment. 
Decisions involving uncertainty even occur in the context of industrial firms making 
repeated purchases of raw materials that they use as inputs (Puto, Patton, & King, 1985). 
The hospital context is ideal for operationalizing this study, as there are numerous 
hospitals, many of which have decided to adopt CT technology. The substantial degree of 
variation in the nation’s hospitals makes it possible to survey hospitals with wide 
variation in both reported objectives and uncertainties. 
3.2: The Data Collection Process 
As no suitable database pertaining to firm acquisitions existed, exploring the 
hypotheses of this study required the creation of a novel dataset. This dataset was created 
through a three-phased process. First, qualitative interviews were conducted to determine 
the relevant issues and constructs. The findings from these interviews were used to 
construct a survey which was then distributed in a pilot study. After examining both the 
completeness and nature of the responses, the survey was refined and conducted on a 
broader scale. It is the data from this second survey which is used to explore the topics of 
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this dissertation. Since this data source requires substantial discussion due to its novelty, 
this chapter explores its features, merits, and flaws. 
3.2.1: Qualitative Data 
To determine the nature of the objectives and uncertainties that hospitals have 
surrounding their CT machines, I conducted a series of nine qualitative interviews with 
decision makers from eight different health systems. To do this, I used a case study 
process loosely similar to the one proposed by Eisenhardt (1989). My case study process 
differed in that its purpose was not to derive answers in and of itself, but instead to 
prompt questions for future quantitative exploration. Each interview was approximately 
an hour long. During the interviews, I asked the respondents about how their hospitals 
acquired CT machines. I additionally asked the respondents about how they chose to 
adopt or disengage from medical imaging technologies. In selecting respondents, I 
attempted to include a broad variety of perspectives. All of the healthcare systems in the 
Philadelphia area were contacted, although not all ultimately agreed to participate. 
Additional healthcare systems in the Chicago area were also contacted. The sample 
included top academic medical centers, regionally-focused academic medical centers, a 
children’s hospital, and a community hospital. From these interviews, I determined that 
hospitals primarily consider six general attributes when purchasing CT machines: 
revenue, operating costs, ability to meet physician preferences, ability to meet consumer 
preferences, ability to deliver high-quality care, and suitability for research. All of the 
machine attributes mentioned during the interviews were grouped into these categories 
through a process loosely based off of grounded theory (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). It has 
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been suggested that hospitals may maintain multiple missions simultaneously, some of 
them other than profit maximization (Walston, Kimberly, & Burns, 2001). While there 
are obviously other attributes that hospitals consider when purchasing machines, by and 
large, they can be simplified into a combination of these six. Revenues and costs were 
measured separately because they are derived from separate sources and have very 
different sets of uncertainties associated with them. The manufacturer plays a key role in 
determining a machine’s operating costs and the variance in those costs, while insurers 
and the government influence revenues. These differences make it important to keep the 
two distinct. 
After speaking with the radiologists about several imaging modalities, I decided 
to focus the study solely on the acquisition of CT machines. While CT machines are part 
of a portfolio of technologies that includes MRI and PET/CT, I felt it was best to only 
focus on one such technology in order be sure that apples-to-apples comparisons could be 
made. In the interest of keeping the survey brief, I did not ask about the other modalities 
present at the hospitals. McNamara and Bromiley (1997) found that bankers framed risks 
narrowly, rather than as members of larger classes. It is quite possible that physicians and 
hospital administrators similarly frame the acquisition of a CT machine as an individual 
investment made under uncertainty, rather than as part of a portfolio of uncertainties. 
Given that qualitative interviews have shown that CT acquisitions typically occur one at a 
time and are not bundled with other acquisitions, it is very possible that this is the case. 
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3.2.2: Quantitative Data 
Table 1 contains data from the 2008 AHA survey on the national prevalence of CT 
machines. As can be seen, nearly 83% of American hospitals have at least one CT 
machine. However, only 32% of hospitals in the study had an advanced CT with 64 or 
more slices. 
--- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--- 
The 2008 AHA survey further revealed that the majority of hospitals are not for-
profits. Out of the 6,407 hospitals that reported the nature of their control to the 
surveyors, only 1,595 were classified as for-profit. The vast majority of the hospitals in 
the dataset are owned by non-Federal government (1,429), owned by the Federal 
government (216), or owned by a non-government non-profit institution such as a church 
(3,167). The relative lack of for-profit hospitals poses a challenge, which can be reduced 
through focusing the study on Texas, a state that is relatively rich in for-profit hospitals. 
The data used in this study were collected both through surveys sent in the mail 
and at the Radiological Society of North America (RSNA) 2010 Annual Meeting. 
Additional data were collected through a web-based survey. However, as web-based data 
collection was less fruitful than mail-based collection, more resources were devoted to 
mail-based collection. 
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3.2.3: Survey Design 
When surveying through the mail, I distributed copies of the survey along with a 
self-addressed, stamped envelope, as such a design has been shown to increase response 
rates by 2-4% (Dillman, 1978; Dillman & Moore, 1983; Dillman, 1991; Armstrong & 
Lusk, 1987). For similar reasons, commemorative stamps were used on the envelopes 
(Armstrong & Lusk, 1987). The survey was accompanied by a brief and professional 
cover letter which deliberately mentioned university sponsorship and was not 
personalized (Simon, 1967; Andreasen, 1970; Jones & Linda, 1978; Mangione, 1998). 
The survey itself was only three pages long, as surveys longer than four pages have lower 
response rates (Yammarino, Skinner, & Childers, 1991). For the same reason, it was 
printed letter-sized paper (Jansen, 1985). While it was not possible to measure each 
construct using multiple items due to this length limitation, keeping the survey short 
boosted the response rate. A pilot study with a more detailed survey was conducted at 
RSNA 2009, and received only 43 usable responses, compared to the 82 usable responses 
collected using the shortened and revised survey at RSNA 2010. Both the pilot and final 
surveys were administered at the same booth at RSNA, over the same period of time. 
Each survey was marked with a unique identifier that was linked to the name and 
address of the recipient. It was necessary to make the survey confidential but not 
anonymous, as respondent identifiers were used to link respondents with the AHA 
Survey Database. Non-responders were sent a second copy of the survey several weeks 
later. Furthermore, the identities of respondents were noted and respondents were asked 
to send additional surveys to their peers. It has been shown that confidential surveys do 
not get significantly fewer responses than anonymous surveys. Furthermore, privacy 
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concerns are unlikely to have dissuaded many people from responding, as the questions 
on the surveys are not on topics about which people are likely to have privacy concerns. 
The survey items concern vague notions whose disclosure is unlikely to endanger the 
respondent or the respondent’s firm. 
 To encourage people to respond, I enclosed a letter offering two incentives. I 
rewarded rapid response by offering a prize (an Amazon Kindle valued at $139) to the 
fiftieth respondent. Furthermore, I incentivized later responders by offering a group 
jackpot for a high response rate. I offered to donate $500 to Doctors Without Borders if 
50% of surveyed individuals responded, and framed non-response as having the potential 
to let the charity down. By doing this, I was able to tie a larger financial consequence to 
the individual behavior of respondents. I offered items via a lottery as Goritz (2004) 
demonstrated that offering items via lottery does not result in significantly worse 
response quality or quantity than offering items to each respondent. However, offering 
items via lottery has substantially lower costs, as the cost of the incentive per respondent 
declines with the number of respondents rather than rising. 
3.2.4: Response Rates 
In order to get a geographically-concentrated sample of radiologists with multiple 
respondents employed at the same hospital, I surveyed 958 (1,000 envelopes were sent; 
42 were ineligible due to relocation or self-declared ineligibility) Texas-based 
radiologists using contact information provided by the Texas Medical Board. By sending 
a survey to nearly every hospital-based Texas radiologist conducting diagnostic imaging, 
I ensured that the population I surveyed was representative of the Texas population. Two 
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waves of the survey were sent, and ultimately 47 radiologists responded; a response rate 
of 4.9%. In order to get a sample of administrators (rather than clinicians), I surveyed 480 
(491 envelopes were initially sent; 11 were ineligible due to relocation or self-declared 
ineligibility) individuals using a mailing list from the American College of Healthcare 
Executives (ACHE). I received 65 responses after two waves, for a response rate of 
13.5%. To better triangulate my results, I sent 83 respondents from the ACHE and Texas 
populations a packet containing two additional surveys for their colleagues to complete. 
These colleague responses contributed 22 surveys to the sample. 
I made an attempt to gather data via a web-based survey with comparable 
questions to the paper-based version. I hired a medical marketing firm to distribute the 
survey to a proprietary list of 4,107 radiologists. After only 4 radiologists responded to 
the initial wave, a response rate of 0.097%, I decided to pursue a solely paper-based 
approach instead. The low response rate from the web-based survey may be due to 
several factors. First, the e-mails sent by the marketing company may have been 
perceived as spam by recipients or their e-mail servers. Second, the web-based version of 
the survey may have taken longer to complete than the paper-based version of the survey. 
Finally, due to the proprietary nature of the mailing list, I had less control over the 
characteristics of the included individuals than was the case with the Texas and ACHE 
lists. As a result, it may have contained more individuals for whom the survey was not 
applicable. 
There is evidence that web-based surveys have lower response rates than mail-
based surveys. Kaplowitz, Hadlock, and Levine (2004) found that within a University 
population, the response rate from a mail-based survey was 52% greater than the 
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response rate from a web-based survey. As the population that they studied consisted 
largely of students whom were active computer users, the discrepancy may be less 
pronounced than would be the case for a somewhat older and less homogeneous 
population of radiologists. 
While it is not possible to tell how the respondents who answered the survey 
differed from typical radiologists, hospital executives, and medical administrators, there 
is information on the trends in the general non-response biases in physician surveys. 
Deehan et al. (1997) reported that among British General Practitioners (GPs), response 
rates in the first two waves of a mail survey were lower for older GPs. Male GPs were 
less likely to respond than female GPs. Using the same dataset, Templeton et al. (1997) 
reported younger GPs were more likely to respond to both mail and telephone surveys 
than older GPs. 
These findings were supported by analyzing the tenure of the respondents. For the 
two data sources with two waves (ACHE and Texas), the respondents who replied to the 
second wave had an average of six years greater tenure than the respondents who replied 
to the first wave (16 years versus 10 years). More recalcitrant second wave responders 
may be more representative of the general population than the more eager responders 
who replied to the first wave. Thus, the bias found by Deehan et al. (1997) appears to 
have been present here as well. 
Only the ACHE and Texas samples could be divided into two waves. I performed 
a series of Mann-Whitney U tests to determine whether there were systematic differences 
between the early and late responders. I found that no significant differences existed for 
most of the variables. However, there were a few variables for which the difference was 
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significant (p<.05). While only 4% of Wave 1 responders were from for-profit hospitals, 
30% of Wave 2 responders were from for-profit hospitals. Likewise, 51% of Wave 1 
responders were hospital system members, while 73% of Wave 2 responders came from 
hospitals which belonged to systems. Catholic status also differed; 12% of Wave 1 
responders came from Catholic hospitals, while 30% of Wave 2 responders came from 
Catholic hospitals. While the majority of the measures on the survey were not 
significantly different for either of the waves, the Wave 2 responders reported higher 
financial uncertainty than the Wave 1 responders (a factor mean of 3.07 versus 2.58). 
I also conducted tests to determine whether there were fundamental differences in 
the values reported in the different samples. The populations of respondents were a bit 
different in each of the samples; the Texas sample contained responses from Texas-based 
radiologists; the ACHE sample contained responses from hospital administrators that 
belonged to ACHE, and the RSNA sample contained a mix of individuals with the 
resources to attend RSNA. One-way ANOVA suggested that there was only significant 
between-source variation on the variables related to for-profit status, Critical Access 
Hospital status, membership in a hospital system, total facility expenses, total full-time 
equivalent employees, use of an administrator as a key decision maker, perceived 
financial factor uncertainty, perceived revenue uncertainty, perceived cost uncertainty, 
and the strength with which the financial factor was held. The means for each of these 
variables in the different samples is provided in Table 20. 
--- 
Insert Table 20 about here 
--- 
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 The Texas subsample had less selection bias, as all relevant Texas hospitals 
received at least one copy of the survey. However, Texas hospitals differ in several 
fundamental ways from other hospitals in the country. The fact that Texas hospitals are 
more likely to be for-profit was a motive for choosing Texas for intensive study in the 
first place. Unsurprisingly, Mann-Whitney U tests revealed that the Texas responses 
differed from the rest of the sample on their likelihood of being from for-profit hospitals. 
They also differed in system membership, financial factor uncertainty, cost uncertainty, 
the number of payer contracts, and total facility expenses as well. The greater propensity 
of the Texas respondents to come from for-profit hospitals may have driven the other 
observed differences as well. A Mann-Whitney U test of the entire sample revealed that 
for-profit hospitals have significantly greater perceived financial factor uncertainty than 
other hospitals. 
 To account for all of these differences, I incorporated variables indicating the 
source of the data into my models. A series of dummy variables were used to account for 
any differences between the ACHE, Texas, and other sources, when compared to the 
baseline source. I supplemented the mail-based and web-based survey data with in-person 
surveys conducted at the 2010 Annual Meeting of the Radiological Society of North 
America (RSNA). This was used as a baseline, in that it contained a broad national 
sample of hospitals, and contained respondents with a variety of backgrounds. RSNA was 
attended by radiologists, radiological technicians, medical physicists, and hospital 
administrators. As a result, RSNA enabled me to diversify my sample through surveying 
a broader range of individuals.  Over 60,000 people were in attendance (RSNA, 2010). I 
stood in a booth on the tradeshow floor and asked every passerby who was a member of 
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the organization or involved in sciences associated with radiology, “Do you deal with 
CT?” If the person responded in the affirmative, I then proceeded to ask, “Do you have 
any involvement in the CT purchasing decisions of a hospital?” If I received an 
affirmative response, I then proceeded to ask whether they would be willing to fill out a 
survey. Respondents were compensated with an item of minimal value (gourmet 
chocolate bar worth $3). Only respondents employed in hospitals based in the United 
States were included in the sample, which contained 82 responses. 
There may have been a number of factors at play driving the low response rate. 
To respond, the recipient had to: be employed at a hospital with a CT, have been 
employed at the time at which the machine was acquired, and have been involved enough 
in the acquisition process to feel comfortable answering the questions. Only 6% of 
respondents reported that their confidence in the accuracy of their responses to the survey 
was less than ‘4’ out of ‘7’. As it is unlikely that 94% of the people whom received the 
surveys were involved in the CT acquisition process, many of the less confident 
recipients may have been non-responders. To illustrate this point, only 3% of the ACHE 
and 2% of the Texas survey respondents had a confidence level of below ‘4’ out of ‘7’. 
Meanwhile, 9% of the RSNA survey respondents had a confidence level below ‘4’ out of 
‘7’. The RSNA respondents had the pressure of the presence of the experimenter that the 
mail-based respondents did not experience. Furthermore, many of the RSNA attendees 
offered the survey refused to take it due to their lack of involvement in the CT acquisition 
process. 
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3.2.5: Survey Issues 
While conducting the survey for this research, feasibility must be balanced with 
validity. Access to key decision makers is a scarce commodity as these individuals tend 
to be both highly busy and highly compensated. As such, the survey must do its best to 
accurately describe a hospital’s decision making process in as few questions as possible. 
The three major forms of biases that this survey presents are common method 
bias, retrospective recall bias, and sole source bias. In short, the dependent and 
independent variables may be somewhat correlated simply because they are obtained 
from the same form and provided by one individual in one sitting. As some of the 
questions ask about past perceptions and decisions, retrospective recall may be an issue. 
Likewise, the use of a single respondent introduces sole source bias, as the responses of 
the respondent may not be representative of the organization. 
Before attempting to remedy common method bias, it is important to consider 
whether it is even an issue. It has been argued that common method bias (monomethod 
bias) is not as great a problem as it has been claimed (Spector, 2006). In fact, the bias 
may serve to blunt the significance of findings, rather than increase them. Nonetheless, 
some measures can be taken to reduce issues related to the use of a common method. It 
has been suggested that increasing the length of the scale can reduce this bias, as people 
have more difficulty remembering their prior responses if they made them on a scale with 
more options (Harrison, McLaughlin, & Coalter, 1996; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & 
Podsakoff, 2003). 
This finding on the influence of additional items on common method bias was 
part of the motivation to use a 7-point Likert scale, rather than the traditional 5-point 
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design, as was used in the pilot study. Furthermore 7-point Likert scales were used 
because Cox (1980) found that scales with seven items, plus or minus two, most 
effectively transmit information. Cox further suggested that scales with an odd number of 
response alternatives be used if it is possible to have a neutral response. Concurring with 
Cox, Matell and Jacoby (1971) found that when asked theoretical questions, subjects had 
the most test-retest reliability for 8-point Likert scales, and the second most test-retest 
reliability for 7-point scales. 
Retrospective surveys, such as this one, may result in inaccurate responses. 
Nonetheless, they are a viable research methodology if used carefully (Miller, Cardinal, 
& Glick, 1997). Huber and Power (1985) noted that people tend to provide inaccurate 
information for one of four reasons; they are motivated to do it, they inadvertently do it 
due to perceptual or cognitive errors, they lack information related to the question asked, 
or they have been subjected to an inappropriate data elicitation procedure. The second 
and third reasons could potentially be a result of the decision having occurred in the past. 
To reduce errors related to the first, I have made the survey confidential, and have only 
identified respondents and hospitals through the use of a secret serial number. To reduce 
the second and third types of error, Huber and Power recommend minimizing time 
between the event in question and the collection of data. By focusing on the most 
valuable CT machine, which is likely to be the machine most recently acquired, this study 
reduces this bias. 
Free reporting has been shown to reduce errors in retrospective reporting (Miller, 
Cardinal, & Glick, 1997). Although it is not possible to use free recall entirely for this 
instrument, it is possible to anchor the respondents’ answers on their recollections before 
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having them provide answers to Likert scale questions. This survey promotes self-
anchoring by providing respondents a brief free response area to explain their motives for 
acquiring a CT before having them complete Likert scales. 
It has been claimed that using a sole reporter, such as the CEO, is not an accurate 
means of assessing corporate strategy (Bowman & Ambrosini, 1997). Furthermore, it has 
been shown that better predictions of buying behavior within group buying decisions can 
be made if multiple informants are used (Wilson and Lilien, 1992). While it is not 
preferable to use a sole source, when it is necessary, Huber & Power (1985) recommend 
identifying and surveying the person with the most knowledge of the issue of interest. 
When possible, multiple informants from individual hospitals have been used. 
Comparing the responses of multiple informants makes it possible to assess the accuracy 
with which respondents have recalled information. Triangulating findings reduces same-
source bias. This triangulation was done both through mailing and e-mailing additional 
survey forms for respondents to give to their colleagues and through encouraging 
colleague groups encountered at RSNA to have all members complete the survey. 
Ultimately, the sample consisted of 145 hospitals with a single informant, 22 hospitals 
with two informants, 8 hospitals with three informants, and 2 hospitals with four 
informants. Thus, there are multiple informants for 32 of the hospitals in the sample. If 
the sample is restricted to only contain respondents whom were both employed at their 
hospital in the year prior to the acquisition of the current most valuable CT and who rated 
their confidence as their responses as 4 or greater on a 7-point Likert scale, the sample 
consisted of 126 hospitals with a single informant, 13 hospitals with two informants, 5 
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hospitals with three informants, and 2 hospitals with four informants. Under these 
restrictions, there are multiple informants for 20 of the hospitals in the sample. 
In order to determine the reliability of the variables, I used the reliability of the 
within-group means computed using one-way ANOVA. One-way ANOVA produces 
measures of both between and within group variation, which can then be used to 
determine reliability by dividing the difference of the between mean squared variance and 
the within mean squared variance by the between mean squared variance (Leoutsakos, 
2006). The estimated reliability of a mean is a number between 0 and 1, with 0 indicating 
complete within group disagreement and 1 indicating complete within group agreement. 
Reliability ranging from 0.41 to 0.60 is considered fair, while reliability from 0.61 to 0.80 
is considered moderate, and 0.81 and above is considered substantial (Landis & Koch, 
1977; Shrout, 1998). Table 2 contains the within-group reliability measures for the 
variables on the survey. 
--- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--- 
 Analyzing the reliability of the variables produced a number of findings. First, the 
reliability of responses concerning the current most valuable CT is greater than the 
reliability of the responses concerning the prior most valuable CT. This makes sense, as 
not all of the respondents were employed at their respective hospitals at the time of the 
purchase of the prior most valuable CT. Furthermore, the details of the machine may be a 
more distant memory. There was somewhat stronger disagreement on the extent to which 
hospitals held minimizing operating costs and maximizing the quality of care as 
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objectives. Likewise, there was substantial disagreement on the extent to which operating 
costs were being minimized before the acquisition of the most valuable CT. Furthermore, 
there was substantial disagreement on the extent to which hospitals experienced 
uncertainty over the revenues and operating costs associated with the most valuable CT 
before acquisition. There was also disagreement over whether the key decision maker 
was an administrator or clinician.  
Although the retrospective analysis conducted in this study may distort the 
findings and introduce problems with recall, it also has advantages. Fischer, Carmon, 
Ariely, and Zauberman (1999) found that the preferences that individuals construct can 
depend on the task goal of the construction process. When respondents are asked about 
objectives constructed in the past, this is less likely to be an issue, as no new objective 
construction is required. If the respondent was at all involved in the purchasing process, it 
is likely that he or she constructed or received the hospital’s purchasing objectives before 
the purchase was made. Thus, the responses are less likely to be sensitive to method of 
inquiry or problems arising from the priming of objectives (Van Osselaer et al., 2005). 
Nonetheless, it has been shown that when goals are attained, they become more attractive 
when retrospectively ranked among goals, and when they are not attained, they become 
less attractive (Filer, 1952). If Filer’s finding holds in this setting, then a relationship will 
exist between the retrospective ratings of the objectives and the extents to which they 
were ultimately achieved.  
Another issue introduced by the use of a retrospective analysis is variation in the 
timing of acquisition. As CT machines are durable goods, hospitals do not buy new 
machines every year. Thus, when acquirers are surveyed, they respond in the present, 
 Powell 71 
which may be several years after the relevant equipment has been acquired. The passage 
of time is likely to reduce uncertainty about technological acquisitions, not increase it. 
This issue will likely reduce the strength of the relationship between uncertainty and 
goals by in general reducing the level of uncertainty reported by hospitals that have 
owned the machines longer. The problem posed by this is not likely to be high, as 60% of 
overall responses, and 65% of responses by people employed at the time of acquisition 
and with certainty of their response greater than or equal to 4 out of 7, reported that their 
most valuable machine had been purchased in the last three years. 
Selection Bias 
Another major concern that may be had about the dataset is that the hospitals that 
responded to the survey are somehow fundamentally different than the average American 
hospital with a CT machine. For one, the hospitals in the sample are far more likely to be 
based in Texas, as Texas radiologists were intensely sampled in order to get more for-
profit hospitals in the sample. The sample included 177 different hospitals, of which 173 
could be matched to hospitals in the 2008 American Hospital Association Annual (AHA) 
Survey Database. I used the Mann-Whitney U test to determine whether the responding 
hospitals differed from the rest of the population on a number of characteristics. I chose 
the Mann-Whitney U test over Student’s t-test because it is more robust to outliers and 
does not require the assumption that the data be normally-distributed. The means for 
several characteristics of these hospitals differed from other hospitals in the overall 
population on the following: 
• Number of HMO contracts (p=.0187; 12.7 in sample vs. 9.2 out of sample) 
• Number of PPO contracts (p=.0000; 27.0 in sample vs. 19.3 out of sample) 
• Number of hospital beds set up and staffed (p=.0000; 281 in sample vs. 129 out of 
sample) 
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• Number of hospital Medicaid days (p=.0033; 290 in sample vs. 357 out of sample), 
• Total facility expenses excluding bad debt (p=.0000; 350,000,000 in sample vs. 
136,000,000 out of sample) 
• Average daily census (p=.0000; 253 in sample vs. 112 out of sample) 
• Number of FTE personnel (p=.0000; 2440 in sample vs. 980 out of sample) 
• Number of FTE radiology technicians (p=.0000; 62.4 in sample vs. 26.9 out of sample) 
• Number of FTE physicians and dentists (p=.0000; 80.5 in sample vs. 21.8 out of sample) 
• Whether facility is a critical access hospital (p=.0000; 6% in sample vs. 26% out of 
sample) 
• Whether facility is a rural referral center (p=.0415; 11% in sample vs. 7% out of sample) 
• Whether facility is Catholic Church operated (p=.0944; 17% in sample vs. 13% out of 
sample) 
 
However, the hospitals did not differ significantly (p<.05) on the following: 
• Percentage of the hospital’s revenue paid on a capitated basis 
• Percentage of the hospital’s revenue paid on a shared risk basis 
• Number of hospital admissions 
• Number of hospital Medicare days 
• Hospital payroll expenses 
• Hospital total expenses, including bad debt 
• Property, plant, and equipment, at cost 
• Accumulated depreciation 
• Total capital expenditures 
• Whether facility is a community hospital 
• Whether facility is the sole community provider 
 
The results of the Mann-Whitney U tests suggest that the respondents to the survey came 
from hospitals with stronger managed care relationships and larger facilities (more beds 
and personnel). As all of the hospitals from the Texas sample were Rural Referral 
Centers, it is not surprising that Rural Referral Centers are overrepresented in the overall 
sample.  Although every hospital in both the in sample and out of sample populations had 
either purchased or leased a CT machine, the in sample hospitals may have had the scale 
and financial resources to have done so more recently. The AHA Survey Database does 
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not provide information that can be used to determine how recently a CT acquisition has 
occurred. 
3.2.6: The American Hospital Association Annual Survey Database 
2008 American Hospital Association Annual Survey Variables 
Using the respondent’s hospital’s name, and in cases of ambiguity, the address as well, 
hospitals mentioned in the survey were paired with hospitals in the 2008 American 
Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey database. Doing this had two advantages. 
First, it enabled the creation of a briefer survey instrument, increasing the likelihood of 
response. Second, it likely increased the accuracy of the responses. It is somewhat 
unlikely that radiologists and radiology administrators have a precise understanding of 
the financial performance of their hospitals and the nature of their hospitals’ managed 
care contracts. The American Hospital Association had both the authority and budget to 
ensure that this sort of data was collected precisely. 
 While the AHA Database contains several measures related to costs, it does not 
contain any measures related to revenue, profitability, or any other measure of overall 
financial performance. Likewise, no measures of uninvested capital are reported. 
Although the survey instrument used by the AHA asks hospitals to report their revenue, 
the AHA has an agreement with respondents that this information will not be disclosed to 
the public. This is unfortunate, as it forces this study to use self-reported assessments of 
financial performance. Furthermore, as these measures are not precisely available, it is 
not possible for any part of this study to consider the influence of slack resources. 
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3.3: Variables 
 The survey discussed in this section is provided in its entirety in the appendix. 
The purpose of this section is to describe the definitions of all of the variables on the 
survey, the definitions of all variables derived from survey, and the definitions of the 
variables incorporated from the American Hospital Association 2008 Annual Survey. 
Crum and Derkinderen (1981) stated that the literature on multiple-objective 
decision making suggests that the maximum number of goal variables that can be handled 
by a decision maker ranges between five and nine. Keeping this in mind, this study 
focuses on six objectives for CT acquisition that are likely to be relevant to most 
hospitals: maximizing revenue, minimizing operating costs, satisfying physician 
preferences, satisfying consumer preferences, providing high-quality patient care, and 
performing novel research. While only the research objective is not directly or indirectly 
tied to profit maximization, different strategies for profit maximization can be employed. 
For instance, some hospitals might employ a high-volume strategy with low margins, 
while others might employ a high-margin strategy that results in lower volumes. As a 
result, it is possible for there to be diversity in the importance placed on the objectives in 
question, even if all of the hospitals are profit-maximizing. To capture this, the 
independent variables on the survey instrument focused on these six attributes, but asked 
about them in a variety of different ways. Each of these attributes is considered 
separately, as there is evidence that multiple uncertainties should be modeled separately, 
rather than as a single construct (Miller & Bromiley, 1990; Wiseman & Catanach, 1997). 
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3.3.1: Dependent Variables 
 There are two sets of dependent variables used in this study. The first are several 
measures of uncertainty about the most valuable CT machine at the time of acquisition. 
These dependent variables are used in the analyses of Hypotheses 1-3, which examine the 
determinants of a hospital’s pre-purchase uncertainties about its most valuable CT 
machine. Hypotheses 4 and 5 are tested with a single dependent variable; the present 
value of the most valuable CT machine. 
Pre-purchase uncertainty. To determine the level of uncertainty the hospital faced before 
acquiring its most valuable CT system, respondents were given 7-point Likert scales for 
each of the objectives, and prompted to answer, “Before your hospital obtained its most 
valuable CT system, how certain was your radiology department’s leadership of the CT’s 
ability to meet the following objectives?” A rating of ‘1’ corresponded to “Very 
uncertain”, while a rating of ‘7’ corresponded to “Very certain.” After providing the 
ratings, respondents were asked, “How well do you feel you recalled these 
uncertainties?” Again, they were provided a 7-point Likert scale. This time, a rating of 
‘1’ corresponded to “Very poorly” and a rating of ‘7’ corresponded to “Very well”. 
In the models for which uncertainty is treated as a dependent variable, revenue 
and cost uncertainty have been merged into a factor called “Financial Uncertainty”, 
weighted by the weightings calculated by Exploratory Factor Analysis. Likewise, 
physician preference, consumer preference, and care uncertainty have been merged into a 
factor called “Customer Desires” uncertainty. Exploratory Factor Analysis suggested that 
research uncertainty was not part of either factor. In the models in which uncertainty is 
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used as a predictor of the present value of the acquisition, the uncertainties were not 
grouped into factors so that a comparison of revenue and cost uncertainty is possible. 
Present value of the most valuable CT. The outcome examined by Hypotheses 4 and 5, 
which explore the determinants of the value of the hospital’s investment, is the present 
value of the hospital’s most valuable CT machine. As purchasing agreements are often 
confidential, it will not be possible to obtain the actual amount of money spent on 
equipment. Furthermore, due to depreciation, the acquisition prices of equipment are 
unlikely to be reflective of their contemporary value. Thus, the CT machines were instead 
valued at their common fair market value. Just as the Kelley Blue Book can be used to 
determine a rough price for a particular make of car, the pricing information on ECRI can 
be used to determine the rough value of imaging equipment. The prices being compared 
were all determined simultaneously, and thus account for changes that have occurred due 
to depreciation. 
Rather than examining the most recent acquisition, the most valuable piece of 
equipment owned was used as a measure of the most advanced investment. It is quite 
possible that the most recent imaging equipment acquisition is that of a “workhorse” 
machine, of limited technical sophistication, but of great clinical value. Workhorses built 
according to less advanced designs command lower prices than the latest and greatest 
machines. Fair market value allows all machines to be compared, and discounts advanced 
older machines over time. One issue that may arise is that some hospitals may have 
acquired a given model later than others, and as a result, were able to make the 
acquisition at a lower price. In order to control for this, the number of years that have 
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elapsed since the acquisition of the most valuable machine was included as a control in 
the model. (The year of acquisition was reported by respondents on the survey.) 
3.3.2: Independent Variables 
 While the three models examining the determinants of uncertainty and the two 
models examining the determinants of acquisition value each share the same dependent 
and control variables, each model utilizes different independent variables. While most of 
the models use the same types of independent variables for all the different CT attributes, 
the normative models for revenue and cost use substantially different independent 
variables. 
Normative Models 
 Both the normative models testing the influence of economic factors on 
uncertainty (Hypothesis 1) and the normative models testing the influence of economic 
factors on acquisition value (Hypothesis 4) used the same independent variables. Namely, 
they included one factor related to revenues (the Payer Contracts factor) and one factor 
related to costs (the Operating Costs factor). Both of these factors were interacted with 
the for-profit and government control type variables. 
Revenue in the Normative Model 
The normative model considered the influence of revenue by examining hospitals’ 
managed care participation and investment time horizon as independent variables. 
Information on managed care participation was derived from the AHA Database, while 
information on the hospital’s investment time horizon was derived from the survey. 
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 The AHA Database contains counts of the number of HMO contracts and 
number of PPO contracts possessed by the hospital at the time of the survey. These 
variables are all important because they indicate the diversity of revenue sources that the 
hospital has and the extent that it is exposed to uncertainty in its payments. Hospitals with 
many HMO and PPO contracts likely have more leverage in negotiating each one, as 
each contract may represent a smaller percentage of revenue. These two variables were 
combined into the Payer Contracts factor using the weights provided by Exploratory 
Factor Analysis. 
Furthermore, the normative models consider the lifespan of the CT. Respondents 
were asked to provide estimates of the minimum lifespan and maximum lifespan of a 
typical CT system at their hospital. Minimum lifespan ranged from 2 to 15 years, and 
maximum lifespan ranged from 2 to 20 years. This variable is important because it 
defines the time horizon of the hospital’s investment. Hospitals buying CTs with shorter 
time horizons for their CTs will need to have greater revenue each year to offset the cost 
of their acquisition than hospitals with longer time horizons. 
Cost in the Normative Model 
 The hospital’s total facility expenses, property, plant and equipment at cost, and 
total full-time equivalent (FTE) employees were considered for inclusion in the 
normative model. These numbers were all derived from the AHA database. After looking 
at the correlations between these variables, it became clear that total full-time equivalent 
employees and property, plant, and equipment at cost were relatively independent, and 
that total facility expenses could be excluded. 
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It should be noted that these variables are potentially measures of the broader 
construct of organizational size. Measuring personnel available to an organization (FTEs) 
and measuring inputs and outputs (total facility expenses and property, plant, and 
equipment at cost) are both means of examining organizational size (Kimberly, 1976). As 
a result, some correlation between these constructs is to be expected. Ultimately, the 
number of FTEs was highly correlated with total facility expenses (.9824), making it 
necessary to exclude one of the two measures. The measure of property, plant, and 
equipment at cost was poorly correlated with the number of FTEs (.0877) and the total 
facility expenditures (.0659). To manage this issue, only the measure of property, plant, 
and equipment at cost and the number of FTEs were retained. While these are both 
measures of size, one is a measure of capital and the other is a measure of labor. 
The overall number of FTE (full-time equivalent) personnel was included as a 
measure of staffing and size. Hospitals with more FTEs are able to care for more patients 
and have higher payroll expenses. Several measures of the hospital’s size were extracted 
from the AHA dataset. The hospital’s number of staffed beds, admissions, Medicaid 
inpatient days, and Medicare inpatient days were all considered for inclusion as 
independent variables. These variables ultimately proved unusable, as information for 
bed staffing, admissions, Medicaid inpatient days, and Medicare inpatient days were only 
available for only 52, 52, 46, and 44 of the 221 responses respectively. As a result, 
staffing was used as a proxy for hospital volume, as staffing information was available 
for the majority of the responses. It is important to control for hospital size, as there is 
evidence that size may both enable change through enabling economies of scale and may 
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hinder change through causing organizational inertia (Walston, Kimberly, & Burns, 
2001).  
The measures of hospital scale considered for use in these models was property, 
plant, and equipment at cost. Payroll expenses were not included because information 
on payroll expenses only was present for 52 of the 221 responses. It is important to 
consider expenses because hospitals differ in their expense mix. For instance, a hospital 
more focused on nursing and rehabilitation than treatment might have lower property, 
plant, and equipment expenses. The relative financial impact of a CT machine decreases 
as the overall size of a hospital’s budget (and likely, equipment inventory) increases. 
Furthermore, larger hospitals are less likely to be strongly financially affected by the 
acquisition of a single machine than are smaller hospitals. 
Performance-aspiration disparity (BTOF/PT) Models 
Using the six CT machine objectives (maximizing revenue, minimizing operating 
costs, satisfying physician preferences, satisfying consumer preferences, providing high-
quality patient care, and performing novel research) and 7-point Likert scales, 
respondents were asked to rate the provide ratings in response to the prompt: “Before 
your hospital obtained its current most valuable CT system, from the perspective of your 
radiology department’s leadership, how well did its CT systems meet its objectives of: 
(followed by a list of the objectives).” A rating of ‘1’ corresponded to “Not at all”, while 
a rating of ‘7’ corresponded to “Very well.” This single question was meant to 
encapsulate both prior performance and aspirations in an integrated fashion. Answers 
above ‘4’ were considered to be performance above the aspiration level, and answers 
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below ‘4’ were considered to be performance below the aspiration level. Using an 
integrated measure was beneficial, as it ensured that the performance and aspirations 
reported related to the same construct. 
After the surveys were gathered, revenue and cost were subsequently grouped into the 
financial factor and physician preferences, consumer preferences, and care were 
subsequently grouped into the customer desires factor using Exploratory Factor Analysis. 
For the models examining performance-aspiration disparity, the value of each factor was 
used as the independent variable in a separate regression, in which it was paired with the 
uncertainty level for that factor, which served as the independent variable. Thus, the two 
factors were tested separately. 
Bounded Rationality Models 
Like the Performance-Aspiration Disparity models, the Bounded Rationality 
models all separately considered different pairs of independent and dependent variables 
corresponding to different factors. Respondents were asked to rate each of the six 
objectives on a 7-point Likert scale in response to the question, “At the time of the 
acquisition of the current most valuable CT, how important to your radiology 
department’s leadership were each of the following objectives for the machine?” A rating 
of ‘1’ corresponded to “Not at all”, while a rating of ‘7’ corresponded to “Very 
important.” Responses were once again paired into the financial factor and the customer 
desires factor using Exploratory Factor Analysis. Each of these factors was then 
separately paired with the measure of uncertainty for the factor in question, with factor 
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importance acting as the independent variable and factor uncertainty acting as the 
dependent variable. 
Prospect Theory Models 
The measure of reported uncertainty used as the independent variable in the 
Prospect Theory models was similar to the one used as the dependent variable for 
Hypotheses 1-3. However, responses were left in their raw form, instead of being 
grouped into factors. Once again, to determine the level of uncertainty the hospital faced 
before acquiring its most valuable CT system, respondents were given 7-point Likert 
scales for each of the objectives, and prompted to answer, “Before your hospital obtained 
its most valuable CT system, how certain was your radiology department’s leadership of 
the CT’s ability to meet the following objectives?” A rating of ‘1’ corresponded to “Very 
uncertain”, while a rating of ‘7’ corresponded to “Very certain.” Afterwards, the scale 
was flipped, so that a value of ‘1’ corresponded to “Very certain” and a value of ‘7’ 
corresponded to “Very uncertain.” After providing the ratings, respondents were asked, 
“How well do you feel you recalled these uncertainties?” For this follow-up question, 
they were provided a 7-point Likert scale. This time, a rating of ‘1’ corresponded to 
“Very poorly” and a rating of ‘7’ corresponded to “Very well”. 
3.3.3: Control Variables 
A variety of control variables were included in the models. To enable apples-to-
apples comparisons to be made, the same set of control variables were included in all of 
the models. Since the same control variables were included in both the uncertainty and 
 Powell 84 
acquisition value models, variables were selected based on whether there was evidence 
from the literature that they might influence either. 
Hospital Control Type 
The AHA Database indicates the nature of the hospital’s control type. This 
variable has been broken into three separate binary variables, indicating whether the 
hospital is for-profit, government-run, or non-profit. For the purposes of the 
regressions, non-profit is the omitted category. As the majority of the hospitals in the 
dataset are non-profit, it made sense to compare the influence of for-profit and 
government-run control to non-profit control. 
Hospital control type was included as a control variable because it substantially 
influences a hospital’s mission and means of financing. Holistically speaking, for-profit 
and non-profit organizations have fundamentally different objectives. For-profit 
organizations first and foremost have the objective of generating a profit for their 
shareholders. Non-profit hospitals may have any number of objectives, but ultimately, 
they are forbidden from distributing their profits to people. If they profit, they must put 
the money to a charitable use, such as giving it away through charity care or reinvesting it 
in the firm (Burns, et al., 2009). Furthermore, the organizational forms differ in their 
potential methods of financing investments. For-profit hospitals may take on debt or sell 
equity, while government and non-profit hospitals may only take on debt. Government 
and non-profit hospitals also have the potential to receive donations or exogenous grants 
from the government. 
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There is evidence that the effect of technological investments differs for for-profit 
and non-profit hospitals; Parente and Van Horne (2007) found that when for-profit 
hospitals invest in health IT, the effect is a reduction in the number of patient bed days 
and bed staffing costs, while in non-profit hospitals, the result is an increase in the 
quantity of services supplied. There is some evidence that non-profit hospitals are more 
likely to buy technologically-advanced CT machines, even though these machines may 
not yield higher reimbursements (Ladapo, Horwitz, Weinstein, Gazelle, & Cutler, 2009). 
Given that for-profit and non-profit hospitals fundamentally differ with respect to 
their objective of producing a profit for shareholders, it is quite possible that the two 
types of hospitals will have different objectives when purchasing CT machines. 
Thompson and McEwen (1958) noted that "the hospital may compete with the midwife, 
the faith-healer, the ‘quack’ and the patent-medicine manufacturer, as well as with 
neighboring hospitals, despite the fact that general hospitals … are not usually recognized 
as competitive." Thus, competitive objectives will be possessed by even non-profit 
organizations. Nonetheless, the nature of an organization may affect the nature of its 
competitive objectives. 
While non-profit hospitals have a firm-wide set of objectives that does not include 
generating a profit for shareholders, they must generate a profit in order to pay back debt 
or generate cash reserves to spend on new initiatives, such as expansion. They also often 
aim for some divisions to be profitable in order to offset losses from other, less lucrative 
divisions. Furthermore, while a hospital may be non-profit, if its radiologists are not 
salaried, they will have a vested interest in maximizing their own income. Thus, while the 
hospital itself is not turning a profit, the radiologists can profit from providing services. 
 Powell 86 
Pauly and Redisch (1973) suggested that non-profit hospitals have the objective of 
maximizing physician income, in contrast to prior literature on hospital ownership and 
hospital objectives that had suggested that non-profit hospitals maximize the quantity and 
quality of care subject to a budget constraint (Newhouse, 1970; Feldstein, 1971), 
maximize quantity subject to a budget and quality constraint (Long, 1964), maximize 
weighted output subject to a budget and availability of capital constraint (Ginsberg, 
1970), maximize the physical capital of the hospital (Lee, 1971), or try to treat the 
greatest number of patients bringing the greatest professional prestige (Reder, 1965). 
From these papers, it is clear that hospitals have a large number of potential objectives. 
Differences in objectives may cause hospitals to have differences in aspirations, 
uncertainties, and acquisition choices. Controlling for hospital control type helps account 
for this issue. 
Nature of the Key Decision Maker 
Respondents were asked whether the key decision maker in their hospital’s CT 
acquisition process was an Administrator or Clinician. Some respondents indicated that 
it was both. As this was a minority of hospitals, only the variable indicating whether an 
administrator was the key decision maker was included as a control. 
There is some evidence that administrators have different goals for organizations 
than clinicians and that they may promote different innovations than members of the 
clinical team. Prior literature has shown that while investors and other actors may prefer 
managers to be uncertainty-seeking, managers themselves may be uncertainty-averse as 
they have no real protection against losses specific to their firm or division and are less 
able to reduce it through diversification as an investor can (Mayers & Smith, 1982; 
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Coffee, 1986; Greenwald & Stiglitz, 1990). As clinicians build their reputations on their 
medical competence rather than their administrative competence, their careers may be 
less harmed than those of administrators in the event a poor investment is made that 
irreparably distresses the hospital. Furthermore, different types of decision makers may 
have different attitudes towards technology. It has been shown the involvement of the 
chief medical officer in administrative activities promotes the adoption of technological 
innovations (Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981). 
Respondent Characteristics 
 It is possible that responses were biased by the respondent’s characteristics. As 
respondents whom were the key decision maker in the acquisition process may have been 
privy to a greater amount of information than those whom were not, I controlled for 
whether the respondent is the key decision maker. Furthermore, for the same reasons 
that I controlled for whether the key decision maker was an administrator, I controlled for 
whether the respondent was a physician (had an MD or DO). Physicians may be more 
attuned to issues related to customer desires and demand (i.e. how well machines satisfy 
physician preferences, consumer preferences, and the needs of care), and less attuned to 
issues related to operating costs and the revenue the CTs generate for hospitals.  
Respondent tenure was likewise included as a control, as more senior respondents may 
be considering a wider (and older) universe of CTs when formulating their responses. 
Finally, the source of the response was included as a control, as the propensity of 
marginal respondents to respond may have differed depending on whether the survey 
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arrived via the mail, was distributed by a colleague, or was administered by the 
experimenter in person. 
Hospital’s Multi-hospital Organization Membership 
 Membership in an entity containing other hospitals may influence both the 
uncertainty a hospital has when acquiring a CT machine and the price at which it is able 
to acquire it. These multi-hospital organizations may share information on CT 
performance, reducing the uncertainty of their members. Furthermore, they may engage 
in collective bargaining with manufacturers, reducing the actual price at which equipment 
is acquired. 
The AHA Database contains both a binary variable indicating whether the 
hospital is a member of a system. A hospital system is a group of two or more hospitals 
managed, owned, or sponsored by a common entity. Systems may be able to share 
resources between member hospitals if they are geographically-proximate and may be 
able to use the patient volume produced by the system as leverage in negotiations with 
both insurers and vendors. Thus, system membership may influence the cost at which a 
hospital can acquire a CT machine and the degree of uncertainty a hospital has during the 
process. 
The dataset contains both a binary variable indicating whether the hospital is a 
member of a network and an additional variable uniquely identifying the network to 
which the hospital belongs. A hospital network is a collection of hospitals that coordinate 
their delivery of services to a community. They tend to consist of hospitals that are 
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geographically-proximate, and may be able to use their joint decision making ability as 
leverage in negotiations with insurers and vendors. 
There is evidence that alliances influence both hospital behavior and the revenues 
and costs experienced by hospitals. Jiang (2009) found that system hospitals with local 
partners have lower adoption rates of MRI technology; an effect with strengthens the 
closer the hospitals are to partners whom have already adopted. However, system 
hospitals without local partners behave like independent hospitals, and in general, have 
higher rates of adoption. Nonetheless, there is somewhat contradictory evidence that the 
horizontal integration increases the marketing efficiency and market power of hospitals, 
but not the efficiency or quality with which services are produced (Dranove, Durkac, & 
Shanley, 1996; Cuellar & Gertler, 2005). 
The effect of the presence of non-local hospitals within hospital systems is 
unclear. Krishnan (2001) found that hospital mergers and acquisitions result in price 
increases which are based upon the market share that the hospital system has at the 
Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) level, indicating that system creation influences revenue 
generation. In contradiction, Young, Desai, & Hellinger (2000) found that hospitals that 
exerted market power through higher prices did so to a greater extent when nonlocal 
hospitals were in their systems. Overall, the influence of system status on pricing power 
has been demonstrated in situations in which hospitals both have and lack other system 
members in their local markets (Melnick & Keeler, 2007). 
The models all also control for whether the CT machine was purchased or not. 
This information was obtained from the survey responses. Leasing offers greater 
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flexibility when a hospital has uncertainty over the intended lifespan of its equipment, 
and may be preferable in these situations (Bierman & Smidt, 1984). 
Experience with CT Systems 
To understand how brand experiences may have impacted responses, respondents 
were asked to indicate the brands of CT currently installed at the hospital, formerly 
installed at the hospital, experienced during prior employment, and rented by the hospital 
(as a mobile unit). Checkboxes were provided for each of these categories for the 
following brands: GE, Hitachi, Philips, Siemens, Toshiba, and Other. 
 To avoid only being able to make brand-specific conclusions, in addition to the 
problem of having 24 brand experience-related variables, the control variables used in the 
model were composite measures constructed from the variables on the survey. One such 
control variable was a measure of the number of brands experienced. For each brand, 
this variable was set to 1 if the respondent had ever encountered the brand in question 
through it being currently installed at the hospital, formerly installed at the hospital, 
experienced during prior employment, or rented by the hospital. The variable was set to 0 
otherwise. These variables can be used to determine whether a respondent’s encounters 
with a brand influence his or her acquisition decisions. 
 Two other variables were included as controls for brand experience in the model. 
These two variables, unlike the brands experienced control, do not consider the 
experiences of the respondent. Instead, they only consider the experiences of the hospital. 
The new brand binary variable was set to 1 if a brand that previously had no presence at 
the hospital made the current most valuable CT machine. Meanwhile, the same brand 
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binary variable was set to 1 if the current most valuable CT was made by the same brand 
as the hospital’s prior most valuable CT. Hospitals in which the current and prior most 
valuable CTs are of the same brand have more up-to-date information on the capabilities 
of the machines offered by that brand. 
Cost of Capital 
 As the prices used as proxies for the value of the most valuable CT are not the 
true prices that the hospitals paid to buy or lease the machine, but instead the present 
values of the machines in question, it is necessary to control for factors that might 
influence the cost of capital for either the hospital or the firm leasing the machine to the 
hospital. To account for this, the models control for the number of years elapsed since 
the most valuable CT (MVCT) was acquired and the London InterBank Offered 
Rate (LIBOR) in the January of the year of acquisition. The age of the machine is 
important to consider, as prices of CT machine models decline over time. While the rates 
at which firms can borrow money is generally above LIBOR by a fixed amount 
(depending on credit risk), as LIBOR rises, the cost of debt rises as well.5 
Hospital Mission 
Rural location and Catholic leadership may influence the mission of a hospital, 
and as a result, the present value of the CT machine the hospital ultimately choses to 
acquire. To account for this, I have included variables indicating whether the hospital is 
Catholic-operated, a Critical Access Hospital, a Rural Referral Center, a Sole 
                                                 
5
 LIBOR rates taken from a table at http://www.wsjprimerate.us/libor/libor_rates_history.htm on January 
19, 2011 
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Community Provider, and a Community Hospital. Hospitals that are situated remotely 
face different competitive pressures than hospitals which are situated near other hospitals. 
Namely, they face less competition for patients. On the other hand, if they lack a 
technology needed to provide care, they are less able refer patients to other hospitals than 
are hospitals situated near other hospitals. 
3.3.4: Other Variables 
 There are a number of other variables that were included in the survey which were 
not included in the models. A number of them are described throughout this study for 
other reasons. Namely, they were useful in determining the characteristics of the 
respondents. 
In order to avoid anchoring the responses of the respondents on something outside 
of their own perceptions, at the beginning of the survey, respondents were asked to 
provide brief statement on why their hospital acquired the current most valuable CT 
system. These free-text responses were not analyzed. After providing the statement, 
respondents were asked to choose one of five checkboxes best explaining their motive for 
acquiring the most valuable CT machine. The options were: capacity expansion, 
competitive action, contract expiration, leadership changes, and tech developments. 
While respondents were only supposed to select the strongest motive, several selected 
multiple responses. Results are reported in Table 10. Respondents were also asked 
whether they perceived the acquisition of the most valuable CT machine would be 
profitable before the acquisition occurred. 
Determining Respondent Eligibility 
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Respondents were asked the year that they joined their present hospital. If this 
year was greater or equal to the year in which the current most valuable CT machine was 
acquired, their response was marked as being less reliable. Likewise, respondents were 
asked to rate their confidence in their responses on the survey using a 7-point Likert 
scale. A rating of ‘1’ indicated “Not at all” and a rating of ‘7’ indicated “Very strong”. 
Surveys in which confidence was rated as less than ‘4’ were marked as being less 
reliable. All of the models in this study were run twice. The first time, they were run 
using the full dataset. The second time, they were run using the usable responses dataset, 
excluding respondents whom were either not confident in their responses or not present at 
the time of acquisition. 
Pairing the Survey to the AHA Database 
Respondents were asked to indicate the name of their hospital. This response was 
used to pair survey responses with data from the 2008 American Hospital Association 
Annual Survey. When a precise match could not be found, Google Maps was used to 
determine likely addresses corresponding to the survey respondent’s hospital. Those 
addresses were then matched against the hospital addresses in the AHA Database. 
3.4: Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 and Table 4 contain descriptive statistics for the variables previously 
mentioned. The percentage of respondents that assigned a value of ‘0’ or ‘1’ or ‘1’, ‘2’, 
‘3’, ‘4’, ‘5’, ‘6’, or ‘7’ are listed in the table, with a rating of ‘7’ being the highest. Note 
that only 5% of hospitals rated the importance of the objective of providing high-quality 
care as less than ‘4’, and only 6% of hospitals gave such a rating to the objective of 
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satisfying physician preferences. The objective with the greatest standard deviation was 
research, which was likely due to the fact that some hospitals reported that they 
performed no research whatsoever, while others were research institutions. 
Table 3 contains summary statistics for the full dataset, while Table 4 contains 
summary statistics for the most usable responses. Throughout this dissertation, all 
computations will be performed on both the complete dataset and the most usable subset. 
Note that only about 6% of responses came from respondents with confidence less than 
‘4’. Nonetheless, about 16% of respondents were not employed by their present hospital 
in the year prior to the acquisition. Ultimately, 80% of the dataset came from respondents 
who were both present and confident in their responses. 
--- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
--- 
--- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
--- 
 Correlation tables for the key variables examined in this dissertation are presented 
in the Supplemental Tables section of the Appendix. The correlation tables also include 
correlations with factors combining multiple variables. (A description of how the factors 
were generated is presented in Section 3.5, the Method section.) Each of the correlation 
tables, Table 20 through Table 27 (in the Supplemental Tables section), was computed 
using either the full dataset or the most usable responses. As a result a different table is 
presented for each dataset. 
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 From Table 5 and Table 6, it appears that the majority of respondents were 
employed at hospitals that upgraded to 64-slice CT. The majority of the prior most 
valuable CT machines were 16-slice CTs. Nonetheless, some of the more advanced 
hospitals upgraded from a 64-slice to a 128, 256, or 320-slice CT. These general 
conclusions held both for the full sample and for the more limited usable response 
sample. 
--- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
--- 
--- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
--- 
 
 In both the full sample (Table 7) and the usable responses subsample (Table 8), 
the most common year for the most valuable CT machine to have been acquired was 
2008, followed by 2010. This likely is a result of the depression that negatively impacted 
America from 2008 onwards. In 2009, the market suffered from much uneasiness, which 
was reduced in 2010 (Aunt Minnie, 2011). Overall, 86% of the respondents in the full 
sample worked at a hospital that had acquired the most valuable CT within the past five 
years, and 60% had experienced such an acquisition within the past three years. In the 
reduced sample, 90% of respondents were employed at a hospital that had acquired the 
most valuable CT within the past five years, and 65% were employed at a hospital that 
had made the acquisition within the last three years. Thus, the vast majority of 
respondents provided answers based upon rather recent events at their hospitals. 
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--- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
--- 
--- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
--- 
As can be seen from Table 9, the majority of hospitals have a CT on premises. 
However, only about a third has an advanced machine with 64 or more slices. The 
majority of CT machines are situated in non-profit, non-governmental hospitals. Due to 
the use of a Texas subsample, statistics on Texas CT possession have also been provided. 
In Texas, slightly fewer hospitals have a CT on premises; 69%. Advanced machines are 
also a bit rare in Texas, possessed by only 24% of hospitals. 
--- 
Insert Table 9 about here 
--- 
As is shown in Table 10, technological developments and capacity expansion 
were by far the most common motives for acquiring the most valuable CT machine, with 
competitive action being a distant third. Contract expiration and leadership changes were 
not common motives for the acquisition. Other data from the survey showed that overall, 
91% of respondents perceived that the CT acquisition would be profitable before it 
occurred. Among the 18 respondents who perceived that the CT acquisition would not be 
profitable, 6 reported that the acquisition had been made for capacity expansion, 2 
reported it had been made for competitive reasons, and 10 reported it had been made due 
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to technological developments. None cited contract expiration or changes in leadership as 
a motive. Thus, it appears that while profit played a role in the decision making process, 
for the minority of acquirers for whom it did not, technological developments were the 
dominant motive. 
--- 
Insert Table 10 about here 
--- 
3.5: Method 
 In order to make the models tested in this paper as parsimonious as possible, each 
was run in roughly the same fashion. All were tested using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression. OLS seemed appropriate as the dependent variables for both the uncertainty 
and CT value models are ordinal variables. As a result, the coefficients in the results 
tables are easily interpreted. In the tables in which attribute uncertainty is the dependent 
variable, coefficients indicate the extent to which a change in the variable value changes 
the level of attribute uncertainty. Likewise, in the tables in which the present value of the 
most valuable CT machine is the dependent variable, the coefficients indicate the extent 
to which a change in the variable values changes the present value of the most valuable 
CT acquired. 
3.5.1: Method for Examining Factors Influencing Uncertainty 
Simplifying the Dataset through Exploratory Factor Analysis 
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 While the respondents were asked to answer questions along six dimensions 
(revenue, costs, physician preferences, consumer preferences, care, and research), it is not 
necessarily the case that all of the respondents maintained six distinct dimensions in their 
heads. It is quite possible that instead, the respondents maintained a smaller number of 
more simplistic dimensions. If this were the case, for example, answers to separate 
questions on revenue and cost might really both be derived from a common perception of 
profitability. 
 Exploratory factor analysis (Spearman 1904, 1927) is a statistical method that 
attempts to explain response data by generating factors which are linear combinations of 
the response variables. The factors are fewer in number than the response variables that 
were used to derive them and thus using factors allows variability to be described using 
fewer variables. As the number of factors that can be computed is potentially equal to the 
number of variables inputted into the computation, criteria must be used to determine 
which factors to retain and which to discard. Two common methods for determining 
which factors to retain are the Kaiser criterion (Kaiser, 1960) and the scree test (Cattell, 
1966). I computed factors using the principal factor method for the six uncertainties, 
objective strengths, and performance-aspiration disparities. In each of the three cases, the 
Kaiser criterion suggested that a single factor would explain all six attributes, while the 
scree test suggested that two factors would explain all of the attributes besides research, 
which was not strongly correlated with any factor. 
The two factors suggested by exploratory factor analysis were one consisting of 
revenue and cost and another consisting of physician preferences, consumer preferences, 
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and care. For simplicity, I will refer to the first factor as the “financial” factor and the 
second factor as the “customer desires” factor. Patients and physicians are both in essence 
customers of the CT machine. Patients desire CT machines to both provide care and to 
provide the peace of mind that comes from knowing a certain technology has been used. 
While more advanced CT machines do not always provide patients with a clinical benefit, 
patients may desire them nonetheless if they are unaware of the lack of benefit or feel that 
an advanced machine is a proxy for general state-of-the-art care. Physicians are also a 
customer of the CT machine, as they sell physician services as complement to the 
hospital services that the CT machine provides. 
I created each of the factors by combining their components in equal proportions.  
Thus, a 1-point higher response on a scale related to revenue increases the financial factor 
by half a point, and a 1-point higher response on a scale related to physician preferences 
increases the customer desires factor by a third-point. As a result of using this 
construction, it is easier to interpret the coefficients in the results section. 
A factor was also created to simply the independent variables. Two measures of 
payer contracts (HMO contracts and PPO contracts) were included in the normative 
models. The measures of HMO contracts and PPO contracts were weighted equally to 
create the payer contracts factor. As a result, the coefficient represents the change that 
would result from the addition of either an HMO or PPO contract. 
 In all of the models examining factors influencing uncertainty, an OLS regression 
was run with controls for for-profit status, government status, system membership, 
network membership, purchasing group membership, whether the valuable CT was 
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purchased or leased, whether the most valuable CT was a new brand, whether the most 
valuable CT was the same brand as the prior most valuable CT, the total number of 
brands experienced, the years elapsed since the most valuable CT was acquired, and 
LIBOR in January of the year of acquisition. There were also two hospital mission 
controls. Namely, whether the hospital was Catholic Church operated and whether it was 
a Critical Access Hospital. The models likewise controlled for a series of respondent 
characteristics: whether the respondent was the key decision maker, whether the 
respondent was a physician, the tenure of the respondent, and the source of the response. 
 The dependent variable in each of the models corresponded to the level of 
uncertainty reported by the respondents. Separate models for each factor were run to test 
the Behavioral Theory of the Firm and Bounded Rationality. While this was also done for 
the normative models, the factors that served as independent variables in these models 
corresponded to the hospital’s number of payer contracts and operating costs. 
Model for Testing Normative Theory 
Hypothesis 1 was tested using OLS regression using the following equation: 
#

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If % is negative and significant, it will suggest that financial uncertainty decreases as 
payment diversity increases. If %( and %+ are negative, it will suggest that financial 
uncertainty decreases as the overall scale of operating costs (both from plant and 
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personnel) increases.  If %- and %0  are positive and significant, it will suggest that the 
firm has a greater amount of financial uncertainty the longer its investment timeline. 
Model for Testing the Behavioral Theory of the Firm 
Hypothesis 2 examines how the disparity between prior performance and prior 
aspirations influence the uncertainty in the performance of the machine ultimately 
selected. For each of the two factors (Financial and Customer Desires), I ran the 
following Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression: 
$
"2 = %& + %
3
4
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After running the regression, I plotted the results and reported them in a table. Given that 
not all of the respondents were present in their hospital at the time of the acquisition of 
the most valuable CT, or were confident in their findings, I reported findings from both 
the full sample and the most usable subsample. 
Model for Testing Bounded Rationality 
To test whether hospitals have less uncertainty about strongly held objectives 
(Hypothesis 3), I ran the following regression for each of the factors using OLS:  
#
$
"5 = %& + %#
6
5 +  + 1 
A negative coefficient on %	would indicate that Hypothesis 3 holds, and that hospitals 
are more certain about machine attributes that are related to objectives that are considered 
to be more important.  
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3.5.2: Method for Examining Factors Influencing Acquisition Value 
 The first of these two models is meant to test how the direct inputs into revenue 
and cost uncertainty influence the machine’s present value, while the second is meant to 
test how reported perceptions of uncertainty influence the present value of the current 
most valuable CT. As was the case with the models examining the determinants of 
uncertainty, each factor is considered separately. All of the models were run twice; the 
first time with the complete dataset, and the second with only the most usable responses. 
The dependent variable for Hypotheses 4 and 5 is the present, fair market value of the 
most valuable CT machine. Thus, this variable is a large integer. While it is technically 
bounded by (0,∞), the minimum value it is likely to take is so far from zero that Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regression may be used. 
Model for Testing Normative Theory: Revenue 
Hypothesis 4 was tested for revenue using OLS regression using the following 
equation: 

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.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 + 
+ 1 
If % is positive and significant, it will suggest that investment increases as payment 
diversity increases. If %( and %+  are positive and significant, it will that the longer the 
investment timeline, the more the firm can invest. 
Model for Testing Normative Theory: Cost 
Hypothesis 4 was tested for the cost attribute using OLS regression using the 
following equation: 
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Hypothesis 4 will be supported if the coefficients on all the independent variables are 
positive and significant. This would suggest that hospitals are willing to invest more if 
their overall expenses are greater. Furthermore, a longer time horizon for the investment 
may encourage increased investment, as the hospital will then be able to spread the fixed 
costs of the CT machine over a greater number of years. 
Method for Testing Prospect Theory 
The model used to test Hypothesis 5 has the following form: 

	8	.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
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Note that this model will be run separately for revenue uncertainty and cost uncertainty. 
If the coefficient % is negative and significant when the uncertainty variable deals with 
revenues and positive and significant when the uncertainty variable deals with costs, then 
Hypothesis 5 will be supported. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
4.1: Determinants of Uncertainty 
4.1.1: Overview of the Results 
 A summary of the findings of all of the models in this study is presented in Table 
20. For each of the hypotheses, I have indicated the expected sign, observed sign, and 
significance of each of the independent variables. In the first stage of the model, 
examining the determinants of uncertainty, Hypotheses 2 (behavioral) and 3 (Bounded 
Rationality) were supported, but Hypothesis 1 (normative) was not. In the second stage of 
the model, examining the determinants of acquisition value, Hypothesis 4 (normative) 
had very weak and partial support, while Hypothesis 5 (behavioral) had no support. 
Subsequent investigation revealed that while financial uncertainty had no relationship to 
the value of the CT acquired, customer desires uncertainty (not featured in Table 20 or 
the hypotheses) played a significant role in determining the value of the most valuable 
CT. 
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 examine whether the normative economic theory (1), the 
Behavioral Theory of the Firm (2), Prospect Theory (2), and Bounded Rationality (3) can 
be used to predict the uncertainty that a firm experiences while acquiring equipment. The 
models run to examine these three potential determinants of uncertainty were crafted to 
be as parsimonious as possible. As a result, they only differ in their independent 
variables. All the models also contain interaction terms in which the independent 
variables are interacted with controls for for-profit and government status. These 
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interactions were conducted in a consistent way as well. The degree of parsimony makes 
comparing the theories possible. 
As not all of the respondents were highly-confident in their responses or present 
at the time of acquisition, all of the models were run twice. The first time, they were run 
using the full dataset. The models were all run an additional time using only responses 
from respondents that were present at their hospital in the year prior to the acquisition 
and whom self-rated the reliability of their responses as 4 out of 7 or greater. 
As is shown in Table 12, increased CT maximum lifespan was significantly and 
negatively associated with financial uncertainty in the normative model using the full 
dataset, but not the model conducted using the most usable responses. Payer contracts, 
property, plant, and equipment, and FTEs were not found to be significantly associated 
with financial uncertainty. Thus, no support was found for Hypothesis 1. I had 
hypothesized that financial uncertainty would increase as the time horizon of the 
investment increased, but in fact it declined. The time horizon of a durable capital 
investment in part determines the volume of usage it may experience before retirement. 
While I had hypothesized that hospitals have less financial uncertainty about longer 
investments because they have more years to make back their sunk costs, this was not 
found empirically.  Furthermore, it is possible that the financial measures were not 
significantly related to perceived financial uncertainty because the respondents were not 
aware of their values when answering the survey. My pilot study revealed that 
respondents were ignorant of the values of variables that could be used to determine the 
profitability of their CTs. 
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Table 13 shows that the performance-aspiration disparity for both the financial 
factor and the customer desires factor were both negatively and significantly associated 
with their respective uncertainties for all the models. Thus, Hypothesis 2 was fully 
supported by the models. This implies that there is support for the behavioral theories on 
the determinants of uncertainty. Higher levels of uncertainty were associated with prior 
performance below aspirations, while lower levels of uncertainty were associated with 
prior performance above aspirations. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, Table 14 shows that both financial factor objectives 
and customer desires objectives were highly significant in explaining uncertainty and had 
a negative relationship with uncertainty. This was the case for both the models tested 
using the full dataset and the most usable responses. Although both objective strength and 
performance-aspiration disparity were found to be highly-significantly predictive of 
uncertainty, the adjusted R2 was slightly greater for objective strength. 
Given that all three models significantly predict uncertainty, it is important to 
attempt to determine which model does the best job of doing so. Adjusted R2 is a measure 
of goodness of fit which accounts for the number of explanatory terms in a model. Unlike 
R2, adjusted R2 accounts for whether improvements in models resulting from the addition 
of explanatory variables are greater than what would be expected by chance. 
--- 
Insert Table 11 about here 
--- 
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 As can be seen in Table 11, some of the models provide a far better prediction of 
the uncertainty experienced by the firms than others. The value of the financial 
uncertainty and customer desires uncertainty factors appear to be best predicted by the 
Bounded Rationality models which used objective strength as a predictor. The worst 
predictions of financial factor uncertainty were made by the economic models, which 
used payer contracts and operating costs as predictors. Performance – aspiration disparity 
was slightly less predictive than objective strengths, and both substantially outperformed 
the economic factors. The same relative ranking held for both the full dataset and the 
usable responses dataset. 
Similar trends held for the relative significance of the independent variables as 
well. In all cases, the independent variable(s) were extremely significant in the behavioral 
and Bounded Rationality models and least significant in the economic model. The models 
are all relatively comparable, as they include the same dependent variables and control 
variables, and only differ in the independent variables that they include. While the 
traditional economic measure of investment horizon has some predictive power for 
determining financial uncertainty, the perceptual measures have greater predictive power. 
Thus, while all three theories predict uncertainty in some contexts, not all do so equally 
well. 
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4.1.2: Normative Theory 
 Two normative models of the determinants of uncertainty were run (Table 12), 
one with the full dataset and the other with the most usable responses. The models each 
contained the payer contracts factor, property, plant, and equipment at cost, FTEs, 
minimum CT lifespan, and maximum CT lifespan as independent variables. Of these, 
only maximum CT lifespan was significantly associated with financial uncertainty. 
Maximum CT lifespan was only significant when the full dataset was used and had a 
negative relationship to uncertainty – the opposite of what was predicted. 
--- 
Insert Table 12 about here 
--- 
 The two models suggested that there may be other factors at play in determining 
the financial uncertainty perceived by hospitals during the CT acquisition process. The 
only control variable which was significant, whether the respondent was a physician, had 
a negative impact on financial uncertainty in both models. Physicians have a general 
propensity to report lower financial uncertainty. The mean of the financial uncertainty 
factor was .92 lower for physicians than for non-physicians. This is equivalent to 
reporting about 1 point less revenue uncertainty and 1 point less cost uncertainty on the 
two 7-point Likert scales on the survey. 
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4.1.3: Behavioral Theory of the Firm 
 The models all suggested a highly significant and negative association between a 
performance-aspiration disparity on both the financial and customer desires factors and 
the respective measures of uncertainty (Table 13). That is, firms whose prior performance 
underperformed aspirations tended to buy machines about which they had more 
uncertainty, while firms whose prior performance outperformed aspirations tended to buy 
machines about which they had less uncertainty. This relationship held for both the full 
dataset and the most usable responses dataset. 
--- 
Insert Table 13 about here 
--- 
 For-profit hospitals had less financial uncertainty than non-profit hospitals in both 
the full and usable dataset models. For-profit hospitals did not have significantly different 
customer desires uncertainty than non-profit hospitals. Government-controlled hospitals 
had no difference in perceived uncertainty relative to non-profit hospitals. The full 
dataset model suggested that for-profit firms on average reported about .7 points less 
revenue and cost uncertainty than non-profit firms. In the more usable sample, this 
difference jumped to 1 point less on average for the two categories. 
 A number of the other control variables were significant as well. Physicians 
reported .8 points lower financial factor uncertainty, but did not have significantly 
different customer desires uncertainty from non-physicians. This is somewhat surprising, 
as physicians were one of the customers considered by the measure of customer desires 
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uncertainty. Lower interest rates were associated with significantly lower financial factor 
uncertainty for the full model, and nearly significantly lower financial factor uncertainty 
(p=.089) for the usable responses model. A 1% increase in the LIBOR interest rate was 
associated with about .1 points lower reported financial uncertainty. This makes sense, as 
a lower interest rate suggests that the machines are less expensive to acquire, and if all 
else is equal, more profitable. Additionally, Catholic status was associated with lower 
financial and customer desires uncertainty. While this was only significant for one of the 
models, it was nearly significant (p<.15) for three of them. Catholic status was associated 
with between .3 and .5 points less uncertainty on both of the factors. Catholic hospitals 
may have slightly different sets of objectives than non-Catholic hospitals, and as a result, 
slightly different perception of how well prospective CTs fulfill those objectives. 
Finally, the respondents who received the survey from their colleagues or took the 
survey online reported significantly more uncertainty than the RSNA respondents. 
Respondents whom were asked to take the survey by colleagues might have been more 
likely to complete the survey than equally-uncertain individuals whom were not given the 
survey at the request of a colleague. As a result, more marginal respondents may have 
entered this sub-sample. The mean confidence in responses was 5.74 out of 7 points for 
respondents whom did not receive the survey from a friend. Among people who were 
urged to take the survey by a friend, the mean reported confidence dropped to 5.20 out of 
7 points. Among people who took the survey online, the mean confidence was only 5.00 
out of 7 points. Some of the online responses were a result of colleague referrals. This 
supports the notion that colleagues tended to be less confident responders than people 
whom were willing to take the survey without collegial prodding.  
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 One issue that has been explored in the Behavioral Theory of the Firm literature is 
the shape of the relationship between the performance-aspiration disparity and 
uncertainty (Bromiley, 1991; Greve, 1998, 2003; Audia & Greve 2006). While Table 13 
demonstrated an overall negative relationship between the disparity and uncertainty, it 
did not precisely show how the two variables were related at different levels of disparity. 
To show these relationships more precisely, I discretized the disparity measure for each 
of the six machine attributes into a series of dummy variables, each equal to one response 
level on the survey. The omitted category is 0, when performance is equal to the 
aspiration level. 
To center the measure of disparity, I assigned the lowest level disparity responses 
(1) the value -3, and the highest level disparity responses (7) the value 3. Respondents 
whom felt that performance was at aspiration levels (responses of 4) were assigned the 
value 0. I then ran simple OLS regressions with the reported level of uncertainty for the 
attribute as the independent variable and the six discretized disparity dummy variables as 
the dependent variables. Table 28 and Table 29 (in the Supplemental Tables section) 
contain the results of the regressions for the full and more usable responses models 
respectively. From the tables, you can see that the larger the magnitude of the disparity, 
whether positive or negative, the more significantly predictive of uncertainty it was. 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 visually display these relationships for the full and more usable 
responses respectively. The X-axis of the figures corresponds to the reported level of 
performance-aspiration disparity for the attribute. The Y-axis of the figures corresponds 
to the coefficient on that level of disparity shown in Table 28 or Table 29. Effectively, the 
Y-axis represents the impact on uncertainty of a firm possessing a given level of 
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disparity. These tables and figures suggest that a significant relationship exists between 
performance-aspiration disparity and uncertainty for all of the attributes considered 
except care. The relationship appears to be more significant for the tails – very high and 
very low levels of the disparity – than for more middling values in which performance is 
near the aspiration level. 
 
Figure 5: Performance-Aspiration Disparity vs. Uncertainty, Full Sample 
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Figure 6: Performance-Aspiration Disparity vs. Uncertainty, Usable Responses 
The various levels of the performance-aspirations disparities were not always 
significantly related to uncertainty. This may in part be due to the fact that some levels of 
performance-aspiration disparity were held by greater numbers of hospitals than others, 
resulting in variation in the statistical power of the comparisons. The relationship tended 
to be less significant for levels of performance closer to aspirations and for levels of 
performance below aspirations. The measure of performance-aspiration disparity was a 
scale that was converted into a series of binary variables, with the omitted value being 0. 
It makes sense that values of the disparity far divergent from 0 are more likely to be 
statistically different in their influence on uncertainty than are values closer to 0. All in 
all, while the graphs are not monotonic for all of the objectives, they generally suggest 
support for findings congruent with the literature (Bromiley, 1991; Greve, 1998, 2003; 
Audia & Greve 2006). 
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
In
fl
u
e
n
ce
 o
n
 U
n
ce
rt
a
in
ty
Performance-Aspiration Before Acquisition
Revenue
Costs
Physician Prefs
Consumer Prefs
Care
Research
 Powell 114 
 Overall, this exploration has shown that a firm’s willingness to experience 
uncertainty on an attribute of its acquisition is related to its experiences with its prior 
most salient acquisition. Firms that felt their prior performance exceeded aspiration levels 
were less likely to take a chance on an uncertain machine, while firms that felt that their 
prior performance fell short of aspiration levels were more willing to take a chance on an 
uncertain machine. While this finding is hardly novel, in the past it has been examined 
through external measures of firm uncertainty-seeking, rather than through the self-
reported uncertainty assessments of individuals involved in the decision making process. 
4.1.4: Bounded Rationality 
 The best explanation of a firm’s financial uncertainty and customer desires 
uncertainty during the investment process is the extent to which it treats both factors as 
objectives. The stronger the objectives are held, the less uncertainty firms have about 
their future CT’s ability to meet them (Table 14). In both models, the strength of the 
financial factor objective was negatively related to financial factor uncertainty, and 
significant at a very high level (p<.001 for three of the models, and p<.005 for the 
customer desires model using the most usable dataset). An increase in the importance of a 
factor by 1 was associated with a decrease in uncertainty for that factor of about .4. The 
magnitude and significance of this relationship was relatively similar for both the 
financial and customer desires factors. 
--- 
Insert Table 14 about here 
--- 
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 Although it was not significant (p<.15 for the full dataset, and p<.06 for the more 
usable responses), for-profit hospitals tended to have about half a point less financial 
uncertainty than non-profit hospitals. For-profit status did not influence customer desires 
uncertainty. If for-profit firms have the primary objective of maximizing profits, it makes 
sense that they would make investments for which they perceive less financial 
uncertainty than would non-profit hospitals, which have a number of objectives. 
 As was the case with the behavioral theory models, physicians had significantly 
less financial uncertainty than non-physicians (.5 points less for the full dataset, .8 points 
less for the most usable responses). Likewise, Catholic hospitals reported less perceived 
financial uncertainty as well (.4 points less using the full dataset, p<.1, and .5 points less 
using the most usable responses, p<.05). Furthermore, colleague and online responses 
reported significantly more financial uncertainty. As I mentioned previously, these 
responses were self-perceived as being of lower quality, and may have come from more 
uncertain and less well-informed respondents. 
 Overall, Bounded Rationality appears to be the best explanation of firm 
uncertainty during the acquisition process. Going forward, it may make sense for those 
wishing to examine hospital uncertainty to focus on hospital objectives, rather than solely 
on hospital characteristics or the perception of a performance-aspiration disparity. The 
predictive power of objectives was robust to both the nature of the objective and the 
quality of the responses considered. 
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4.2: Determinants of the Present Value of the Acquisition  
4.2.1: Overview of the Results 
Hypotheses 4 and 5 examine the implications of using normative economic theory 
(4) and Prospect Theory (5) models to predict the value of CT machines acquired. The 
economic theory hypothesis was partially supported, and the Prospect Theory hypothesis 
was not supported. Nonetheless, exploring the impact of perceived uncertainty on 
acquisition value led to the unanticipated finding that uncertainty related to customer 
desires has a negative impact on the value of acquisitions. 
The models used to test these two hypotheses were initially designed to be highly 
parsimonious, only differing in their independent variables and interaction terms. Non-
financial machine attributes were not considered in the initial comparison, as there are no 
measures of non-financial uncertainty stemming from the normative model. After the 
initial comparison, I also examined how non-financial uncertainty influenced the present 
value of the acquisition. I was surprised to find that non-financial measures of uncertainty 
were more predictive of the ultimate value of the acquisition than were the normative 
measures and the measures of financial uncertainty observed through the survey. 
 When testing Hypothesis 4, a significant and positive relationship was found 
between minimum lifespan of the CT machine and acquisition value in the model in 
which the payer contracts factor was considered and only the most usable responses were 
used. While this provides little support for Hypothesis 4, it also does little to go against 
the notion that hospitals behave in a profit-maximizing fashion. The traditional economic 
model of firm profit-maximization suggests that firms do not consider uncertainty when 
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making investment decisions, but instead consider factors influencing the revenue, costs, 
interest rate, and time horizon of their investments. Thus, economists may find it 
unsurprising that these accounting proxies for uncertainty do not appear to significantly 
influence spending. They may further be unsurprised to find that the time horizon of the 
investment (minimum lifespan), which does influence profitability, is significant. 
The level of revenue and cost uncertainty reported by the respondents on the 
survey had no relationship to the present value of the most valuable CT machine.  In fact, 
the relationship between cost uncertainty and acquisition value flipped sign between the 
full and more usable datasets. Prospect Theory suggests that higher revenue uncertainty 
might be associated with lower acquisition values, while higher cost uncertainty might be 
associated with higher acquisition values. This was not found. 
One of the reasons that financial uncertainty may not have had a significant 
impact on acquisition value is that the acquirers may have been relatively financially 
insensitive. Non-salaried physicians are compensated for the services that they provide 
interpreting scans, not for anything related to the acquisition cost, operating costs or price 
of scans produced by the machine. As a result, physicians may favor machines that 
encourage large volumes to come to them for care, and encourage them to seek scans 
requiring more expensive interpretation services. This compensation model makes 
physicians insensitive to the sunk and operating costs of their imaging equipment, unless 
the costs interfere with continued operation of the department or constrain the department 
from acquiring other desired equipment. It appears that acquisition value is significantly 
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determined by the hospital’s level of uncertainty about whether the machine will fulfill 
customer desires rather than profit, supporting this notion.  
While Hypothesis 5 was not supported, examining the hypothesis caused me to 
further examine how non-financial forms of uncertainty influence acquisition value. 
(Prospect Theory does not provide any predictions on this, as it is not clear whether these 
forms of uncertainty are viewed as gains or losses.) Ultimately, it was found that 
increased physician preference, consumer preference, and care uncertainty were all 
significantly associated with lower acquisition present values. A 1 point increase in 
physician preference uncertainty was associated with $96,000 lower value, while a 1 
point increase in consumer preference uncertainty was associated with $78,000 lower 
acquisition value. The impact of care uncertainty was the greatest, with a 1 point increase 
associated with $100,000 lower acquisition value. 
Overall, the examination of Hypotheses 4 and 5 suggest that future models of 
capital investment may need to consider factors traditionally excluded from economic 
models, such as the extent to which a firm is uncertain about whether its acquisition will 
fulfill customer desires (i.e. physician preferences, consumer preferences, and care 
needs). The separation between physician and hospital payment may induce decision 
makers to be more concerned about customer desires than about the profit of the hospital 
in which they work. Hospitals may be a unique context in which decision makers are less 
concerned about the financial well-being of their host firm than they are about how their 
decisions impact the demand for their firm’s services. Nonetheless, this study 
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demonstrates that under some circumstances, customer desires may play a critical role in 
determining the magnitude of capital investment. 
4.2.2: Normative Theory 
 Hypothesis 4 asserted that measurable, economic characteristics of hospitals 
would influence the present value of the most valuable CT acquired. I further speculated 
that more payer contracts, higher operating costs, longer investment durations and lower 
interest rates would all be associated with the acquisition of a more valuable CT. The 
results presented in Table 15 show that while in one model, a longer minimum 
investment lifespan is associated with greater acquisition value, payer contracts, overall 
property, plant, and equipment, the number of FTEs, the maximum length of the 
investment, and the interest rate (LIBOR) at the time of investment lack a significant 
relationship to investment value. Thus, Hypothesis 4 was by and large unsupported. 
--- 
Insert Table 15 about here 
--- 
 The models testing the influence of the payer contracts factor on acquisition value 
using the most usable dataset suggested that government control was significantly 
associated with lower acquisition value. These two models suggested that government 
hospitals acquired CTs with a present value of about a quarter-million dollars less, after 
controlling for all of the other factors. 
 A number of the other control variables were significant as well. Purchasing 
(rather than leasing) was associated with $380,000 greater acquisition value in the model 
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that examined the influence of the payer contracts factor using the most usable responses. 
Experiencing an additional brand was associated with a $71,000 more expensive 
acquisition in the model considering the payer contracts factor using the full dataset. In 
both of the models run using the full dataset, a greater number of years elapsed since the 
acquisition was associated with the acquisition having a lower present value (significant 
at the p<.10 level for the model considering payer contracts, and p<.05 for the model 
considering measures of operating costs). This makes sense, as older machines tend to be 
inferior and worth less than newer ones. In all of the models, Critical Access Hospital 
status was significantly associated with lower acquisition value. Critical Access Hospitals 
must by definition be remotely located, and may not need as expensive technologies to 
attract customers. It is unlikely that in an emergency, a patient needing care would have 
an alternative to seeking it at a Critical Access Hospital. 
 Lastly, the results showed some evidence of bias. In the models that included a 
measure of payer contracts, the ACHE and Texas samples were associated with the 
acquisition of significantly more expensive CTs (around a quarter-million more 
expensive) than the RSNA sample. This effect was significant when the full dataset was 
considered and was nearly significant when only the most usable responses were 
considered. It is possible that respondents at hospitals whom acquired less expensive 
most valuable CTs may have been biased towards not answering the survey if they 
received it in the mail instead of via a live experimenter. Furthermore, response by a 
physician was associated with the acquisition of a less-expensive CT being reported. This 
effect was significant in all of the normative models and ranged in size from $275,000 to 
$375,000, depending on the model. This bias may have been introduced because 
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physicians may be less aware of their hospital’s most valuable CT machine than non-
physicians whom may have an outlook that spans multiple hospital departments, or even 
multiple financially-integrated hospitals. Physicians may fail to identify more valuable 
machines in other departments, and non-physicians may contribute to this bias by 
improperly answering the survey by considering an offsite CT that is present in a separate 
but connected hospital, or in a freestanding facility. 
4.2.3: Prospect Theory 
 I explored the influence of uncertainty on acquisition value through a three step 
exploration. First, to test Hypothesis 5, I ran regressions that examined whether the 
present value of the acquisition was negatively related to revenue uncertainty and 
positively related to cost uncertainty (Table 16). No significant relationship was found for 
the independent variables that were examined. Although Prospect Theory does not make 
any predictions on how non-financial uncertainty will influence the value of an 
investment, I examined the influence of the four types of non-financial uncertainty 
anyway using the full dataset (Table 17) and the most usable responses (Table 18). 
 Interestingly, for the full dataset, I found that the present value of the most 
valuable CT machine was significantly and negatively related to both the extent of 
physician preference, consumer preference, and care uncertainty. A 1 point increase in 
reported physician preference uncertainty was associated with a $96,000 less expensive 
acquisition ($85,000 less for the most usable responses). For consumer preferences, a 1 
point increase in uncertainty was associated with a $78,000 less expensive acquisition 
($63,000 for the most usable responses). The greatest impact came from a 1 point 
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increase in care uncertainty, which was associated with a $100,000 less expensive 
acquisition ($88,000 for the most usable responses). When considered in aggregate, a 1 
point increase in customer desires factor uncertainty was associated with the acquisition 
of an $113,000 less expensive machine in the full dataset model and the acquisition of a 
$96,000 less expensive machine in the most usable responses model (Table 19). These 
findings all suggest that uncertainty about a machine’s ability to fulfill customer desires 
has a substantial financial impact on the outcome of the acquisition. This makes sense, as 
the customer desires factor may be a measure of uncertainty about how well a CT will 
attract demand. Demand for the machine may have a greater financial impact on 
physicians than the revenues and operating costs tied to the hardware itself.  Physicians 
may be behaving in a rational fashion when placing more emphasis on demand 
uncertainty than on the financial uncertainty that the hospital faces as a result of the 
acquisition. 
--- 
Insert Table 16 through Table 19 about here 
--- 
The general conclusion of these explorations is that it is not clear how the framing 
of the uncertainty (i.e. as a gain or a loss) influences its impact on the present value of the 
acquisition. The respondent-perceived measures of financial uncertainty were not 
significantly related to the value of the acquisitions that their hospitals made. However, a 
number of the measures of uncertainty related to customer desires were significantly 
related to the present value of their hospitals’ acquisitions. While these forms of 
uncertainty are not clearly related to gains or losses and thus not very compatible with the 
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framework of Prospect Theory, they are worth noting as they appear to significantly 
impact hospital acquisition decision making. 
Going through the results tables one at a time reveals further details about the 
factors influencing CT value when self-reported uncertainty is considered in the 
regression. It should be noted that the regressions tested in this section only differ from 
those in Section 4.2.2 with respect to their independent variables. The control variables in 
all of the models are the same, and the dependent variable in all cases is the present value 
of the most valuable CT machine. 
In the models considering respondent-reported revenue and cost uncertainty in 
Table 16, for-profit status was significantly associated with lower acquisition value – all 
the models suggested that for-profits acquire machines worth about $300,000 less than 
non-profits, all else being equal. Once again, survey responses from physicians reported 
the acquisition of machines worth about a quarter-million dollars less in the models tested 
using the full dataset. This relationship did not hold for the models tested using the more 
usable responses. In both of the models tested using the full dataset, hospitals that 
acquired a new brand of machine got a machine that was worth about $200,000 more 
(significant at p<.05 for the revenue model, and at p<.075 for the cost model). The 
present value of the machines declined at about $74,000 per year, and older machines had 
significantly lower present values. Once again, Critical Access Hospital status was 
associated with the acquisition of a significantly less expensive machine, worth about 
$70,000 less.  
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As was previously mentioned, Table 17 and Table 18 explore the impact of the 
four non-financial types of uncertainty on the value of the acquisition. When the either 
dataset was used, physician preference, consumer preference, and care uncertainty were 
negatively related to acquisition value. In the full dataset model, the impact of an 
additional point (on a 7-point Likert scale) of physician preference, consumer preference, 
and care uncertainty was estimated to be a decrease in CT value of $96,000, $78,000, and 
$100,000 respectively. When the most usable responses were considered, the impact of 
an additional point of uncertainty was smaller; $85,000, $63,000, and $88,000 
respectively. 
Within Table 17 and Table 18, a number of control variables were significant. 
The control variables that were significant were more or less the same ones that were 
significant in the models considering financial uncertainty. Once again, for-profit status, 
physician responses, older year of acquisition, and Critical Access Hospital status were 
all significantly associated with lower acquisition value in nearly all of the models. The 
selection of a CT of a new brand was significantly or nearly significantly (p<.075) 
associated with a $200,000 higher acquisition value in all of the models tested using the 
full dataset. 
The tenure of the respondent may have biased the answers as well. In the models 
tested using the full dataset, each additional year of tenure was significantly associated 
with an $8,000 less expensive acquisition in the physician preferences factor model, and 
was associated with a less expensive machine at near significance in the other three 
models. One possibility is that respondents with longer tenure may have experienced a 
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greater number of previous “most valuable CTs” over the course of their time at their 
hospital, and may have been more likely to accidently report on one of these prior 
machines. 
Last but not least, it is important to examine Table 19, which examines the impact 
of the financial factor and customer desires factor on the present value of the acquisition. 
I examined these attributes via factors as well, as this is how they were considered in the 
first stage of the model. Although it is not possible to test Prospect Theory using these 
regressions, as revenues and costs have been merged into the financial factor, these 
models are worth exploring in that the independent variable in them is the dependent 
variable from the models run in Section 4.1. As I mentioned previously, among these 
models, customer desires uncertainty is significantly and negatively related to the present 
value of the acquisition in both datasets. In the full dataset, a 1 point increase in customer 
desires uncertainty is significantly related to an $113,000 decrease in acquisition value, 
while in the more usable dataset, the impact is a $96,000 decrease. The control variables 
all have relatively the same impact that they do in the models tested without factors. 
Overall, these models of the influence of respondent-reported measures of 
uncertainty on the value of the acquisition suggest that decision maker perceptions of 
financial uncertainty do not influence the value of the acquisition, while decision maker 
perceptions of customer desires uncertainty negatively influence the value of the 
acquisition. This effect is a bit stronger for physician preference uncertainty and care 
uncertainty than it is for consumer preference uncertainty. Consumer preference 
uncertainty is both less significant and less impactful on acquisition value than physician 
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preference uncertainty. Uncertainty about the research performance of a machine does 
not appear to significantly influence the value of an acquisition. 
Beyond the influence of uncertainty, several other factors appear to influence the 
value of the acquisition as well. For-profit status and Critical Access Hospital status were 
associated with lower acquisition values. For-profit hospitals may select less expensive 
CT machines with equal clinical benefit, but lower ability to perform non-essential 
functions, as they have difficulty charging more for the non-essential functions under the 
Diagnosis Related Group system, and are primarily concerned with profit maximization. 
Critical Access Hospitals are remotely situated and do not need to invest as extensively in 
technology as a result of competitive pressures from local rivals. Finally, older 
acquisitions had significantly lower present values. This is not a surprising finding, as 
when technologies advance, older versions tend to depreciate.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusions & Discussion 
5.1: Summary of the Findings 
 
 
Figure 7: Graphical Summary of the Findings 
 Figure 7 provides a graphical summary of the findings of this dissertation. The 
dark lines symbolize supported relationships, the dashed lines symbolize partially 
supported relationships, and the dotted line symbolizes an unsupported relationship. A 
more detailed summary of the hypothesized relationships and findings is provided in 
Table 20. Ultimately, it appears that some of the economic factors have a significant 
relationship to the degree of financial uncertainty perceived by the firm. Higher values of 
both disparity measures and objective strength measures were associated with lower 
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corresponding values of perceived financial and customer desires uncertainty, providing 
support for the findings of the behavioral literature (Cyert & March, 1963; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979) and Bounded Rationality literature (Simon, 1947) on the determinants of 
firm uncertainty-seeking. The present value of the acquisition was significantly related to 
some of the economic factors considered, but not to the reported perception of financial 
uncertainty. The present value of the most valuable CT was most strongly determined by 
the extent to which the hospital was uncertain about whether it would fulfill customer 
desires; greater uncertainty related to this factor was associated with lower acquisition 
values. This is consistent with the statement by Pauly and Burns (2008) that the selection 
of costly devices is driven by physicians’ preferences, and that physicians may be 
unaware of the absolute or relative prices of the devices they select. 
--- 
Insert Table 20 about here 
--- 
 These overall findings are somewhat counterintuitive, as they suggest that 
uncertainty about customer desire fulfillment play a greater role in determining the 
outcome of the decision making process than does uncertainty about profitability. 
Furthermore, they suggest that future research should pay more attention to the role of 
non-financial factors in the capital investment decision making process. Crum and 
Derkinderen (1981) suggested that many capital investment decisions are not made based 
upon financial grounds, and Bromiley (1986) suggested that corporate strategy plays a 
role in investment decisions. However, the role that these non-financial factors play has 
thus far not received quantitative analysis. 
 Powell 129 
 The results also provide information about the determinants of a firm’s 
uncertainty about its investment’s ability to fulfill customer desires. Namely, the firms 
tended to have more uncertainty about the investments ability to fulfill customer desires 
if they did not consider fulfilling customer desires to be as important an objective. If such 
firms were constrained in their acquisition research process, as was suggested by 
Bounded Rationality (Simon, 1947, 1951, 1952/1953, 1955), then they may have 
redirected their investigative efforts away from reducing customer desires uncertainty, 
and had more such uncertainty as a result. 
 Although the finding that reported perceptions of financial uncertainty do not 
influence the value of the acquisition in a manner supporting Prospect Theory, the finding 
also does little to disprove it. It is quite possible that there is interfirm inconsistency in 
whether revenue and cost uncertainty are framed as gains or losses. Although revenues 
deal with money gained and costs deal with money lost, having lower than expected 
revenue is a loss, and having lower than expected costs is a gain. While it is unclear 
whether uncertainty over a machine’s ability to fulfill customer desires is in the gains or 
the losses domain, the data suggest that firms behave in an uncertainty-averse fashion 
when facing this form of uncertainty. 
 To conclude, the results of this dissertation do not displace any of the existing 
theories, but instead highlight areas for future theoretical expansion. Although most of 
the literature has focused on the impact of economic measures of financial uncertainty on 
investment, this study demonstrates that perceptions of non-financial uncertainty are 
more significantly related to levels of investment than perceptions or concrete measures 
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of financial uncertainty. Outside of their impact on decision making theory, these results 
suggest that decision makers acquiring equipment should make sure to invest effort in 
understanding the impact of their investments on their customers. As uncertainty about 
this impact is a larger driver of the ultimate outcome of the process than is financial 
uncertainty, it deserves to be given strong consideration during the investment decision 
making process. 
5.2: Theoretical Implications 
This study has explored the relationships between hospital characteristics, 
objectives, uncertainties and acquisition value in the context of the purchase of an 
expensive, durable technology. Although this research may not be generalizable to other 
domains, it provides an additional empirical example of a situation in which descriptive 
theories (Behavioral Theory of the Firm, Prospect Theory, and Bounded Rationality) 
outperform the normative approach that has been used by much of the prior economic 
literature. In doing so, it paves the way for future empirical studies. 
5.2.1: Implications for the Normative Perspective 
The exploration of the economic perspective has made some empirical 
contributions to the economic literature on uncertainty, capital investment, and their 
determinants. Although the interest rate did not significantly impact the magnitude of the 
investment, as was suggested by Johnson and Lewellen (1972) and Gorton (1974), in the 
two normative models run using the most usable responses (Table 15), higher interest 
rates were associated with lower investment in the model considering payer contracts 
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(p=.051). This model suggested that every 1% increase in the interest rate is associated 
with acquiring a CT machine worth about $55,000 less. 
One debate that has been occurring in the economics literature is on how 
uncertainty influences capital investment. One group of papers have argued that the two 
have a negative relationship (Bertola, 1988; Pindyck, 1988; Craine, 1989; Zeira, 1989; 
Caballero, 1991), while another group have argued that the two have a positive 
relationship (Hartman, 1972; Pindyck, 1982; Abel, 1983, 1984, 1985). While testing 
Hypothesis 5, I found that increased perceived uncertainty about an acquisition’s ability 
to fulfill customer desires was associated with decreased investment (Table 19). Thus, 
this paper provides some empirical support for the existence of a negative relationship.  
5.2.2: Implications for the Behavioral Perspective 
Through the test of Hypothesis 2, this study provides further confirmation of the 
assertion held by the main proponents of the Behavioral Theory of the Firm and Prospect 
Theory—that uncertainty-seeking increases as performance falls below aspirations, and is 
reduced as performance exceeds aspirations (Cyert & March, 1963; Wright & 
Kunreuther, 1975; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Bromiley, 1991). While there appears to 
be little relationship between the disparity and uncertainty when the disparity is close to 
zero, when the disparity diverges far from zero, a significant relationship exists. 
Although Hypothesis 5 was not able to tie revenue or cost uncertainty to 
investment value, it was successful in revealing some interesting relationships between 
non-financial forms of uncertainty and investment. It is possible that Hypothesis 5 was 
not able to demonstrate that revenue uncertainty leads to decreased investment and 
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operating cost uncertainty leads to increased investment because firms did not 
consistently frame revenues as gains and costs as losses. The findings of Hypothesis 2 
suggest that firms may have considered actual revenue relative to aspired revenue when 
judging if there was a “gain” in revenue, and actual costs relative to aspired costs when 
judging if there was a “loss” from costs, rather than strictly labeling revenues as gains 
and costs as losses. 
 Although only one set of tests were conducted for Hypothesis 2, the tests can be 
framed in the language of Prospect Theory as well as that of the Behavioral Theory of the 
Firm. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) claimed that decision makers are uncertainty-
seeking when experiencing losses and uncertainty-averse when experiencing gains. If the 
problem of CT acquisition is framed so the status quo is the state the hospital was in 
before it acquired its prior most valuable CT, and gains and losses for each of the 
objectives are considered by measuring the difference between their performance and the 
hospital’s aspirations for them at that time, then the overall hypothesis of Prospect 
Theory holds. 
There is a debate in the performance-aspiration disparity literature about whether 
firms performing below aspiration levels become more uncertainty-averse (Janis & 
Mann, 1977; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981; Sitkin and Pablo, 1992) or more 
uncertainty-seeking (Cyert & March, 1963; Wright & Kunreuther, 1975; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Bowman, 1980, 1982; Bromiley, 1991) the further their performance 
deviates from their aspiration levels. The results presented in Table 28 and Table 29 and 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 demonstrate that firms with performance further below aspiration 
levels seek investments associated with greater degrees of uncertainty. This finding has 
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historically received a greater deal of empirical support than the finding that poorly 
performing firms become more uncertainty-averse. 
There are also potential implications for the rugged landscapes literature. The 
behavioral literature has traditionally argued that firms tend to satisfice on multiple 
dimensions, rather than maximizing along one dimension. As a result, they tend to restrict 
themselves to searching for solutions near their status quo. In searching for solutions, 
firms have been said to take an incremental, localized approach, rather than making 
radical leaps (March & Simon, 1958; Cyert & March, 1963). Meanwhile, the rugged 
landscapes literature has suggested that there may be multiple possible solutions to a 
problem, some better than others. Firms making incremental change may be optimizing 
themselves towards the best performance for their solution, but may not by optimizing 
themselves for the best performance overall. “Long-jumps”, consisting of radical change, 
are needed for firms to go from optimizing for one solution to optimizing for another 
(Kauffman, 1993; Levinthal, 1997). When hospitals with poorly performing CTs acquire 
new ones veiled in a high degree of uncertainty, they may be taking the type of long-
jump described by the rugged landscapes literature. 
Lastly, this study may also serve as a counter-example to the findings related to 
Bowman’s Paradox (Bowman, 1980; 1982). The implication of the findings from 
Hypotheses 2 and 5 considered in conjunction is that when the prior most valuable CT 
performs below aspirations in fulfilling customer desires, hospitals have greater 
uncertainty about the extent that their new most valuable CT with fulfill customer desires 
(Hypothesis 2). High uncertainty about whether a CT will fulfill customer desires is 
associated with the acquisition of a less expensive machine (Hypothesis 5). 
 Powell 134 
In order to test Bowman’s Paradox, I examined the impact of disparities between 
performance and aspirations on CT value as well (Table 32). The models were structured 
the same way as the models testing Hypothesis 5, save for the change of independent 
variable. Neither of the models pertaining to disparity related to the financial factor was 
significant. As was expected, the relationship was significant for the customer desires 
factor when the full dataset was used, and nearly significant (p=.075) when the most 
usable responses were used. An additional point of customer desires performance above 
the aspiration level was associated with additional acquisition value of between $72,000 
(according to the full sample) and $53,000 (according to the more usable sample). This 
all suggests that hospitals experiencing worse prior performance take on less uncertainty 
in their subsequent acquisition and acquire a less expensive machine. In contrast, 
Bowman found that troubled firms take on more risk than their less troubled peers.  
5.2.3: Implications for Bounded Rationality 
Furthermore, this study provides findings on the relationship between a firm’s 
uncertainties and objectives. Greater importance of both financial and customer desires 
objectives were associated with reduced uncertainty in the acquisition’s ability to fulfill 
that objective. This finding on the relationship between objective importance and 
uncertainty suggests that firms may be boundedly rational, and may invest their limited 
search resources in reducing uncertainty for the attributes that they feel are of the most 
importance to them (Simon, 1947). This helps refute March’s (1978) statement that we 
avoid our preferences during the decision making process, and specify goals that differ 
from the outcomes we wish to achieve. The tests of Hypothesis 3 imply that firms do 
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appear to be focusing their efforts to reduce uncertainty on objectives that matter to them. 
Likewise, less important objectives were associated with greater levels of uncertainty 
during the decision making process. 
5.3: Practical Implications 
The results of this study are potentially of interest to several groups of people: 
decision makers inside and outside of hospitals, equipment manufacturers, and policy 
makers wishing to influence equipment purchasing. CT machines are very expensive and 
their increasing utilization is contributing to the increasing cost of healthcare (Hartman, 
Martin, Nuccio, & Catlin, 2010). While hospitals do not often buy advanced imaging 
machines, the few decisions that they do make with respect to imaging have the potential 
to have substantial implications for their own financial performance and, in aggregate, for 
the financial performance of the industry. 
5.3.1: Implications for the Hospital Literature 
There has long been a debate in the literature over whether and how a hospital’s 
ownership status influences its behavior, investments, and objectives (Long, 1964; Reder, 
1965; Ginsberg, 1970; Feldstein, 1971; Newhouse, 1970; Lee, 1971; Pauly & Redisch, 
1973; Burns et al., 2009). As the full sample used in this study contained responses from 
hospitals of a variety of control types, it was possible to make some comparative 
assessments. In each of the models, variables for control type were included. As a result, 
there were a number of findings about the influence of control type. Relative to non-
profit status, for-profit status was significantly associated with reduced financial factor 
uncertainty in several of the models, as well reduced acquisition value. Government 
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status was associated with lower acquisition value than non-profit status in some of the 
hospitals. 
These findings suggest that hospital control type has the potential to influence 
both the uncertainties a hospital possesses while acquiring equipment and the amount it is 
ultimately willing to spend. The difference in the objectives of for-profit and non-profit 
hospitals has received considerable research. This study suggests that such attention is 
warranted, as control type appears to impact both perceived uncertainty and acquisition 
value. 
One finding of this study that was contrary to much of the literature was the 
variables related to operating costs (property, plant, and equipment expenditures and 
FTEs) did not appear to significantly impact the value of the investment. This was in 
congruence with the findings of Dunkelberg, Furst, and Roenfeldt (1984), but contrary to 
the findings of Dunn and Lefkowitz (1978), Bentkover, Sloan, Feeley, Campbell, and 
Firth (1984), and Somers (1989). One possible explanation for this finding is that 
hospitals did not consider their overall operating costs when deciding which model of 
machine to acquire, as the machines are more similar in their operating costs than in their 
fixed costs. 
Another finding of this study is that CT machines appear to be physician 
preference items. The value of a CT acquired is significantly influenced by the degree of 
uncertainty about whether it will fulfill customer desires, but not by the degree of 
financial uncertainty surrounding its performance. A line of research has examined the 
relative financial insensitivity surrounding the purchase of physician preference items. 
The physician preference item literature has largely focused on the purchase of patient-
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specific equipment by physicians on behalf of their patients, such as implants, medical 
devices, orthotics, and stents (DeJohn, 2005). Unlike commodity items, physician 
preference items are relatively unlikely to be purchased through hospital purchasing 
alliances (Burns & Lee, 2008). As a result, solutions to reducing expenditures related to 
physician preference items have looked at implementing rules like formularies and 
payment caps, rather than solutions that are more applicable to large purchases for which 
decisions are infrequent and made with managerial involvement (Montgomery & 
Schneller, 2007). The results of this study suggest that CT machines are also physician 
preference items. Hospitals may need to continue to devise methods for managing the 
acquisition of large, infrequently acquired physician preference items, in addition to the 
smaller, more frequently acquired items that have been more extensively studied. 
Future research on hospital investment decision making should improve upon this 
study by attempting to account for the operating costs of the equipment acquired, instead 
of the overall operating costs of the hospitals. Hospital control type should continue to be 
considered as a potential determinant of investment decision making. This study confirms 
prior empirical and theoretical assertions that for-profit, non-profit, and government 
hospitals behave slightly differently (Wedig, Hassan, & Sloan, 1989; Duggan, 2000; 
Cutler, Feldman, & Horwitz, 2005). 
5.3.2: Implications for Decision Makers 
Hospitals may also be interested in the results of this study because they have 
historically engaged in “technology wars” with other hospitals. My field interviews 
revealed that nationally-renowned academic medical centers bought equipment in part to 
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be on par with other nationally-renowned academic medical centers, as they felt that they 
risked losing faculty if they did not do so. A total of 49 of the responses that I received 
indicated that their hospitals had acquired their most valuable CT as a response to 
competitive action. This was the third most popular motive, behind technological 
developments and capacity expansion (Table 10). 
Fortunately, the normative portion of this study has several implications for 
decision makers. First, this study makes it clear that it is important to realize that there is 
a connection between managed care contracting and equipment purchasing. While the 
two tasks are often handled by entirely separate divisions of the hospital, the number of 
managed care contracts held by hospitals appears to influence the financial uncertainty 
that decision makers have when making equipment acquisition decisions (Hypothesis 1). 
Second, there were several financial factors that were not found to be significant. The 
interest rate at the time of investment was not significant in any of the models (although it 
came close in one). This may be because the economic factors examined and the 
questions asked dealt with operating costs, rather than sunk costs. These costs are less 
likely to be influenced by the interest rate than the cost of the machine. Nonetheless, it 
was a bit surprising to see that hospitals did not invest in less expensive machines during 
times of higher interest rates, and that the decision to lease or purchase did not influence 
the value of the investment. Normatively, hospitals should take the interest rate into 
account when making an investment, as it will influence their cost of capital if borrowing 
or their hurdle rate if deciding between multiple investments. 
This study is also of value to decision makers because it can help them understand 
what drives the degree of uncertainty that they are bear to take when making investment 
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decisions. There is strong support for the assertion that firms take more on more 
uncertainty when in the past they have been underperforming their aspirations and take 
on less uncertainty when in the past they have been outperforming their aspirations 
(Hypothesis 2), in accordance with the Behavioral Theory of the Firm and Prospect 
Theory. The normative theory does not hold as well. The degree of revenue and cost 
uncertainty the decision makers were willing to take on was not significantly related to 
many of the underlying characteristics of the hospital. While normatively, one would 
assume that a hospital with a smaller budget would be less willing to take on a high 
degree of financial uncertainty than a hospital with a larger budget, the factor 
corresponding to financial uncertainty had no bearing on the value of the acquisition. 
Descriptively, hospitals seemed to have taken on more financial uncertainty if their prior 
equipment had worse than aspired financial performance and less financial uncertainty if 
their prior equipment’s financial performance exceeded aspirations (Hypothesis 2). This 
finding is surprising, as McNamara and Bromiley (1997) suggested that when decision 
makers are influenced by both organizational factors and cognitive biases, the influence 
of the organizational factors outweighs the influence of the cognitive biases. 
It is unsurprising that hospital decision makers were influenced more greatly by 
uncertainty over whether customer desires would be satisfied than by uncertainty over 
profitability. During my pilot study, I found that respondents were unable to answer basic 
questions that could be used to estimate profitability, such as the volume of machine 
utilization. As physician salaries do not have a direct relationship to equipment 
profitability in a hospital setting, it makes sense that it is not an area of great concern. 
Physicians generate income by charging for their services in conjunction with the use of a 
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CT machine – the cost of the machine itself may simply be considered part of the 
hospital’s overhead (GE Healthcare, 2010). Furthermore, there is a descriptive literature 
that shows that decision makers act in a manner that minimizes personal potential for job 
loss (Coffee, 1986; Gupta, 1987, Chatterjee & Lubatkin, 1990; Greenwald & Stiglitz, 
1990; Wiseman & Gomes-Mejia, 1998). By meeting the needs of their constituents, even 
at the expense of firm profitability, the decision makers may be acting in a way that is 
most beneficial to their careers. 
There are a number of prescriptions for improving the CT acquisition process that 
hospitals can glean from this study. Hospitals may wish to more consciously consider the 
cost of capital in their decision making process. The profitability of an investment is 
lower if the capital required to finance it is higher due to a higher interest rate. In the 
majority of the models that were tested, the interest rate did not appear to influence the 
value of the acquisition. Additionally, the most decisive factor in determining the 
ultimate value of the acquired machine appears to be the hospital’s degree of certainty 
about whether the machine will meet customer desires. The extent of this uncertainty is 
influenced by both hospital objectives and the disparity between the hospital’s aspiration 
level and the previous machine’s performance. Given that uncertainty about an 
acquisition’s ability to fulfill customer desires appears to play such a decisive role in the 
ultimate outcome of the decision, it may be prudent for hospitals to over-weight fulfilling 
customer desires as an objective when deciding how to allocate time investigating 
machines. 
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5.3.3: Implications for CT Manufacturers 
Ultimately, the goal of manufacturers is to understand their customers so that they 
can offer products in a more profit-maximizing fashion. If more expensive models also 
are more profitable (as they tend to be – otherwise there would be no incentive to upsell), 
manufacturers desire encourage their customers to acquire more expensive machines. The 
results of this study highlight the factors that cause a hospital to acquire a more costly 
machine. Manufacturers may also wish to invest more heavily in educating decision 
makers about how their equipment can meet the needs of physicians and the demands of 
providing high-quality care. Increased uncertainty related to these two issues was 
significantly related to lower acquisition value. This study suggests that more educated 
consuming firms might be willing to spend more. 
There are other means of reducing uncertainty related to a machine’s ability to 
fulfill customer desires. By stressing the importance of fulfilling the needs of physicians 
and patients to purchasers when promoting machines, manufacturers can seek to increase 
the perceived importance of fulfilling customer desires as an objective. This study has 
shown that when hospitals perceive an objective to be more important, they tend to also 
have less uncertainty about their most valuable CT’s ability to fulfill it. This may be 
because hospitals more rigorously investigate objectives that they perceive as more 
important. Getting hospitals to pay more attention during the decision making process to 
whether the machines fulfill the desires of their customers may result in the hospitals 
acquiring more expensive machines. 
Although this study did not directly examine the relationship between 
performance-aspiration disparity and acquisition value, I computed regressions 
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examining this relationship, which I have included as the supplemental tables, Table 30 
and Table 31. While the disparity was not significantly related to the acquisition value 
when the control variables were included, when the model was run without using control 
variables, prior customer desires performance in excess of aspirations was associated 
with acquiring a more expensive machine. Thus, there is some empirical support for the 
linkage between performance-aspiration disparity, uncertainty, and CT value which I 
have postulated. 
5.3.4: Implications for Understanding the Impact of Policy Changes 
 Finally, the results of this study may be useful in predicting the implications of 
several forthcoming policy changes. The financial and customer desires uncertainty that 
hospitals face is likely not static, but instead is in part determined by the environment in 
which hospitals operate. The spread of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), 
increased price transparency, and increased outcomes research all may have an impact on 
both the uncertainties that hospitals have when acquiring CTs and on the value of their 
ultimate acquisitions. 
 One of the features of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (a.k.a. 
Obamacare) was the provision for the creation of Accountable Care Organizations 
(ACOs). Section 3022 of the bill allows ACOs to contract with Medicare and be held 
accountable for the care, cost of treatment, and quality of treatment received by the fee-
for-service Medicare beneficiaries assigned to them. Beneficiaries assigned to ACOs 
would in effect be put under shadow capitation, with payments to their providers being 
either increased or reduced depending on how well the providers in the ACO performed 
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relative to local benchmarks (Goldsmith, 2009). As the creation of ACOs may 
concentrate market power, the Federal Trade Commission has had to issue guidelines for 
when it will consider ACO activity as anticompetitive (Federal Trade Commission, 
2011). 
To the extent that ACOs create exogenous uncertainty in revenue, they will 
increase the financial uncertainty of hospitals acquiring subsequent CT machines. 
However, if ACOs drive hospitals within geographic areas to collaborate on managing 
the cost and quality of treatment, they may decrease the demand uncertainty that hospitals 
face. If an ACO commands a far greater share of the market than any of its constituent 
hospitals and makes cross-hospital decisions on equipment acquisition, the hospitals may 
experience less uncertainty in customer demand. This study has shown that an increase in 
financial uncertainty does not appear to impact the value of CT machines acquired. 
However, a decrease in uncertainty about consumer preferences is associated with the 
acquisition of more expensive CTs. Thus, the increased prevalence of ACOs may 
encourage the acquisition of more expensive CTs, in spite of the increased financial 
uncertainty that will likely accompany this change. 
Another recent development is the increased consideration of policies promoting 
price transparency. In 2011, 34 states required the reporting of hospital charges or 
reimbursement rates, and there was increasing pressure for hospitals to be more 
forthcoming about pricing, particularly formerly confidential pricing information in payer 
contracts (Cutler & Dafny, 2011). It is unclear whether more transparent pricing will 
result in lower or higher prices. However, it may cause hospitals to match the prices of 
their peers, resulting in less price variation (Cutler & Dafny, 2011; Sinaiko & Rosenthal, 
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2011). In an environment of reduced price variation, hospitals likely have less uncertainty 
about the revenues that their CT machines will generate. While they may still be 
uncertain about the volume of patients they will receive for the machine, if prices are 
coordinated, they will likely be far less uncertain about how much they will be 
reimbursed. As this study showed that changes in uncertainty related to customer desires 
are associated with changes in acquisition value, but changes in uncertainty related to 
revenue are not, increased price transparency may have no significant impact on the value 
of CT machines that hospitals acquire. 
On a related note, manufacturers are facing increasing pressure to disclose the 
prices that they charge hospitals for equipment (U.S. Senate, 2007; Pauly & Burns, 
2008). Medical devices, such as CT machines tend to be sold under differentiated 
oligopolies, in which a small number of firms sell distinct devices (Pauly & Burns, 2008). 
In the case of CT, the primary manufacturers are GE, Hitachi, Philips, Siemens, and 
Toshiba. While mandatory disclosure of average prices might give hospitals more 
leverage in negotiation and reduce uncertainty related to the sunk costs associated with 
acquiring equipment, it would not influence uncertainty related to operating costs. As 
overall hospital property plant, and equipment expenditures at cost did not have a 
significant impact on the value of the CT acquired, there is no evidence that a policy 
which reduces the sunk costs associated with other equipment will reduce CT spending. 
The direct impact of increased CT equipment price transparent on the value of CTs 
acquired is unexplored in this work. 
One form of policy that is likely to influence the value of CTs acquired is policy 
promoting increased outcomes research. The form of uncertainty found to be most 
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negatively associated with the value of CTs acquired was that related to how well the 
machines would deliver patient care. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009 allocated $1.1 billion to support comparative effectiveness research. Comparative 
effectiveness research investigates the benefits and harms of diagnosis, prevention, and 
treatment methods (Sox & Greenfield, 2009). The Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act went on to subsequently create the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute 
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2010). If this research achieves its aim, there will ultimately 
be more information available to decision makers about the impact of different CT 
machines and procedures on care. Ironically, although comparative effectiveness has 
been touted as a tool for both increasing quality and reducing costs, hospitals with better 
information on outcomes may be willing to acquire more expensive CT machines. This 
study has found that decreased uncertainty over care outcomes is associated with the 
acquisition of more costly machines. 
5.4: Limitations 
Although there were several significant findings in this study, there are issues in 
the methodology that may lead some to question the results. Participants were not 
randomly selected, but instead were people who either chose to answer a mail survey or 
both attended a conference and opted to participate. The response rates of the mail 
samples were rather low, and the demographics of the respondents were not random. 
Respondents to the Texas survey tended to be radiologists, respondents to the American 
College of Healthcare Executives survey tended to be hospital administrators, and 
respondents to Radiological Society of North America survey tended to be either 
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radiologists, radiology technicians, or medical physicists. Given the poor response rate, 
the willingness of participants to participate may indicate that they more strongly value 
research—one of the attributes considered by the study. 
The low response rate caused additional issues as well. As a result, the sample 
size used in the study was rather small. Furthermore, the adjusted R2 of the models was 
rather poor. The number of variables included in the models had to be somewhat 
restricted in order to get the models to have reasonable statistical power as the sample 
size was so small. 
There were also issues related to the nature of the data that went into the study. 
Cross-sectional data was used, all of which was reported after the acquisition being 
studied had occurred. As a result, respondents may have had trouble recalling the 
information that they reported, or may have reported it inaccurately. Since the 
respondents appeared to have trouble recalling facts related to revenue and profitability, 
and this information was not provided in the American Hospital Association Annual 
Survey Database, the study was not able to consider profitability. Likewise, it was not 
possible to obtain information on the characteristics of the key decision makers, except in 
the cases in which the key decision makers also happened to be the respondents.  
Another issue of this study is that of generalizability. In order to make the value 
of the acquisitions comparable, only one type of acquisition was examined. The findings 
of this study may not be generalizable to other medical imaging equipment acquisitions, 
or to acquisitions occurring outside of a hospital setting. Many CT machines are acquired 
by free-standing clinics, and it is possible that these facilities employ a different decision 
making process. 
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Additionally, this study did not consider inter-firm interactions. The control 
variables included did not account of the CT machines possessed by nearby competing 
hospitals. While hospital system and network membership was considered as a binary 
variable, this study did not control for a network effect. If some systems or networks 
share equipment to a greater extent than others, this may be a factor influencing the value 
of acquisitions. 
Finally, it is important to note that this study was unable to conclusively prove or 
disprove any theories. Instead, it provided a single-context empirical example in which a 
series of theories were compared. The results of subsequent studies may differ if different 
contexts or methodologies are used. There may be issues related to the quality of the 
indicators used, as there was substantial inter-rater disagreement on a number of them. A 
fuller picture of the relative performance of the theories in question will only be possible 
after more comparisons have been made. 
Furthermore, there may be relevant theories for explaining uncertainty levels and 
acquisition values which have not been considered or not yet proposed. For instance, one 
explanation for acquisition decision making might be institutional theory, which suggests 
that organizations adopt changes in part due to a drive towards isomorphism out of a 
desire for legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Coercive, mimetic, and normative forces 
drive organizations to become increasingly similar (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Institutional theory suggests that understanding acquisition decision making requires an 
understanding of the other firms with which the focal firm is interacting. This is but one 
of several potential explanations for the acquisition decision making process unexplored 
in this study. 
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Despite all these limitations, this study has managed to provide information about 
the comparative performance of three different perspectives on the determinants of 
acquisition uncertainty during the firm acquisition decision making process, as well as 
findings on the comparative performance of two different perspectives of the 
determinants of the value of firm capital investments. The construction of a novel dataset 
enabled the testing of a series of issues related to firm capital investment decision making 
using both publicly-reported and perceived factors internal to the firm. The prior 
literature has largely looked at outside proxies of firm performance, aspirations, and 
objectives, rather than directly surveying the people involved in the process. 
5.5: Future Research Directions 
 There is much room for further research on the impact of non-financial 
uncertainty on the magnitude of capital investments. The impact of non-financial 
uncertainty on the magnitude of the investment was a bit of a surprise, as none of the 
theories I considered had predicted that it would have any influence. The surprise in part 
resulted from the paucity of research on this subject. The uncertainty-investment 
relationship has not been extensively empirically explored using firm-level data, and as a 
result, heterogeneity in firm characteristics have largely been ignored (Guiso & Parigi, 
1999). The two notable exceptions to this have taken a substantially different approach 
than this study. Leahy and Whited (1996) looked at the expected variance in the daily 
stock market returns of firms, and Guiso and Parigi (1999) looked at firms’ self-reported 
uncertainty about the growth in the demand for their products. Neither study looked at an 
extensive battery of perceptions of uncertainty. As this study demonstrates that non-
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financial measures of uncertainty, such as employee preference (physician preference), 
consumer preference, and product quality (care) uncertainty matter, they warrant further 
research. 
This study further suggests that at least in some contexts, non-financial measures 
of uncertainty may play a larger role in determining the value of a capital investment than 
the financial measures of uncertainty traditionally studied. Future researchers should 
conduct studies that consider both perceived and environmentally-determined forms of 
non-financial uncertainty and attempt to determine if and how they impact capital 
investment. This study found no significant relationship between uncertainty in the 
research productivity of an investment and the magnitude of an investment, but was not 
able to provide a good explanation as to why no relationship was found.  Although 
uncertainty-aversion was found for the other three types of non-financial uncertainty, it is 
not clear whether that finding is generalizable to other types of non-financial uncertainty. 
Future researchers can attempt to generalize rules for both determining which forms of 
perceived non-financial uncertainty impact investments, and how they do so. 
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Appendix 
A.1: Tables 
 
Any CT 
Multislice, 
<64 Slices 
Multislice, 
64+ Slices 
Nationwide    
Number of Hospitals With: 4,030 2,747 1,552 
Number of Hospitals Without: 834 2,105 3,295 
Percentage of Hospitals With: 82.9% 56.6% 32.0% 
    
Nationwide, by Control Type    
Non-Federal Government 917 536 137 
Non-Profit 2466 1813 1068 
For-Profit 567 352 199 
Federal Government 80 46 48 
    
Texas    
Number of Hospitals With: 374 250 131 
Number of Hospitals Without: 168 292 411 
Percentage of Hospitals With: 69.0% 46.1% 24.2% 
    
Texas, by Control Type    
Non-Federal Government 103 58 25 
Non-Profit 132 101 58 
For-Profit 139 91 48 
Federal Government 0 0 0 
Table 1: Prevalence of CT in 2008 
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Variable Reliability 
Slices (Current CT) 0.87 
Slices (Prior CT) 0.76 
Year (Current CT) 0.93 
Year (Prior CT) 0.00 
Purchased (Current CT) 0.82 
Purchased (Prior CT) 0.72 
Objective Importance - Revenue 0.44 
Objective Importance - Costs 0.16 
Objective Importance - Physician Pref 0.39 
Objective Importance - Consumer Pref 0.52 
Objective Importance - Care 0.12 
Objective Importance - Research 0.70 
Objective Fulfillment Before - Revenue 0.42 
Objective Fulfillment Before - Costs 0.25 
Objective Fulfillment Before - Physician Pref 0.54 
Objective Fulfillment Before - Consumer Pref 0.53 
Objective Fulfillment Before - Care 0.59 
Objective Fulfillment Before - Research 0.44 
Uncertainty - Revenue 0.21 
Uncertainty - Costs 0.00 
Uncertainty - Physician Pref 0.70 
Uncertainty - Consumer Pref 0.59 
Uncertainty - Care 0.65 
Uncertainty - Research 0.49 
Dept. - Key DM Admin 0.19 
Dept. - Key DM Clinician 0.32 
Table 2: The Reliability of Usable Responses from Hospitals with Multiple Respondents 
Note: Higher is better. 
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  Mean S.D. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 N 
Uncertainty - Revenue 5.23 1.42   2% 2% 5% 22% 22% 26% 22% 217 
Uncertainty - Costs 5.02 1.32   1% 1% 7% 30% 22% 24% 15% 217 
Uncertainty - Physician Pref 5.69 1.31   0% 3% 3% 12% 16% 34% 32% 217 
Uncertainty - Consumer Pref 5.35 1.40   1% 2% 6% 20% 16% 32% 23% 215 
Uncertainty - Care 5.88 1.24   0% 1% 5% 9% 15% 30% 40% 217 
Uncertainty - Research 3.44 2.20   33% 9% 9% 14% 8% 16% 11% 209 
Uncertainty - Recall 5.29 1.46   2% 3% 5% 21% 16% 31% 23% 216 
Most Valuable CT Value 1.1E+6 5.4E+5                 215 
Hospital - # HMO Contracts 11.97 27.42                 161 
Hospital - # PPO Contracts 29.21 33.92                 172 
Hospital - Total Facility Expenses 3.9E+8 4.8E+8                 208 
Hospital - Property Plant & Equipment 3.9E+2 2.6E+2                 184 
Hospital - Total FTEs 2.7E+3 3.0E+3                 208 
Dept. - Min. Life of CT 6.42 2.30                 209 
Dept. - Max. Life of CT 9.74 3.00                 205 
Objective Before - Revenue 4.95 1.49   5% 3% 5% 19% 31% 22% 15% 221 
Objective Before - Costs 4.85 1.50   4% 5% 7% 19% 27% 27% 11% 221 
Objective Before - Physician Pref 4.87 1.64   4% 5% 12% 17% 22% 22% 19% 221 
Objective Before - Consumer Pref 4.59 1.66   6% 5% 11% 25% 20% 19% 14% 221 
Objective Before - Care 5.24 1.58   2% 5% 7% 14% 23% 21% 28% 221 
Objective Before - Research 2.75 2.02   47% 9% 8% 14% 8% 7% 6% 221 
Objective - Revenue 5.57 1.69   5% 2% 6% 9% 12% 26% 40% 221 
Objective - Costs 5.22 1.68   3% 5% 9% 14% 18% 20% 31% 221 
Objective - Physician Pref 5.86 1.32   1% 2% 2% 9% 17% 28% 41% 221 
Objective - Consumer Pref 4.98 1.75   5% 6% 9% 17% 17% 21% 25% 221 
Objective - Care 6.46 1.11   1% 0% 1% 4% 5% 18% 71% 221 
Objective - Research 2.93 2.12   42% 11% 10% 12% 7% 8% 10% 221 
Control - For Profit     91% 9%             221 
Control - Government     81% 19%             221 
Respondent - Key DM is Administrator     27% 73%             218 
Respondent - Is Key DM     61% 39%             218 
Respondent - Key DM is MD/DO     52% 52%             221 
Respondent - Tenure 11.22 9.38                 219 
Hospital - System Member? 0.57 0.50 43% 57%             221 
Hospital - Network Member? 0.36 0.48 64% 36%             193 
Purchased (Current CT) 0.81 0.39 19% 81%             210 
Current CT is a New Brand 0.23 0.42 77% 23%             221 
Current CT is Same Brand as Prior MVCT 0.50 0.50 50% 50%             221 
Experienced - Total Brands 2.45 0.98   18% 36% 32% 13% 2%     221 
Years Elapsed Since CT Acquired 2.41 2.20                 206 
LIBOR (Current CT) 3.00 1.67                 206 
Hospital - Catholic Church Operated? 0.16 0.37 84% 16%             208 
Hospital - Critical Access Hospital 0.05 0.21 95% 5%             208 
Table 3: Summary Statistics, Full Sample 
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  Mean S.D. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 N 
Uncertainty - Revenue 5.30 1.38   2% 2% 4% 21% 24% 25% 23% 174 
Uncertainty - Costs 5.08 1.31   1% 1% 7% 30% 21% 23% 17% 174 
Uncertainty - Physician Pref 5.77 1.26   1% 2% 2% 11% 17% 33% 34% 174 
Uncertainty - Consumer Pref 5.44 1.39   2% 1% 5% 19% 17% 30% 26% 172 
Uncertainty - Care 5.95 1.19   0% 1% 5% 7% 16% 30% 41% 174 
Uncertainty - Research 3.43 2.22   33% 10% 8% 13% 8% 13% 12% 172 
Uncertainty - Recall 5.32 1.47   2% 4% 4% 19% 15% 32% 23% 175 
Most Valuable CT Value 1.1E+6 5.2E+5                 170 
Hospital - # HMO Contracts 9.13 7.52                 126 
Hospital - # PPO Contracts 29.09 29.40                 137 
Hospital - Total Facility Expenses 3.8E+8 5.0E+8                 165 
Hospital - Property Plant & Equipment 3.9E+2 2.6E+2                 146 
Hospital - Total FTEs 2.7E+3 3.2E+3                 165 
Dept. - Min. Life of CT 6.29 2.24                 168 
Dept. - Max. Life of CT 9.58 2.82                 166 
Objective Before - Revenue 5.05 1.46   3% 3% 5% 20% 29% 23% 17% 176 
Objective Before - Costs 4.95 1.43   3% 4% 7% 19% 28% 25% 13% 176 
Objective Before - Physician Pref 4.96 1.60   4% 3% 11% 15% 26% 22% 19% 176 
Objective Before - Consumer Pref 4.60 1.66   7% 5% 11% 24% 22% 18% 14% 176 
Objective Before - Care 5.32 1.56   2% 5% 6% 12% 24% 21% 29% 176 
Objective Before - Research 2.71 2.02   48% 10% 6% 15% 8% 6% 7% 176 
Objective - Revenue 5.65 1.63   5% 2% 5% 9% 13% 26% 41% 176 
Objective - Costs 5.23 1.71   4% 5% 7% 15% 18% 19% 32% 176 
Objective - Physician Pref 5.91 1.34   2% 2% 2% 7% 15% 30% 43% 176 
Objective - Consumer Pref 5.08 1.78   5% 7% 9% 14% 15% 23% 27% 176 
Objective - Care 6.46 1.16   2% 1% 2% 3% 4% 17% 72% 176 
Objective - Research 2.84 2.09   44% 12% 11% 10% 7% 7% 9% 176 
Control - For Profit     81% 19%             176 
Control - Government     35% 65%             176 
Respondent - Key DM is Administrator     25% 75%             173 
Respondent - Is Key DM     61% 39%             174 
Respondent - Key DM is MD/DO     46% 54%             176 
Respondent - Tenure 12.89 9.31                 176 
Hospital - System Member? 0.60 0.49 40% 60%             176 
Hospital - Network Member? 0.36 0.48 64% 36%             152 
Purchased (Current CT) 0.83 0.38 17% 83%             165 
Current CT is a New Brand 0.23 0.42 77% 23%             176 
Current CT is Same Brand as Prior MVCT 0.53 0.50 47% 53%             176 
Experienced - Total Brands 2.17 1.96   18% 35% 31% 14% 2%     176 
Years Elapsed Since CT Acquired 2.17 1.96                 162 
LIBOR (Current CT) 2.92 1.64                 162 
Hospital - Catholic Church Operated? 0.82 0.38 82% 18%             165 
Hospital - Critical Access Hospital 0.05 0.23 95% 5%             165 
Table 4: Summary Statistics, Most Usable Responses Sample 
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Table 5: Number of Slices in the Current and Prior Most Valuable CT, by Number of Responses (Full Sample) 
 
 
Table 6: Number of Slices in the Current and Prior Most Valuable CT, by Number of Responses (Usable Sample) 
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Table 7: Year of Acquisition of the Current and Prior Most Valuable CT, by Number of Responses (Usable Sample) 
 
 
Table 8: Year of Acquisition of the Current and Prior Most Valuable CT, by Number of Responses (Full Sample) 
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Any CT 
Multislice, 
<64 Slices 
Multislice, 
64+ Slices 
Nationwide    
Number of Hospitals With: 4,030 2,747 1,552 
Number of Hospitals Without: 834 2,105 3,295 
Percentage of Hospitals With: 82.9% 56.6% 32.0% 
    
Nationwide, by Control Type    
Non-Federal Government 917 536 137 
Non-Profit 2466 1813 1068 
For-Profit 567 352 199 
Federal Government 80 46 48 
    
Texas    
Number of Hospitals With: 374 250 131 
Number of Hospitals Without: 168 292 411 
Percentage of Hospitals With: 69.0% 46.1% 24.2% 
    
Texas, by Control Type    
Non-Federal Government 103 58 25 
Non-Profit 132 101 58 
For-Profit 139 91 48 
Federal Government 0 0 0 
Table 9: CT Ownership by Machine Type and Control Type 
 
Motive Frequency 
Capacity expansion 82 
Competitive action 49 
Contract expiration 9 
Leadership changes 6 
Tech developments 94 
Table 10: Frequency of Reported Motives for CT Acquisition 
 
Please note that some of the hospitals in Table 10 provided multiple responses, although 
the prompt was to report the primary motive. 
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Factor: Financial Financial Financial Financial Financial Financial 
Model: Economic Disparity Objective Economic Disparity Objective 
Dataset: Full Full Full Usable Usable Usable 
Adjusted R^2 0.100 0.308 0.350 0.140 0.335 0.388 
       Factor: Customer Customer Customer Customer Customer Customer 
Model: Economic Disparity Objective Economic Disparity Objective 
Dataset: Full Full Full Usable Usable Usable 
Adjusted R^2   0.139 0.158   0.152 0.193 
Table 11: Comparison of the Adjusted R
2
 of the Uncertainty Models 
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  Financial Financial 
  Uncertainty Uncertainty 
  Full Usable 
Hospital - Payer Contracts Factor -0.00116 0.0117 
  (0.672) (0.229) 
Hospital - PP&E at Cost 0.00000582 0.000198 
  (0.990) (0.730) 
Hospital - Total FTEs 0.0000132 0.0000133 
  (0.704) (0.716) 
Dept. - Min. Life of CT 0.115 0.00167 
  (0.102) (0.986) 
Dept. - Max. Life of CT -0.0888* -0.0233 
  (0.037) (0.690) 
Control - For Profit -0.433 -0.711 
  (0.334) (0.163) 
Control - Government 0.270 0.0325 
  (0.469) (0.941) 
Respondent - Key DM is Admin -0.214 -0.0494 
  (0.446) (0.886) 
Respondent - Key DM 0.308 0.213 
  (0.242) (0.392) 
Respondent - MD/DO -1.145*** -1.241** 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Respondent - Tenure 0.00586 0.0151 
  (0.668) (0.327) 
Hospital - System Member? -0.275 -0.444 
  (0.247) (0.072) 
Hospital - Network Member? -0.0674 0.145 
  (0.793) (0.587) 
Purchased (Current CT) 0.302 0.513 
  (0.298) (0.195) 
Current CT is a New Brand 0.317 0.400 
  (0.415) (0.435) 
Current CT is Same Brand as Prior MVCT -0.0103 0.166 
  (0.970) (0.651) 
Experienced - Total Brands 0.0736 0.103 
  (0.584) (0.514) 
Years Elapsed Since MVCT Acquired -0.0453 -0.0940 
  (0.332) (0.156) 
LIBOR (Current CT) -0.0262 -0.0373 
  (0.704) (0.660) 
Hospital - Catholic Church Operated? -0.413 -0.667 
  (0.183) (0.060) 
Hospital - Critical Access Hospital 0.480 0.561 
  (0.384) (0.415) 
Source - ACHE -0.158 0.138 
  (0.674) (0.751) 
Source - Other 0.468 0.856 
  (0.243) (0.059) 
Source - Texas -0.0788 0.208 
  (0.810) (0.594) 
Constant 3.409*** 2.630** 
  (0.000) (0.001) 
Observations 121 96 
Adjusted R-squared 0.100 0.140 
Table 12: Impact of Normative Factors on Financial Uncertainty 
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Financial 
Customer 
Desires Financial 
Customer 
Desires 
 
Uncertainty Uncertainty Uncertainty Uncertainty 
 
Full Full Usable Usable 
Disparity - Factor -0.394*** -0.287*** -0.433*** -0.274** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
Control - For Profit -0.688* -0.500 -0.985** -0.519 
  (0.028) (0.158) (0.001) (0.151) 
Control - Government 0.0905 -0.370 0.0132 -0.329 
  (0.652) (0.113) (0.959) (0.215) 
Respondent - Key DM is Admin -0.0873 -0.00499 -0.0716 -0.125 
  (0.676) (0.981) (0.770) (0.588) 
Respondent - Key DM 0.283 0.194 0.222 0.0686 
  (0.107) (0.284) (0.243) (0.700) 
Respondent - MD/DO -0.827*** -0.278 -0.845** -0.454 
  (0.000) (0.195) (0.002) (0.069) 
Respondent - Tenure 0.00377 -0.00836 0.00380 -0.00881 
  (0.669) (0.318) (0.716) (0.406) 
Hospital - System Member? -0.0407 0.241 -0.0729 0.182 
  (0.824) (0.302) (0.736) (0.485) 
Hospital - Network Member? -0.128 -0.322 0.0452 -0.163 
  (0.458) (0.103) (0.829) (0.428) 
Purchased (Current CT) 0.0272 0.0475 0.188 0.0530 
  (0.890) (0.815) (0.482) (0.835) 
Current CT is a New Brand -0.155 -0.376 -0.211 -0.321 
  (0.552) (0.167) (0.505) (0.280) 
Current CT is Same Brand as Prior MVCT -0.180 -0.305 -0.205 -0.233 
  (0.383) (0.204) (0.391) (0.327) 
Experienced - Total Brands 0.0602 0.0439 0.0728 -0.00362 
  (0.526) (0.659) (0.519) (0.973) 
Years Elapsed Since MVCT Acquired 0.00572 0.0564 0.00243 0.129 
  (0.874) (0.235) (0.967) (0.059) 
LIBOR (Current CT) -0.121* -0.0757 -0.107 -0.124 
  (0.017) (0.243) (0.089) (0.125) 
Hospital - Catholic Church Operated? -0.319 -0.307 -0.486* -0.407 
  (0.132) (0.216) (0.034) (0.068) 
Hospital - Critical Access Hospital 0.0111 0.671 0.120 0.929 
  (0.984) (0.198) (0.852) (0.083) 
Source - ACHE -0.173 -0.235 -0.106 -0.0172 
  (0.394) (0.298) (0.663) (0.945) 
Source - Other 0.693** 0.457 0.823** 0.527 
  (0.007) (0.095) (0.006) (0.076) 
Source - Texas -0.0292 -0.145 0.186 0.0441 
  (0.903) (0.619) (0.477) (0.890) 
Constant 5.583*** 4.277*** 5.567*** 4.323*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 166 164 130 128 
Adjusted R-squared 0.308 0.139 0.335 0.152 
Table 13: Impact of Performance-Aspiration Disparity (BTOF/PT) on Uncertainty 
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Financial 
Customer 
Desires Financial 
Customer 
Desires 
 
Uncertainty Uncertainty Uncertainty Uncertainty 
 
Full Full Usable Usable 
Objective Strength - Factor -0.410*** -0.399*** -0.414*** -0.378** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
Control - For Profit -0.495 -0.208 -0.661 -0.160 
  (0.139) (0.503) (0.058) (0.604) 
Control - Government -0.126 -0.309 -0.117 -0.286 
  (0.528) (0.169) (0.640) (0.271) 
Respondent - Key DM is Admin -0.0400 0.0354 0.0594 0.0844 
  (0.846) (0.872) (0.786) (0.723) 
Respondent - Key DM 0.0689 0.140 -0.00790 0.0509 
  (0.673) (0.421) (0.962) (0.746) 
Respondent - MD/DO -0.526* -0.169 -0.766** -0.365 
  (0.024) (0.475) (0.005) (0.141) 
Respondent - Tenure 0.00230 -0.0145 0.00233 -0.0147 
  (0.813) (0.106) (0.836) (0.184) 
Hospital - System Member? -0.0566 0.223 -0.173 0.0745 
  (0.768) (0.344) (0.420) (0.772) 
Hospital - Network Member? -0.0705 -0.278 0.142 -0.142 
  (0.679) (0.137) (0.490) (0.461) 
Purchased (Current CT) 0.0549 0.120 0.0494 0.00541 
  (0.776) (0.583) (0.845) (0.982) 
Current CT is a New Brand -0.0194 -0.207 -0.0106 -0.144 
  (0.936) (0.444) (0.970) (0.621) 
Current CT is Same Brand as Prior MVCT -0.0988 -0.183 -0.00576 -0.0867 
  (0.580) (0.436) (0.979) (0.722) 
Experienced - Total Brands 0.0197 0.0230 0.0218 -0.0321 
  (0.834) (0.823) (0.836) (0.765) 
Years Elapsed Since MVCT Acquired 0.0205 0.0655 0.0296 0.117 
  (0.586) (0.173) (0.636) (0.097) 
LIBOR (Current CT) -0.0664 -0.0306 -0.0724 -0.0493 
  (0.210) (0.643) (0.253) (0.519) 
Hospital - Catholic Church Operated? -0.420 -0.156 -0.530* -0.269 
  (0.072) (0.560) (0.032) (0.244) 
Hospital - Critical Access Hospital 0.232 0.668 0.288 0.727 
  (0.625) (0.187) (0.595) (0.190) 
Source - ACHE -0.197 -0.0908 0.0701 0.217 
  (0.378) (0.683) (0.780) (0.329) 
Source - Other 0.662* 0.296 0.936** 0.492 
  (0.049) (0.460) (0.006) (0.232) 
Source - Texas 0.0182 -0.0898 0.280 0.202 
  (0.935) (0.743) (0.293) (0.520) 
Constant 5.602*** 4.815*** 5.479*** 4.728*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 166 164 130 128 
Adjusted R-squared 0.350 0.158 0.388 0.193 
Table 14: Impact of Objective Strength on Uncertainty 
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CT Value CT Value CT Value CT Value 
 
Payer 
Contracts 
Operating 
Costs 
Payer 
Contracts 
Operating 
Costs 
 
Full Full Usable Usable 
Hospital - Payer Contracts Factor -885.0   2717.1   
  (0.298)   (0.311)   
Hospital - PP&E at Cost   87.87   160.9 
    (0.663)   (0.498) 
Hospital - Total FTEs   10.84   4.310 
    (0.499)   (0.780) 
Dept. - Min. Life of CT 19404.6 -10149.3 65075.8* 14486.5 
  (0.540) (0.697) (0.024) (0.581) 
Dept. - Max. Life of CT -22096.0 -4992.4 -30579.5 -3620.9 
  (0.238) (0.792) (0.134) (0.870) 
Control - For Profit -374544.5** -285434.5* -544681.3*** -334391.2* 
  (0.010) (0.037) (0.000) (0.016) 
Control - Government -222539.9 33721.6 -280097.4* 81831.0 
  (0.064) (0.824) (0.028) (0.646) 
Respondent - Key DM is Admin -16707.3 15958.7 -170484.4 -128358.8 
  (0.892) (0.882) (0.066) (0.237) 
Respondent - Key DM 66022.1 47581.5 147565.6 119240.1 
  (0.426) (0.540) (0.081) (0.132) 
Respondent - MD/DO -272313.3* -272865.3* -372840.0** -296195.3* 
  (0.013) (0.021) (0.003) (0.044) 
Respondent - Tenure -2891.1 -3534.7 3569.4 -1910.6 
  (0.535) (0.432) (0.393) (0.652) 
Hospital - System Member? 12110.9 -63403.1 147451.7 69236.4 
  (0.903) (0.498) (0.115) (0.477) 
Hospital - Network Member? -1798.1 -26501.3 -24138.2 -53568.3 
  (0.987) (0.786) (0.793) (0.601) 
Purchased (Current CT) 21745.1 -131383.4 379995.7*** 73685.0 
  (0.880) (0.370) (0.000) (0.588) 
Current CT is a New Brand 212723.4 216728.6 132248.5 118293.1 
  (0.124) (0.068) (0.472) (0.432) 
Current CT is Same Brand as Prior MVCT -30750.5 49394.6 -228346.0 -116117.5 
  (0.768) (0.624) (0.092) (0.376) 
Experienced - Total Brands -7659.8 8477.5 70794.9* 46729.1 
  (0.857) (0.842) (0.041) (0.277) 
Years Elapsed Since MVCT Acquired -42777.1 -61883.1* -35739.8 -52857.0 
  (0.077) (0.046) (0.185) (0.138) 
LIBOR (Current CT) -8065.8 -23939.8 -55229.0 -59920.7 
  (0.784) (0.435) (0.051) (0.120) 
Hospital - Catholic Church Operated? 48804.2 28906.8 -46453.8 -8676.8 
  (0.660) (0.796) (0.709) (0.940) 
Hospital - Critical Access Hospital -779476.4*** -812041.8*** -652239.1*** -793586.6*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Source - ACHE 242427.3* 102634.7 262842.1 67861.3 
  (0.044) (0.413) (0.060) (0.652) 
Source - Other 170823.2 37279.9 93904.2 9196.1 
  (0.123) (0.776) (0.414) (0.949) 
Source - Texas 272100.2* 59443.0 134440.1 -76269.0 
  (0.047) (0.689) (0.340) (0.606) 
Constant 1439255.2*** 1633212.7*** 968705.6*** 1449432.3*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 125 145 98 115 
Adjusted R-squared 0.129 0.125 0.293 0.134 
Table 15: Impact of Normative Factors on CT Value 
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CT Value CT Value CT Value CT Value 
 
Revenue Cost Revenue Cost 
 
Full Full Usable Usable 
Uncertainty - Factor -40748.9 -3880.9 -19591.6 24679.1 
  (0.092) (0.895) (0.491) (0.487) 
Control - For Profit -287278.3* -290627.0* -325132.7** -295635.2* 
  (0.016) (0.013) (0.005) (0.015) 
Control - Government -67866.0 -76981.9 -22035.3 -24151.7 
  (0.568) (0.522) (0.871) (0.855) 
Respondent - Key DM is Admin 42669.1 48516.1 -70237.2 -71712.4 
  (0.653) (0.614) (0.444) (0.443) 
Respondent - Key DM 71933.4 68449.2 125355.4 122907.8 
  (0.345) (0.369) (0.089) (0.092) 
Respondent - MD/DO -266558.3* -226764.1* -254655.8 -206020.8 
  (0.018) (0.050) (0.069) (0.157) 
Respondent - Tenure -5266.1 -5026.2 -2143.5 -2194.4 
  (0.185) (0.208) (0.567) (0.546) 
Hospital - System Member? -95086.2 -88857.1 19747.2 34390.3 
  (0.262) (0.299) (0.846) (0.728) 
Hospital - Network Member? 12487.5 16403.4 -39374.8 -49276.9 
  (0.879) (0.842) (0.689) (0.616) 
Purchased (Current CT) -96257.1 -89754.8 27067.9 21996.2 
  (0.466) (0.510) (0.850) (0.880) 
Current CT is a New Brand 209917.2* 196117.9 92897.7 79421.7 
  (0.049) (0.072) (0.427) (0.511) 
Current CT is Same Brand as Prior MVCT 1329.7 -479.8 -114135.4 -115375.7 
  (0.988) (0.996) (0.298) (0.302) 
Experienced - Total Brands -913.2 -1089.8 37130.9 34073.2 
  (0.980) (0.977) (0.319) (0.357) 
Years Elapsed Since MVCT Acquired -74125.5** -73883.9** -55879.9 -50931.8 
  (0.007) (0.009) (0.101) (0.125) 
LIBOR (Current CT) -19843.6 -17565.2 -49263.4 -49359.8 
  (0.456) (0.516) (0.128) (0.124) 
Hospital - Catholic Church Operated? 31591.8 33261.9 -15477.4 12898.0 
  (0.766) (0.758) (0.883) (0.904) 
Hospital - Critical Access Hospital -716010.4*** -711428.9*** -673554.0*** -672448.5*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Source - ACHE 13580.2 14977.9 43508.6 36732.8 
  (0.905) (0.895) (0.760) (0.794) 
Source - Other 93358.0 72865.8 43814.6 1580.6 
  (0.406) (0.537) (0.737) (0.991) 
Source - Texas 110006.4 118263.5 -19842.5 -32388.2 
  (0.411) (0.367) (0.884) (0.816) 
Constant 1735529.3*** 1598425.3*** 1618298.8*** 1474276.0*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 163 163 127 127 
Adjusted R-squared 0.201 0.190 0.172 0.172 
Table 16: Impact of Reported Financial Uncertainty on CT Value 
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CT Value CT Value CT Value CT Value 
 
Physician Pref. Cons. Pref. Care Research 
 
Full Full Full Full 
Uncertainty - Factor -95872.8*** -78054.6** -99848.9*** -20283.3 
  (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.301) 
Control - For Profit -328750.3** -353876.8** -331587.0** -264455.2* 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.030) 
Control - Government -123490.9 -126686.5 -126714.6 -64675.8 
  (0.290) (0.262) (0.287) (0.628) 
Respondent - Key DM is Admin 83850.4 53402.4 60199.3 56005.8 
  (0.379) (0.574) (0.519) (0.563) 
Respondent - Key DM 62885.2 84633.2 73735.7 66584.3 
  (0.395) (0.262) (0.326) (0.412) 
Respondent - MD/DO -253218.7* -272589.6** -251400.4* -223278.2* 
  (0.017) (0.009) (0.019) (0.041) 
Respondent - Tenure -7670.5* -5986.6 -7139.9 -5273.1 
  (0.047) (0.124) (0.080) (0.191) 
Hospital - System Member? -58937.9 -68682.3 -71602.6 -89964.1 
  (0.482) (0.414) (0.373) (0.289) 
Hospital - Network Member? -21324.1 16267.5 9611.1 17388.5 
  (0.801) (0.846) (0.904) (0.841) 
Purchased (Current CT) -79131.1 -78394.2 -80473.5 -108009.2 
  (0.538) (0.536) (0.525) (0.446) 
Current CT is a New Brand 176156.6 197938.4 214138.3* 223145.7 
  (0.088) (0.074) (0.040) (0.050) 
Current CT is Same Brand as Prior MVCT -16890.5 -41103.2 -6102.4 6612.8 
  (0.842) (0.638) (0.941) (0.942) 
Experienced - Total Brands 4971.4 499.8 1976.4 -871.2 
  (0.892) (0.989) (0.957) (0.983) 
Years Elapsed Since MVCT Acquired -75735.4** -74288.0** -74559.3** -74771.7** 
  (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) 
LIBOR (Current CT) -10653.8 -23977.8 -13881.6 -13112.6 
  (0.678) (0.388) (0.575) (0.644) 
Hospital - Catholic Church Operated? 7666.8 -35939.0 -1147.1 49149.4 
  (0.937) (0.726) (0.990) (0.648) 
Hospital - Critical Access Hospital -664599.2*** -673505.7*** -614053.7*** -715082.5*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Source - ACHE -4029.5 9421.6 -4245.1 19805.7 
  (0.972) (0.934) (0.970) (0.871) 
Source - Other 105322.3 97072.1 117262.0 84619.4 
  (0.323) (0.358) (0.277) (0.466) 
Source - Texas 86253.3 85126.2 121812.3 135894.7 
  (0.517) (0.522) (0.334) (0.303) 
Constant 1813847.9*** 1866735.6*** 1802745.2*** 1663559.9*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 163 161 163 155 
Adjusted R-squared 0.242 0.234 0.246 0.185 
Table 17: Impact of Reported Non-Financial Uncertainty on CT Value, Full Sample 
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CT Value CT Value CT Value CT Value 
 
Physician Pref. Cons. Pref. Care Research 
 
Usable Usable Usable Usable 
Uncertainty - Factor -84635.1** -62869.6* -87545.3* 8576.7 
  (0.008) (0.025) (0.014) (0.686) 
Control - For Profit -347077.4** -364657.6** -362598.3** -313106.2* 
  (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.011) 
Control - Government -64108.2 -46056.6 -69551.4 34352.4 
  (0.630) (0.726) (0.608) (0.818) 
Respondent - Key DM is Admin -35106.8 -68225.2 -58766.6 -77371.9 
  (0.707) (0.445) (0.522) (0.417) 
Respondent - Key DM 105435.3 122480.6 125901.1 99928.5 
  (0.153) (0.100) (0.092) (0.209) 
Respondent - MD/DO -268952.9* -285235.7* -269920.6* -222216.1 
  (0.040) (0.029) (0.042) (0.091) 
Respondent - Tenure -4143.1 -2682.4 -3579.6 -2012.5 
  (0.266) (0.463) (0.397) (0.599) 
Hospital - System Member? 45009.3 49620.4 23659.3 52638.7 
  (0.645) (0.610) (0.806) (0.564) 
Hospital - Network Member? -59492.4 -38295.3 -21236.4 -32592.2 
  (0.545) (0.698) (0.828) (0.759) 
Purchased (Current CT) 25502.7 39741.2 33259.9 67489.8 
  (0.854) (0.775) (0.808) (0.626) 
Current CT is a New Brand 91809.0 100810.0 125481.1 124240.2 
  (0.422) (0.418) (0.295) (0.330) 
Current CT is Same Brand as Prior MVCT -110700.3 -137153.8 -105161.2 -102986.5 
  (0.303) (0.222) (0.324) (0.380) 
Experienced - Total Brands 36195.5 32109.2 34935.2 41434.2 
  (0.338) (0.382) (0.356) (0.327) 
Years Elapsed Since MVCT Acquired -53246.1 -52918.1 -58315.1 -53654.7 
  (0.089) (0.134) (0.073) (0.126) 
LIBOR (Current CT) -45058.2 -54654.6 -47535.1 -49281.7 
  (0.135) (0.114) (0.114) (0.163) 
Hospital - Catholic Church Operated? -45087.4 -69242.1 -72217.8 2284.8 
  (0.667) (0.504) (0.505) (0.983) 
Hospital - Critical Access Hospital -627863.4*** -625373.0*** -587079.2*** -661643.9*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Source - ACHE 40891.0 49685.7 48424.3 31519.2 
  (0.770) (0.723) (0.734) (0.828) 
Source - Other 67848.1 54949.5 88388.0 9463.8 
  (0.595) (0.666) (0.508) (0.941) 
Source - Texas -28863.9 -48367.9 11452.7 -32082.6 
  (0.828) (0.725) (0.931) (0.820) 
Constant 1750084.9*** 1772200.2*** 1744622.6*** 1435887.1*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 127 125 127 119 
Adjusted R-squared 0.211 0.204 0.212 0.151 
Table 18: Impact of Reported Non-Financial Uncertainty on CT Value, Usable Responses Sample 
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CT Value CT Value CT Value CT Value 
 
Financial Customer D. Financial Customer D. 
 
Full Full Usable Usable 
Uncertainty - Factor -30934.9 -113067.6*** 731.3 -96002.7** 
  (0.277) (0.000) (0.983) (0.004) 
Control - For Profit -300518.1* -353266.1** -320247.6** -369460.8** 
  (0.010) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) 
Control - Government -74428.1 -140338.8 -20725.5 -68718.3 
  (0.533) (0.225) (0.878) (0.605) 
Respondent - Key DM is Admin 46239.8 70366.2 -68700.6 -52232.6 
  (0.627) (0.455) (0.455) (0.566) 
Respondent - Key DM 72597.1 75589.3 123700.7 115378.3 
  (0.339) (0.309) (0.093) (0.120) 
Respondent - MD/DO -253832.8* -271695.6* -229020.9 -290152.6* 
  (0.027) (0.010) (0.116) (0.027) 
Respondent - Tenure -5078.9 -7354.1 -1985.1 -3803.9 
  (0.201) (0.058) (0.590) (0.322) 
Hospital - System Member? -93417.2 -58821.4 29272.4 47648.9 
  (0.273) (0.475) (0.772) (0.625) 
Hospital - Network Member? 14312.1 2836.7 -44101.0 -33396.9 
  (0.862) (0.973) (0.656) (0.734) 
Purchased (Current CT) -88870.2 -75012.1 28793.3 38378.0 
  (0.505) (0.552) (0.841) (0.780) 
Current CT is a New Brand 202397.1 201852.1 89353.5 116001.3 
  (0.059) (0.059) (0.457) (0.339) 
Current CT is Same Brand as Prior MVCT -2918.9 -29877.4 -115195.2 -122548.6 
  (0.974) (0.720) (0.302) (0.255) 
Experienced - Total Brands 13.66 1988.8 35678.2 32304.8 
  (1.000) (0.956) (0.335) (0.390) 
Years Elapsed Since MVCT Acquired -74949.1** -75806.2** -55020.8 -54916.6 
  (0.008) (0.006) (0.108) (0.097) 
LIBOR (Current CT) -18797.8 -16161.9 -48581.1 -49992.3 
  (0.484) (0.534) (0.133) (0.118) 
Hospital - Catholic Church Operated? 24222.1 -26353.0 -9412.2 -79482.5 
  (0.822) (0.786) (0.930) (0.454) 
Hospital - Critical Access Hospital -712523.1*** -637277.7*** -674122.6*** -597636.4*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Source - ACHE 11332.3 -4425.1 36643.5 45106.1 
  (0.921) (0.969) (0.799) (0.748) 
Source - Other 89006.2 113199.6 23285.5 77207.6 
  (0.440) (0.281) (0.865) (0.549) 
Source - Texas 115435.0 87131.6 -24773.7 -31094.1 
  (0.383) (0.504) (0.857) (0.815) 
Constant 1697163.4*** 1896165.2*** 1547823.9*** 1813797.1*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 163 161 127 125 
Adjusted R-squared 0.194 0.254 0.169 0.220 
Table 19: Impact of Reported Factor Uncertainty on CT Value 
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Hypothesis 1: Uncertainty during the acquisition is influenced by measurable, non-psychological internal and external 
hospital characteristics. 
Hypothesis Dep. Variable Ind. Variable Expected Observed Significant? Support? 
1 Financial U. Payer Contracts - -/+ N/N N 
1 Financial U. PP&E at Cost - +/+ N/N N 
1 Financial U. Total FTEs - +/+ N/N N 
1 Financial U. Min. Life of CT + +/+ N/N N 
1 Financial U. Max. Life of CT + -/+ Y/N N 
  
      
Hypothesis 2: Uncertainty during the acquisition is negatively influenced by the disparity between the firm’s 
aspirations for the prior acquisition and the performance of that acquisition. 
Hypothesis Dep. Variable Ind. Variable Expected Observed Significant? Support? 
2 Financial U. Financial D. - -/- Y/Y Y 
2 Customer Des. U. Customer Des. D. - -/- Y/Y Y 
  
      
Hypothesis 3: Uncertainty during the acquisition is negatively influenced by the objectives the firm held for the 
acquisition. 
Hypothesis Dep. Variable Ind. Variable Expected Observed Significant? Support? 
3 Financial U. Financial D. - -/- Y/Y Y 
3 Customer Des. U. Customer Des. D. - -/- Y/Y Y 
  
      
Hypothesis 4: The present value of the acquisition is influenced by measurable, non-psychological internal and 
external hospital characteristics. 
Hypothesis Dep. Variable Ind. Variable Expected Observed Significant? Support? 
4 CT Val. (Payer) Payer Contracts + -/+ N/N N 
4 CT Val. (Payer) Min. Life of CT + +/+ N/Y Y 
4 CT Val. (Payer) Max. Life of CT + -/- N/N N 
4 CT Val. (Op. Costs) PP&E at Cost + +/+ N/N N 
4 CT Val. (Op. Costs) Total FTEs + +/+ N/N N 
4 CT Val. (Op. Costs) Min. Life of CT + -/+ N/N N 
4 CT Val. (Op. Costs) Max. Life of CT + -/- N/N N 
  
      
Hypothesis 5: The present value of the acquisition is influenced by the acquirer’s perceived uncertainty about the 
acquisition before it takes place. 
Hypothesis Dep. Variable Ind. Variable Expected Observed Significant? Support? 
5 CT Val. (Revenue) Revenue Uncertainty - -/- N/N N 
5 CT Val. (Cost) Cost Uncertainty + -/+ N/N N 
Table 20: Summary of Findings 
 
When interpreting this table, note that the observed signs and significance levels are 
reported in the format (full dataset / most usable responses dataset). If either of the 
datasets yields a significant relationship with the proper sign, support is said to be found. 
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A.2: Supplemental Tables 
Variable ACHE Other RSNA Texas 
Control - For Profit 0.030303 0.1153846 0.0487805 0.212766 
Respondent - Key DM is Admin 0.8923077 0.64 0.6790123 0.6595745 
Hospital - System Member? 0.4393939 0.5384615 0.597561 0.7446809 
Hospital - Critical Access Hospital 0.1076923 0.12 0 0 
Uncertainty - Financial 2.414063 2.92 3.08642 3.106383 
Objective Strength - Financial 5.719697 6.134615 5.097561 5.06383 
Hospital - Total Facility Expenses 2.28E+08 2.17E+08 4.81E+08 5.63E+08 
Hospital - Total FTEs 1748.215 1802.2 3305.696 3618.744 
Uncertainty - Revenue 2.296875 2.84 3.024691 2.93617 
Uncertainty - Cost 2.53125 3 3.148148 3.276596 
Table 21: Comparison of Sample Means for Samples with Significantly Different Means 
Economic - Full 
# HMO 
Contracts 
# PPO 
Contracts 
PP&E at 
Cost Total FTEs 
# HMO Contracts 1       
# PPO Contracts 0.64*** 1     
PP&E at Cost 0.060 -0.020 1   
Tot. FTEs 0.046 0.11 0.088 1 
Payer Contracts 0.88*** 0.93*** 0.018 0.080 
Table 22: Economic Variables Correlation Table - Full Dataset 
Economic - Usable 
Responses 
# HMO 
Contracts 
# PPO 
Contracts 
PP&E at 
Cost Total FTEs 
# HMO Contracts 1       
# PPO Contracts 0.37*** 1     
PP&E at Cost -0.11 -0.076 1   
Tot. FTEs 0.18* 0.11 0.090 1 
Payer Contracts 0.56*** 0.98*** -0.091 0.12 
Table 23: Economic Variables Correlation Table - Usable Responses Dataset 
Disparity - Full Revenue Costs 
Physician 
Preferences 
Consumer 
Preferences Care Research 
Customer 
Desires 
Revenue 1             
Costs 0.71*** 1           
Physician Preferences 0.51*** 0.48*** 1         
Consumer Preferences 0.49*** 0.40*** 0.66*** 1       
Care 0.54*** 0.52*** 0.75*** 0.55*** 1     
Research 0.21** 0.22*** 0.33*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 1   
Customer Desires 0.58*** 0.53*** 0.92*** 0.84*** 0.87*** 0.36*** 1 
Financial 0.92*** 0.92*** 0.53*** 0.49*** 0.57*** 0.23*** 0.60*** 
Table 24: Disparity Variables Correlation Table - Full Dataset 
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Disparity - Usable 
Responses Revenue Costs 
Physician 
Preferences 
Consumer 
Preferences Care Research 
Customer 
Desires 
Revenue 1             
Costs 0.75*** 1           
Physician Pref 0.57*** 0.49*** 1         
Consumer Pref 0.52*** 0.39*** 0.66*** 1       
Care 0.59*** 0.54*** 0.74*** 0.51*** 1     
Research 0.20** 0.22** 0.31*** 0.25*** 0.26*** 1   
Customer Desires 0.64*** 0.54*** 0.92*** 0.84*** 0.86*** 0.32*** 1 
Financial 0.94*** 0.93*** 0.57*** 0.48*** 0.60*** 0.23** 0.63*** 
Table 25: Disparity Variables Correlation Table – Usable Responses Dataset 
Objective Strength - 
Full Revenue Costs 
Physician 
Preferences 
Consumer 
Preferences Care Research 
Customer 
Desires 
Revenue 1             
Costs 0.59*** 1           
Physician Pref 0.1 0.17** 1         
Consumer Pref 0.38*** 0.25*** 0.51*** 1       
Care 0.22** 0.24*** 0.52*** 0.44*** 1     
Research -0.0055 0.058 0.19** 0.15* 0.13* 1   
Customer Desires 0.31*** 0.28*** 0.82*** 0.85*** 0.75*** 0.20** 1 
Financial 0.89*** 0.89*** 0.16* 0.36*** 0.26*** 0.029 0.33*** 
Table 26: Objective Strength Variables Correlation Table - Full Dataset 
Objective Strength - 
Usable Responses Revenue Costs 
Physician 
Preferences 
Consumer 
Preferences Care Research 
Customer 
Desires 
Revenue 1             
Costs 0.64*** 1           
Physician Pref 0.1 0.16* 1         
Consumer Pref 0.38*** 0.24** 0.52*** 1       
Care 0.26*** 0.23** 0.55*** 0.45*** 1     
Research 0.053 0.079 0.22** 0.15* 0.15* 1   
Customer Desires 0.32*** 0.26*** 0.82*** 0.86*** 0.76*** 0.21** 1 
Financial 0.90*** 0.91*** 0.14 0.34*** 0.27*** 0.073 0.32*** 
Table 27: Objective Strength Variables Correlation Table - Usable Responses Dataset 
Uncertainty - Full Revenue Costs 
Physician 
Preferences 
Consumer 
Preferences Care Research 
Customer 
Desires 
Revenue 1             
Cost 0.64*** 1           
Physician Pref. 0.38*** 0.37*** 1         
Consumer Pref. 0.44*** 0.37*** 0.68*** 1       
Care 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.79*** 0.63*** 1     
Research 0.047 0.097 0.21** 0.18** 0.21** 1   
Customer Desires 0.48*** 0.45*** 0.92*** 0.87*** 0.89*** 0.23** 1 
Financial 0.91*** 0.90*** 0.42*** 0.45*** 0.51*** 0.078 0.51*** 
Table 28: Uncertainty Variables Correlation Table - Full Dataset 
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Uncertainty - Usable 
Responses Revenue Costs 
Physician 
Preferences 
Consumer 
Preferences Care Research 
Customer 
Desires 
Revenue 1             
Cost 0.70*** 1           
Physician Pref. 0.40*** 0.35*** 1         
Consumer Pref. 0.46*** 0.36*** 0.69*** 1       
Care 0.47*** 0.46*** 0.78*** 0.63*** 1     
Research 0.042 0.16* 0.20* 0.18* 0.21** 1   
Customer Desires 0.50*** 0.43*** 0.92*** 0.88*** 0.89*** 0.22** 1 
Financial 0.92*** 0.92*** 0.41*** 0.45*** 0.51*** 0.11 0.51*** 
Table 29: Uncertainty Variables Correlation Table - Usable Responses Dataset 
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 Uncertainty 
Perf-Asp. Revenue Costs 
Physician 
Pref 
Consumer 
Pref Care Research 
-3 3*** 1.939*** 1.278* 1.203** 1.233 2.709*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.004) (0.080) (0.000) 
-2 0.143 -0.228 0.096 -0.145 0.385 1.363** 
  (0.773) (0.554) (0.819) (0.731) (0.347) (0.002) 
-1 0.273 0.00152 -0.482 0.0364 -0.0583 1.142* 
  (0.507) (0.996) (0.129) (0.908) (0.871) (0.013) 
1 -0.103 -0.664** -0.151 -0.178 0.00667 -0.665 
  (0.667) (0.006) (0.573) (0.498) (0.980) (0.139) 
2 -0.633* -1.086*** -0.660* -0.864** -0.368 -1.054* 
  (0.014) (0.000) (0.015) (0.001) (0.177) (0.028) 
3 -1.212*** -1.321*** -1.186*** -1.254*** -0.974*** -2.030*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -1.000*** -0.439* -1.278*** -1.036*** -1.567*** -0.613* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 217 217 217 215 217 209 
Adjusted R-squared 0.278 0.213 0.138 0.160 0.122 0.527 
Table 30: Performance-Aspiration Disparity vs. Uncertainty, Full Sample 
 Uncertainty 
Perf-Asp. Revenue Costs 
Physician 
Pref 
Consumer 
Pref Care Research 
-3 3.779*** 2.922*** 1.069 1.363** 1.167 2.784*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.067) (0.003) (0.163) (0.000) 
-2 0.0286 0.588 0.436 -0.337 0.333 1.575*** 
  (0.955) (0.222) (0.419) (0.492) (0.458) (0.001) 
-1 0.154 0.0498 -0.631 0.0575 -0.0606 1.601** 
  (0.735) (0.895) (0.076) (0.870) (0.885) (0.003) 
1 -0.0106 -0.512* -0.197 -0.0534 0.178 -0.522 
  (0.967) (0.048) (0.501) (0.852) (0.553) (0.295) 
2 -0.646* -1.025*** -0.833** -0.804** -0.306 -1.308* 
  (0.017) (0.000) (0.006) (0.009) (0.320) (0.020) 
3 -1.205*** -1.151*** -1.155*** -1.277*** -0.922** -1.974*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Constant -1.029*** -0.588** -1.269*** -1.163*** -1.667*** -0.692* 
  (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) 
Observations 174 174 174 172 174 166 
Adjusted R-squared 0.297 0.231 0.136 0.173 0.128 0.544 
Table 31: Performance-Aspiration Disparity vs. Uncertainty, Usable Responses 
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CT Value CT Value CT Value CT Value 
 
Financial Customer D. Financial Customer D. 
 
Full Full Usable Usable 
Disparity - Factor 39384.5 72423.0** 763.7 53085.9 
  (0.089) (0.004) (0.978) (0.075) 
Control - For Profit -247360.5* -240908.0* -315479.9** -268989.3* 
  (0.030) (0.021) (0.009) (0.014) 
Control - Government -75559.3 -106525.7 -21384.7 -47547.8 
  (0.516) (0.352) (0.874) (0.722) 
Respondent - Key DM is Admin 36060.2 59046.2 -67746.5 -29786.5 
  (0.705) (0.548) (0.463) (0.757) 
Respondent - Key DM 61251.4 63715.6 123106.0 115557.5 
  (0.409) (0.384) (0.092) (0.112) 
Respondent - MD/DO -248441.8* -258709.7* -229647.9 -253299.0 
  (0.022) (0.014) (0.092) (0.055) 
Respondent - Tenure -4363.1 -5813.9 -1962.2 -2917.2 
  (0.266) (0.133) (0.589) (0.436) 
Hospital - System Member? -85630.8 -87459.1 28198.5 8581.3 
  (0.320) (0.277) (0.786) (0.930) 
Hospital - Network Member? 21648.2 32484.3 -45028.0 -36630.8 
  (0.791) (0.683) (0.642) (0.700) 
Purchased (Current CT) -93115.3 -78977.3 29158.7 17361.3 
  (0.489) (0.553) (0.839) (0.903) 
Current CT is a New Brand 214338.7* 241612.9* 91240.7 149824.3 
  (0.046) (0.024) (0.442) (0.241) 
Current CT is Same Brand as Prior MVCT 7617.8 22267.8 -113982.4 -79287.7 
  (0.929) (0.790) (0.309) (0.482) 
Experienced - Total Brands 3594.0 7577.9 36694.0 38466.1 
  (0.922) (0.834) (0.314) (0.307) 
Years Elapsed Since MVCT Acquired -76489.1** -76308.6** -55126.4 -61911.5 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.103) (0.068) 
LIBOR (Current CT) -14674.6 -11223.5 -48095.5 -37807.4 
  (0.587) (0.669) (0.138) (0.229) 
Hospital - Catholic Church Operated? -3151.1 -24132.7 -10276.2 -33294.0 
  (0.977) (0.819) (0.921) (0.757) 
Hospital - Critical Access Hospital -704249.2*** -711609.5*** -675715.9*** -711289.8*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Source - ACHE 36470.8 69273.0 39810.5 92581.3 
  (0.745) (0.534) (0.786) (0.530) 
Source - Other 16898.6 10873.1 23325.3 32834.3 
  (0.885) (0.920) (0.853) (0.790) 
Source - Texas 104489.8 123013.4 -25716.1 -1275.3 
  (0.416) (0.311) (0.848) (0.992) 
Constant 1388369.7*** 1178034.6*** 1541364.3*** 1225759.5*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 167 167 129 129 
Adjusted R-squared 0.198 0.227 0.172 0.193 
Table 32: The Influence of Performance-Aspiration Disparity on CT Value  
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A.3: Instrument
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Boxes for dependent variables are black, control variables are dark gray, and independent 
variables are light gray. White boxes are for variables not included in the models. 
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